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Abstract 
 
Pension Fund Evictions: Lessons for Housing and Labor 
 
by 
 
Marnie Brady 
 
Advisor: Frances Fox Piven 
 
In this dissertation I analyze an institutional investor portfolio of over-leveraged 
multifamily rental housing in East Palo Alto, California to demonstrate how changing 
forms of landlordism produce both new and familiar targets for tenants organizing against 
displacement and for housing security. Venture capital investors in the first decade of the 
2000s exploited the Silicon Valley regional conditions of racial exclusion, uneven 
development, and weakened municipal rent control. I introduce the legacy of Black 
political organization in East Palo Alto as a way of contextualizing the tenants’ and the 
city leaders’ response to the monopoly investment purchase. The structure of this rental 
portfolio demonstrates the multiple actors involved in such large-scale residential 
investments, including institutional state pension funds, high-net worth individuals, local 
and international lenders, money managers, and the Security and Exchange Commission. 
The case study analysis considers how tenants, advocates, and a local union representing 
shareholders in the country’s largest pension, the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS), mobilized city and state officials to exert influence over 
these targets, focusing on the institutional investor in particular, albeit with limited 
success.  
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This case finds that venture capital investors backed by public pension funds 
exacerbated the escalating renter crisis in East Palo Alto, and elsewhere. I suggest that the 
findings from this case study, particularly those detailing the points of leverage available 
to tenants to target public pension funds, as well as the power of cities, bear lessons for 
tenants organizing in other large-scale multifamily rental portfolios and bundled scattered 
site single-family real estate owned (REO) foreclosure-to-rental portfolios. The analysis 
concludes by drawing from principles of housing security and offering what a coalitional, 
labor/community, racial justice politics for “the right to the city” might entail when 
taking into account changing conditions of investor landlordism.
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Pension Fund Evictions: The Case of East Palo Alto 
 
A casual observer might regard as par for the course that in 2009, in the midst of a 
chaotic housing market collapse, Page Mill, a venture capital-backed firm registered in 
Delaware, lost a $270 million dollar real estate portfolio to foreclosure. That year, 2.8 
million U.S. properties went into foreclosure (Blomquist, 2010). The U.S. real gross 
domestic product (GDP) contracted by more than 6 percent and more than 750,000 jobs 
were lost each month (Executive Office of the President Council of Economic Advisors, 
2010: 25).  Page Mill, like many “opportunistic” investment funds, had placed its bets on 
a U.S. housing market that would continue to boom, if even for a few more years. 
Underpinning the Page Mill earlier prospects were pension fund managers increasingly 
willing to take greater risk and, relatedly, bankers amenable to skewed debt ratios feeding 
into the ever-ravenous securitization markets. At first glance, it might appear that Page 
Mill’s partners simply made and lost the gamble in overestimating the market’s arc or in 
timing its foreseeable collapse.  
A closer look at the case of this particular loss, however, reveals that the Page 
Mill gamble also rested on a widely held assumption regarding the political scaffolding 
of the neoliberal economy: the dominance of corporate political power over and through 
city governance.1 Page Mill executives premised their investment on plans to railroad the 
																																																								
1 The reference to governance here and throughout employs the definition offered by Ekers, Hamel and 
Keil (2012): “the varying institutions, practices, discourses, ideologies, and representations that affect how 
different spaces are produced, contested, and experienced” (24). This definition attends to the private-
public dimensions of rule, and differs for its very broad definition that includes private enterprise. This is 
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small city government of East Palo Alto, California and dislodge thousands of people, 
mostly Black and Latino, from their homes. They calculated they would be able to 
undermine the city’s rent control law through existing loopholes, in addition to strategic 
lawsuits. Page Mill presumed, ostensibly, that the City of East Palo Alto would have 
neither the capacity nor political will to effectively defend and enforce its own rental 
regulation ordinance. 
Through an analysis of the City of East Palo Alto’s response to the Page Mill 
investment, this dissertation exposes how land and housing speculation entails a gamble 
not only on the global market, as if a reified entity, but also over the municipal urban city 
government as a mediating actor, complicit ally, target, or oppositional force in real estate 
speculation. The City of East Palo Alto ultimately strengthened its rent control policies 
and enforcement, passing a new ordinance in direct retort to Page Mill’s slew of costly 
lawsuits meant to weaken city control over its regulation of rental housing.  
The Page Mill portfolio also sheds light on another state-based actor commonly 
involved in the private equity and private real estate fund corporate model: institutional 
public-sector pension funds as limited partners. In this case the East Palo Alto speculative 
venture was financed indirectly by the state through California’s public worker pension 
funds. Notably, several tenant leaders, city officials, and pertinent judges reviewing Page 
Mill lawsuits against the City of East Palo Alto were contributors to the very same 
pension fund invested in this specific Page Mill gamble. These complexities challenged 
tenants to consider their housing security through the organization of economy and state 
																																																								
distinct from Hall’s useful definition of government: the machinery of the state (McLennan, Held, & Hall, 
1984). 
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at multiple and embedded scales within and beyond the micro politics of individual 
grievances or building-based landlordism.  
As this study details, tenants pursued the California Public Employees Retirement 
System (CalPERS) based on the tenants’ expanded power analysis of housing finance. 
California advocates also exploited public information provisions regarding state 
managed funds to win the release of more than two thousand pages of otherwise 
proprietary documents pertinent to the Page Mill investment portfolio. Tenants’ and the 
City of East Palo Alto’s efforts ultimately led to CalPERS ceasing any renewed 
commitment to Page Mill, a contributing factor that pushed Page Mill into foreclosure, 
and resulted in a $100 million loss for CalPERS.  
This dissertation considers challenges and lessons for political actors who assert 
their right to the city. The case study provides an example of the uneven practice of the 
right to the city amidst the politics of increasing housing financialization and state signals 
of retreat from rent protection. The analysis pays particular attention to the City of East 
Palo Alto’s response to Page Mill through the city’s and tenants’ efforts to engage 
CalPERS. In so doing, the case highlights how capital stakeholders may be made 
vulnerable to tenant demands of the state, beginning at the leverage held by urban 
claimants at the scale of the city and reaching to the regional and state political spheres.  
The tenants’ efforts also led to initiatives by organized labor to scrutinize their 
members’ pension investment options in CalPERS. Service Employees International 
Union (SEIU) Local 521, a union that includes public service workers in California’s 
Central Valley, worked in concert with tenant advocates in opposition to CalPERS’ 
investment in the Page Mill monopoly holding in East Palo Alto. The union subsequently 
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worked together with tenants to spearhead a state legislative initiative to prevent 
California public pension investment in “predatory” real estate. The local also created a 
pension advisory committee to strengthen the union’s capacity to influence CalPERS 
investments.  
 The “predatory” investment model called for creating short-term returns on what 
for nearly half a century had required long term investment. Beginning in the early 2000s, 
multiple rent-regulated residential portfolios were packaged as opportunistic investments 
to high net worth individuals and pension fund institutional investors. An exemplary case, 
the 2005 sale of NYC’s Stuyvesant Town Peter Cooper offers a similar case in-point: 
CalPERS lost $500 million and CALSTERS, the California State Teachers Retirement 
System, lost $100 million in that deal. CalPERS also invested in overleveraged rent 
regulated multifamily complexes, Riverton Houses in Harlem and Parkmerced in San 
Francisco. In New York City, the New York City Employees Retirement System 
(NYCERS) and the New York State and Local Retirement System (NYSLRS) 
additionally invested $85.9 million and $72.3 million, respectively, in predatory equity 
purchases of five former publicly subsidized Mitchell Lama buildings (Pincus, 2007). In 
fact, this dissertation research began in New York City before the study of the Page Mill 
portfolio came into focus.   
 The dissertation raises the following questions pertinent to these various portfolio 
examples, but which will be discussed through the specific details of the Page Mill 
portfolio case study: 
 
1. What is the relationship between the racialized valorization of land and housing 
 
5	
and institutional investors’ risks and returns? 
 
2. Under what conditions did opportunistic corporate landlordism become financed 
by workers’ capital and the state? 
 
3. What are the political vulnerabilities of the investment portfolio structure that 
allowed renters to pry open ‘actually existing’ spaces of political leverage and 
opposition? 
 
 Before presenting the dissertation framework and chapter sequence, the following 
section explains how I arrived at the case of Page Mill in East Palo Alto, California. My 
dissertation focus emerged following an exploration of the right to the city efforts and a 
view of ‘predatory equity’ in New York City. 
 
Research Background: Beginning at Home  
 
This dissertation first began with an inquiry into the theory and practice of “right 
to the city,” specifically the work of the U.S. anti-gentrification organizing alliance that 
consciously borrows its very name from the work of the French social theorist Henri 
Lefebvre, le droit a la ville  (1996[1968]). I spent a year working as co-principal 
investigator with Tony Samara, at that time Associate Professor at George Mason 
University, conducting more than twenty interviews with U.S. Right to the City Alliance2 																																																								
2 The translocal U.S. network of membership-based organizing groups that formed in 2007 in response to 
gentrification and public housing demolition (See Samara, 2007). 
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member organizers around questions of gentrification, criminalization/ incarceration, and 
urban strategy in New York, New Orleans, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. At the 
same time I was deeply involved in the questions of right to the city at home.  
When I embarked on my dissertation research, I was living in a rent-regulated 
building slated for sale in Brooklyn, New York’s Bedford Stuyvesant neighborhood. For 
my majority Black, community-minded, and active neighbors, the right to the city as a 
right to inhabit and participate in the city and shape central city life, was not a given but a 
demand, negotiation, and persistent struggle. In the year that led up to my building’s 
eventual sale, speculators called on renters who were primarily seniors and harassed them 
to take moving money or face their threats of building disrepair and eventual eviction, 
which meant very possibly the loss of long-sustained kinships, and even destitution. The 
agents dialing my neighbors represented prospective owners, not actual purchasers. The 
brokers were testing the tenants’ responses. So did the broker who arrived with a fake 
deed at one senior’s door saying he was the new owner and would she please let him into 
her apartment. My neighbor laughed in his face. Deed or no deed, she knew her rights 
and would not allow him in to size up her home.3 
When the building did finally change hands, obtaining the name of the new owner 
was a challenge. We wanted the name of the persons behind the limited liability 
corporation who were responsible for sabotaging the boiler, cutting off the hot water, and 
refusing to accept senior tenants’ rent. Eventually, we learned who was responsible when 
seniors in the building successfully sued the management company for harassment and 
																																																								
 
3 A phone call to the management company that day confirmed there had not been a change in ownership, 
and that the present owner had not appeared at the building. 
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deferred maintenance. The “owner” was a fund of investors who had purchased the 
building for a price incongruent with the rent-rolls at the time. We later learned the profit 
model relied on tenant vacancy to subdivide family-sized apartments into single studios. 
After interviewing housing organizers in Queens, New York, with a similar story 
of what tenants were facing there, I decided to shift my research focus to investigating the 
structure of speculation in what seemed to be a new rise of investor landlords. Unlike my 
small building, however, in the Queens’ Vantage Realty example, the stakes were at a 
mammoth scale of multiple rent- regulated buildings of thousands of units each bundled 
into over-leveraged4 portfolios involving tens of thousands of residents at risk of 
displacement. Vantage was a defining example of “predatory equity.” 
“Predatory equity,” as housing advocates call it, refers to the marketization of rent 
regulated housing through large pools of investment capital in overleveraged buildings 
slated for debt exchange, securitization, and further investment. In the four years 
preceding the 2007-2008 housing crash, predatory equity firms had purchased with 
extraordinary sums of investment capital at least 100,000 rent-regulated units in New 
York City alone, all positioned to force existing tenants to vacate their units in order to 
raise rents through every means possible (Morgenson, 2008). Financing for these 
purchases were based on the premise that the rent regulated units would be quickly 
																																																								
4 “Leverage,” a widely used concept that emerges describes all kinds of social, political and economic 
relations, refers to using limited resources (in the case of real estate, borrowed capital) to maximize returns. 
Over-leveraged is a relative term and refers to debt burden. The New York City Housing Preservation and 
Development department began tracking over-leveraged NYC multifamily buildings in 2009 using the 
criteria of debt load greater than seven times a property’s rent roll (Pincus, 2009). See Chapter 5 herein for 
a discussion of this case’s measures of debt burden.   
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vacated and converted to generate market rate rental income. In other words, the current 
tenants would be pushed out. 
Early on in my preliminary research on the role of pensions in these portfolios, I 
was moved by an interview with a NYC public school teacher ready to retire, but with no 
place in NYC to live in sight. Like any good teacher, she made every minute of her time 
with me count. We met in Manhattan’s P.S. 3 library so I could interview her about the 
private equity-backed firm that had purchased her building through her pension’s 
investment in the City Investment Fund, a partner with investors Putnam LLC and Urban 
America. She cut to the up-shot, “My pension made my apartment unaffordable” 
(personal interview, June 19, 2012). In a confusing twist of obligation, the pension fund’s 
mandate to make profits for its contributor-investors would seek to evict some of the 
same investors and raise the rent for other NYC workers. Although this African-
American 30+ year public school teacher, the eldest member of P.S. 3’s faculty at the 
time, was finally nearing retirement herself, she spent much of her free time in tenant 
meetings and housing court.  
For teachers in New York City, this use of their pension was at once tragedy and 
farce that Marx could not have imagined. Years before this teacher’s career started in 
1975, the public school teachers’ pension had bailed out the city and saved New York 
from financial collapse. But 40 years later, there were few places the city had saved for 
the teachers to call home. Rent stabilized apartments, and those once regulated by the 
now-expired Mitchell Lama affordability program, were among the rental units that 
remained precariously “affordable.” For this city worker who had lived in the same 
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former Mitchell Lama apartment since 1987, rent was $2,400/month, half of what she 
calculated Urban America Management planned to collect at market rent.  
Indeed, millions of people in hundreds of thousands of families, including this 
teacher and my neighbors, had remained in NYC during its “worst of times” due in part 
to the opportunity of public sector employment available to people of color and state 
regulated housing. Many of these same households in turn created value in the city 
through their neighborhood activities and, in the case of this teacher, by educating NYC’s 
future generations. In tightening housing markets like New York City, or the Bay area, 
however, rent stabilization programs, including regulatory programs such as the New 
York’s Mitchell Lama program, eventually became a source for and target of speculation. 
In the example of investment by public pension funds in public sector workers’ housing, 
it seemed as if the city had not only become entrepreneurial, the city was now eating (and 
spitting out) its own.  
My original research design focused on a range of organizing responses to 
gentrification. After interviewing this teacher, and several more tenants in pension-
funded portfolios in downtown housing court, and in their homes uptown, in East New 
York, and on Roosevelt Island, I decided instead to investigate the structuring of 
speculation through the relationship of capital stakeholders and the state. I sought to 
understand the role of the state as a historical development in creating racial capital 
conditions of contemporary corporate landlordism, the role of the state in facilitating and 
financing real estate predation, and the points of leverage vis-a-vis the political power of 
the state, if any, for tenants to strategically invoke their right to the city. 
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At the time, in the years of the onset of the housing crisis, there were multiple 
lines of strategy debated among housing justice organizers. One line of discussion was 
around a strategic de-emphasis on the state. Some organizers from the national Right to 
the City Alliance called for focus on the community-control of housing as the strategic 
direction for organizing in the “new economy” and austerity politics. Leaders in Take 
Back the Land, another prominent direct-action group responding to the housing crisis, 
referred to this as the “third way” that provided an alternative to individual private access 
to home ownership or to the public provision, or state rent regulation of housing. A few 
housing justice organizers likewise referred to state-centered demands as a vestige of the 
“old economy,” or industrial and state managerial economy, one in which the poor are at 
the mercy of a pendulum of state supports. 
Notwithstanding the call for alternative control structures, this dissertation 
foregrounds questions of the state’s persistent role in both regulating affordability in the 
case of rent control, and in structuring and investing in opportunities for real estate 
speculation through the example of public pension funding of evictions. The study 
reminds us that in addition to the regulatory political decision making of state 
apparatuses, the state and workers’ contributions to public sector pensions make for 
capital investment opportunity. An effective housing justice movement both engages with 
the state and develops existing demonstration models of alternative control. These linked 
strategies that create lived spaces of democratic participation and amplify voices of 
possibility are the practice of the right to the city. 
 
Methods and Sources 
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This dissertation foregoes my initial focus on New York City as my research site 
and instead seized the opportunity to analyze the Page Mill portfolio in East Palo Alto, 
California. The shift and opportunity was one of data access. The First Amendment 
Coalition of California had obtained by court mandate the disclosure of thousands of 
pages of pension fund documents pertinent to this predatory real estate portfolio, the Page 
Mill fund. It was in my research of pension investment in NYC multifamily portfolios in 
2012 that I came across this significant transparency win, which was an outcome of the 
organizing of similarly situated tenants in California. The disclosure provides the public a 
rare opportunity to examine decisions of individuals within institutions whose investment 
strategies helped to shape the market conditions that led to the housing crisis.  
This exceptional disclosure included emails between the Page Mill investment 
partners, correspondence by tenants and the City of East Palo Alto to the investment 
partners, and the Page Mill prospectus, or placement plan, which according to Page Mill 
executives and investors, amounted to “trade-secrets.” The documentation offers a 
window into the drama of large-scale institutional speculative investment in low-income 
housing, including the lead-up to the Page Mill deal in the years prior to the completion 
of their East Palo Alto portfolio. Terse email exchanges portend the fall of Page Mill, 
which the internal Page Mill documents attribute to the tenants’ and the city’s disruptive 
and obstructive plans by Page Mill executives to attract additional premium investors.  
The focus of my analysis herein is the data obtained through the California 
Public Employees Retirement System mandated document release. The release allowed 
me to construct the ‘anatomy’ of the portfolio and the relationship of the fund to other 
capital stakeholders, the city, and the state. It was through this transparency that a fuller 
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understanding of the vulnerabilities of this portfolio could be made. The disclosure 
allowed for a study that analyzed the files held by the fund’s largest limited partner 
investor.  
In addition to the primary source of the CalPERS release, this case study includes 
a review of media coverage from 2004-2015 using the database Lexis Nexis, as well as 
San Mateo County court findings, San Mateo Local Agency Formation Committee 
reports, legislative hearing transcripts, CalPERS Investor Committee session transcripts 
through use of the California Public Records Act and Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), City of East Palo Alto Rent Stabilization and City Council meeting minutes, City 
of East Palo Alto planning records, U.S. Census decennial and American Community 
Survey data, Page Mill, Wachovia and Wells Fargo filings to the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, CalPERS public pension investment annual reports, review of 
tenant-led participatory action research, archival video interviews with city founders and 
activists, and my own participant-observation. City incorporation documents and early 
history sources were obtained during my visit to the archival collection at Stanford 
University.  
I also interviewed 23 subjects specific to the question of predatory equity 
including five public officials and city administrators and two private equity investment 
liaisons who provided background information of the industry. These interviews in East 
Palo Alto and New York City were supplemental to my primary source for this 
dissertation: the disclosure data. These interviews specific to predatory equity followed 
20 additional interviews with housing justice organizers in the U.S. on the broader 
question of renters’ rights and right to the city. 
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In my research I found no other case of public-pension investment in venture 
capital funds involved in rent regulated real estate with data access to this level of detail. 
In fact, venture capital funds, as I discuss in Chapter 5, are exempt from most public 
reporting and disclosure otherwise typical of publicly traded funds. As I detail in Chapter 
6, the particular arguments made by advocates for transparency in California 
demonstrated that the public good outweighed the need for confidentiality. Also, the 
CalPERS real estate asset class designation could not preclude a disclosure of the 
financial terms of the investment. Following an analysis of the disclosure data, the 
dissertation research brought me to East Palo Alto on four different research visits where 
I gained access to local document collections and conducted the bulk of my interviews. 
I also found the case study compelling because East Palo Alto was not New York 
City, the latter a city that Marcuse (1999) calls in his survey of U.S. housing movements, 
both “paradigmic and exceptional” (p. 71). Indeed, much of the U.S. journalistic, 
advocacy (Morgenson, 2008; Waters and Bach, 2008; Bindrim, 2008; Brescia, 2010) and 
subsequent scholarship (Fields, 2015; Fields and Uffer, 2016) on predatory equity in 
multifamily housing has focused largely on New York City cases, albeit the role of public 
pension funds investment in the NYC cases remains under-examined. The East Palo Alto 
case allows for an understanding of corporate landlordism at a very different site and 
scale: a sub/urban site and small municipality.  
The doubling of suburban poverty in the country’s 100 largest metropolitan 
regions between 2000-2010 (U.S. Census) suggests the rebounding effects of central city 
gentrification and Black and immigrant suburbanization contrary to the traditional 
sociological explanatory notions of ethnic succession. The police killing of Michael 
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Brown, a young Black man in Ferguson, MS, is one example among many others that has 
brought increased attention to the underlying conditions of the ex/sub/urban geography of 
race, poverty, and inequality.  The suburbanization of poverty places new demands on 
fragmented municipalities to contend with shifting regional inequity. Moreover, 
inequities of core versus periphery regions, and within hyper-capitalized regional nodes 
such as Silicon Valley, raise the question of the right to the city in areas of capital 
centrality outside the largest global cities. The case of East Palo Alto demonstrates the 
path dependent but altered contours of financial expropriation, capital investment and 
(re)development through the place-making of a small city in what has become a massive 
regional economy. 
 
Dissertation Framework  
 
This case study of a corporate landlord in East Palo Alto exposes what several 
critical scholars (see Chakravartty and Ferreira da Silva, 2012; Wyly, Moos, et. al 2009) 
and I call “the logic of racial risk” in real estate. This mode of calculative risk has 
involved both state abandonment and state intervention in shaping and enforcing the 
racial dimensions of labor, land, and housing valuation. Contrary to the tenets of the 
American Dream, or regional notions of California’s progressive liberalism, U.S. housing 
markets are not race neutral, a point demonstrated in a vast body of research and street 
level observation. Today’s politics of housing financialization must be understood 
through an examination of how housing became a hyper-speculative market tied to debt, 
one embedded in state sanctioned, racialized hierarchies of risk and obligation.  
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The harnessing of public pension funds by venture capital firms to intervene in 
state-regulated housing points to the common interests of labor and housing activists to 
organize together in strategic opposition to accelerated financialization. On the one hand, 
the confidence of investment firms and their ability to displace tenants by the thousands, 
including public pension contributors, reflects the increased centrality of finance power. 
On the other hand, overleveraged institutional investor purchases in areas with few 
typical indicators of gentrification suggest an example of neoliberalism in crisis, “its 
logic stretched beyond reason” (Dumenil and Lévy, 2011:126). If ever reasonable (as 
opposed to rational) in risk and intent, the speculative creation of portfolios from working 
class communities reflects a persistent settler modality of border-making and frontier-
prospecting. 
Gentrification, what I call the racial property regime5 of neoliberalism in the U.S., 
emerges from and furthers the racialized uneven production of space. The resultant 
fragmentation is of socio-political, material, and psychic consequence for Blacks and 
Latinos in particular. Labor’s interests in urban processes as investor, producer, and 
inhabitant, therefore, go well beyond an instrumentalist understanding of housing as a 
component of workers’ wages. Urban contestations in the area of housing and in the fight 
for the right to the city are part and parcel of labor’s decommodification. Whereas the 
‘central contradiction’ of capitalism is the simultaneous growth of capital and growth of 
inequality, this dissertation argues that the ‘central contradiction’ is not confined to a 
singular strategic relational location, such as the work site. Rather, the ‘central 
contradiction’ can be understood through the expansive relational dynamics of the city 																																																								
5 Property regimes, for the purposes herein, refer to the economic, social and political relations that connect 
people to the built environment and underlying land. 
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that acts at once as work site, material product, home, and future financial portfolio 
through which productive capital also flows. 
In this dissertation’s example of an over-leveraged, hyper-financialized portfolio 
comprised of what East Palo Altans called their homes, the renters and their city fought 
back. The dissertation maps the corporate structure of the portfolio, and provides a 
specific view of the points of vulnerability in the structuring of speculation. The lessons 
of this case demonstrate areas of strategic interest and alignment for labor and 
community. By extension, the ongoing renters’ crisis calls for collective, expansive, 
compassionful, radical imagination, and coalitional strategy for the right to the city as 
fundamental to the decommodification of personhood, labor, and home.   
 
Dissertation Structure 
 
 The dissertation is divided into three sections after the literature review, Control, 
Decontrol and Recontrol. These terms also refer to the stages of rent regulation, 
deregulation, and re-regulation based on occupancy and vacancy of rent-controlled units 
in California post the states anti-rent control Costa-Hawkins Act of 1995. In broad 
strokes, I borrow these terms as reflective of the processes of people-centered place-
making of East Palo Alto. 
 
Control: Early History & Making A City  
The case study begins with a depiction of the socio and political landscape of East 
Palo Alto through a broad historical accounting of the racialization processes that are 
constitutive of East Palo Alto’s development into cityhood. Chapter 3 demonstrates the 
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historical context to my claim that racial discourses and ideology tied to home, land, and 
security contribute to the impetus, consequences, and responses involved in calculations 
of urban land value. The historical overview section foregrounds how land and housing 
speculation, and the ongoing rental housing crisis, have been embedded in the social 
historical relationship of race and risk in the United States context.  
It is important to situate this case through the iteration of race, space, and place-
making to put into view the relationship of the East Palo Alto urban scale to regionally 
situated class and racial inequities. The fact that East Palo Alto had yet to follow in the 
footprint of Silicon Valley’s hyper-gentrification resulted from a particular regional 
history of race and housing that while reflecting the contours of national and state policy 
was site particular and contingent. This history includes the organized responses of East 
Palo Alto African-American and Latino residents to assert voice in San Mateo County 
and to practice community control within their claimed city.  
As East Palo Alto’s former mayor Carlos Romero and Rent Stabilization Board 
member William Webster are quick to point out, the city’s very founding in 1988 was 
based on a campaign by Black and Latino residents for rent-control. The City of East 
Palo Alto’s founding assumed a right to the city, and its rent control ordinance, initially 
considered to be one of the strongest in California, emphasized the related “right to stay 
put” (Hartman, 1984) in an increasingly prosperous economic region. 
 
Decontrol: Gambling on the City, Making a Portfolio out of East Palo Alto 
Since the 1970s, capital innovation across U.S. primary cities followed the 
contours of redlining to predatory lending, sweat equity to predatory equity and mass 
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devaluation by state disinvestment to revaluation and extraction for private enterprise, 
notably in this case of a “predatory equity” deal via labor’s own capital. Chapter 4 
presents the tenants’ experiences of Page Mill that catalyzed their mobilization. Tenants 
explain how the venture capital firm assessed and invested in Black and Latino renters’ 
communities in East Palo Alto. Their investment prospecting reflected a racialized 
rationale that framed gentrification as a contribution, rather than extractive liability, to the 
development of East Palo Alto. Chapter 5 of the dissertation analysis takes a step back 
from the impact of speculation on renters to demonstrate how the financial calculations 
were premised on debt, profits from fees, and the large scale and high speed of capital 
exchange. 
In the period of Page Mill’s holding of the portfolio, the speculative investment 
threatened the near complete loss of the city’s regulated rental units and the displacement 
of thousands of residents. Ultimately, the tenants and city would bear the burdens of Page 
Mill’s opportunistic investment. Arguably, the greatest risks were incurred not by 
investors but by tenants with very little money but an entire community to lose, as well as 
by a strapped city government desperate for “development” revenue, but with the very 
principle of the city’s founding at stake.  
 
Recontrol: Political Vulnerabilities & a Right to the City 
The tenants’ and city officials’ response to Page Mill’s monopolistic and 
speculative investment just two decades following cityhood spurred renewed demands for 
the right to the city and community control. The investment shaped a critical juncture in 
the city’s development plans. The city, state, the limited partner CalPERS, and the lender 
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Wells Fargo were all political mediators and capital stakeholders in the making and 
unmaking of the portfolio.  
Chapter 6 analyzes the vulnerabilities of this portfolio’s structuring of speculation 
and the stakeholders’ leverage using a framework borrowed from labor’s strategic 
corporate research comprehensive campaigns. Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of 
right to the city as an organizing framework that by definition emphasizes the urban scale 
of popular power. The conclusion considers more recent lessons from this specific case in 
relationship to other renter organizing efforts in the Bay Area region, as well as for 
broader urban movements. At a time of ongoing and increasing crisis for renters and 
workers, the study concludes by suggesting the prospects for labor and community 
coalitional politics behind a transformative scale-able land and housing agenda that at 
once emphasizes racial justice, community/worker control, and redefines current 
measures of home and land security. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
Chapter Introduction 
 
This section presents the scholarship in which I situate my case analysis. To 
begin, I honor Neil Smith who advised me to “start this dissertation with Engels.” Smith 
was right for pointing me to the political economy of the city. Engels’s writing on 
housing, from his journalistic description of industrial Manchester to his polemical 
intervention in socialist strategy, offers a touchstone for debate over sites, expression, and 
embodiment of class struggle. Engels draws boundaries between strategic sites of 
struggle of home and work, while also drawing conclusions that blur these distinctions in 
the every day lives of the working class. This dissertation departs from such a binary 
between community and work to argue that the collective production of urban space by 
the city’s inhabitants (and by the worker-investor-renter) demands a more expansive and 
complex view of struggle and possibility.  
The review begins with several works in the Marxist tradition from Engels to 
Harvey, Lefebvre, and Smith to outline the geography of capital, class formation, and 
class struggle. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Smith’s theorizing of gentrification was 
influential to my own work in neighborhood-based organizing for housing rights and 
equitable development in Washington, D.C.6 It was in part through Smith that I came to 
understand the stakes of my organizing work not as housing per se but as the city, and the 
city as the scene (to borrow Lefebvre) and the stakes of neoliberal economic restructuring 
																																																								
6 The colonial arrangement of Congressional oversight of the District of Columbia made this city early 
testing ground and a place of contestation around the “roll-backs” and “roll-outs” of neoliberal projects (i.e. 
charter schools, vouchers). 
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in the U.S. My review of the literature on gentrification and financialization orbit Smith’s 
early-work that links the housing market, the economy, with policy, the state. The irony 
of neo-liberalism as an ideology that espouses market freedom, to echo many before me, 
is the state intervention that allows for market dominance. 
I posit, and then disrupt, this literature in political economy to emphasize the 
framework of racial capitalism that shapes my inquiry into the historical development of 
East Palo Alto. This literature also shapes my understanding of gentrification, what I call 
the present racial property regime in U.S. cities of capital centrality. The historical 
context of land and housing in the U.S. demonstrates how housing became a racial, social 
and ideological signifier and organizer of value. I engage the work of Robinson (1983) 
and Hall (1980) specifically as well as Chakarvetty and Ferreira da Silva (2012), and 
MccIntrick and Woods (2007) for their clarity in creating and demanding complexity and 
praxis. My presentation of the racial valorization of land and housing in the subsequent 
chapter extends from these frameworks. I am also indebted to Piven & Cloward’s (1967) 
provocative programmatic papers that bring to the fore questions of Black urban electoral 
and disruptive power. I point to the work of Pulido (2000), Gilmore (2007), and powell 
(2009) for their regional frameworks, and Geronimus and Thompson (2004), Fullilove 
(2001; 2011), and de Oliver (2015) for their attention to the social, cultural, and psychic 
effects of dislocation and displacement. 
The literature review then raises questions of ‘actually existing’ spaces of social 
contestation in the neo-liberal city. I examine sociological notions of social movements 
and tenancy. I consider the power analysis tools of labor’s corporate campaigns as useful 
for tenant organizing efforts examining the financialized portfolios of housing investors. I 
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conclude the literature review by returning to Lefebvre’s (1996 [1968]) formulation of 
the right to the city that shifts political centrality to the otherwise dispossessed and 
appropriated. It is the necessary collective ‘call and demand’ for the right to the city to 
participate in the democratic decision-creative-making processes of the city, as the right 
to place (Samara, 2014) and to place-making, as a right to the city where “Black Lives 
Matter”— that provides the premise and perspective for this dissertation’s study.  
 
The Question of Housing  
 
When Engels wrote the essay The Housing Question in 1872, German cities faced 
a severe housing shortage and the working class masses experienced little if any reprieve 
in their daily lives between the miserable conditions of home and work. Engels wrote his 
essay in part to counter a socialist assertion that the relationship of the tenant and 
landlord is akin to the worker and capitalist; Marx and Engels strongly disagreed with 
this analogy. Engels argued that whereas the concentration of both private property and 
proletariats in cities is a contingent factor for proletariat insurgency against capitalism, 
the issues of slum dwellings, slum clearances (ie. Haussmann forms of urban renewal in 
Paris), and workers’ rental versus ownership of housing were symptoms of capitalism 
rather than axes, or levers, for social change.  
Throughout the essay Engels pointed to the terrible conditions of workers’ 
housing as not only a secondary but also a necessary evil that would help cohere class 
polarization and militancy. Attention to housing or other social issues within the city did 
not impact the central contradiction between labor and capital; therefore, Engels stated, 
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any successful struggle to improve the conditions of poor workers in the city would only 
force the same terrible conditions to emerge in another area of the city. In this way, the 
essay privileges struggle at the site of production over struggle focused on the conditions 
of everyday life, or social reproduction. Engels’ polemic raises the strategic question of 
connectedness and dissonance between the housing crisis for the working class and the 
conditions of their labor at work. 
A century later, Harvey (1978) speaks directly to this “housing question” raised 
by Engels in his study of capital circuits. Harvey first focuses on a strategic question for 
class struggle: how accumulation provides the means for the capitalist class to reproduce 
itself and how over-accumulation results in crisis. He specifically elaborates on Marx’s 
discussion of the primary circuits of investment (production) and secondary circuits (the 
built environment for production and for consumption). Harvey demonstrates how the 
movement of capital to other circuits, including what he calls the tertiary circuit 
(knowledge production, sciences, technology, education, etc.) mitigates crises of over 
accumulation in the primary circuit. The secondary and tertiary circuits are constitutive of 
the reproduction of the primary circuit, but remain distinct.  
There are multiple contradictions that arise in the flow of capital to the secondary 
circuit of the built environment pertinent to the housing question. For example, 
devaluation of the built environment precedes its revalorization (“creative destruction”). 
Harvey draws attention to the state in this process, which he says plays a mediating role 
between the primary and secondary circuits. The state also helps to guarantee profitability 
in the secondary circuit by making available “fictive capital” through credit. This last 
point was important in Harvey’s perceptive analysis of the secondary circuit as a 
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potentially expansive terrain for finance. At the time of his publication, the bricks and 
mortar of the illiquid secondary circuit required much more time to generate profits 
compared with surplus extraction through the direct appropriation of labor in the primary 
circuit. Harvey ultimately argues that class struggle must be as expansive as the realms 
upon which capital relies for absorbing crises of accumulation.  
In this way Harvey complicates the housing question by pointing out that issues 
of housing or social reproduction more broadly can serve as either an “antidote” or 
“springboard” for class struggle.  Harvey did not anticipate the securitization of 
residential housing debt and the opportunity to conquer time through the space of the 
built environment, so that all that is solid melts to liquidity. Yet he provides a framework 
for considering the potential expansion of the finance economy through urban processes, 
and specifically in the concentration of capital in the built environment. Instead, 
Lefebvre provides a provocative call to consider the city itself as not simply a circuit but 
a means of capital accumulation. 
Harvey’s work on capital circuits followed the tumultuous years of the 1960s 
when key Marxist theorists turned their attention from conflict at sites of production to 
contestation over everyday life and the city.  Partly as a response to the quick dissolution 
of student struggles in France due to capitalism’s pervasive presence and recuperative 
capacities in everyday life, and partly as a rejection of the homogeneous character of 
urbanism under socialism, Lefebvre (1996 [1968]; 1970) came to recognize urban 
subjectivity and social questions as strategically important to class struggle. Following 
Marx, Lefebvre also engages questions of over-accumulation pointing out that industry is 
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the primary circuit of capital, and the built environment of land and infrastructure acts as 
a secondary circuit.  
Unlike Marx, or Harvey’s work, however, Lefebvre (1970) theorized that these 
circuits would eventually blur in the production of surplus value. Lefebvre goes much 
further than Harvey’s distillation by declaring a dialectic, or opposition, between 
industrialization and urbanization.  Lefebvre imagined the city as ultimately the means of 
production itself and anticipated increasing class conflict over urban space. Urbanization, 
and the domination and commodification of fused social and physical space by capital, 
would become the central contradiction according to Lefebvre. In this way Lefebvre 
reframed the site of class struggle outside the walls of the factory and into the city.  
Much of the later seminal research on the rise of neoliberal urbanism in the US 
and UK context, specifically, demonstrates the heightened urban contradictions to which 
Lefebvre’s larger body of work alluded: an increased centrality of power that widens 
division of classes despite greater integration of world economies, communication, and 
people. A primary expression of neoliberal urbanism in the finance-nodes of global cities 
(Sassen, 1991) is gentrification (Smith, 2002).  
 
Gentrification and Uneven Development 
 
Smith (1984) explains that uneven development is the capital organization of 
spatial inequity. Smith’s work conceptualizes how urban space becomes both 
homogenized and differentiated for exchange value and speculation as a function of 
capitalism within the limits of capital in a finite planet. Gentrification is an expression of 
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uneven development and the tendency of urban disinvestment and investment cycles to 
(re)create opportunities for capital movement and expansion. 
Gentrification, in shorthand, conflates all aspects of the exploitation and 
(neo)colonization of the urban terrain for exchange value by its wealthier residents, 
government authorities, and enterprises whether local or global, resulting in the 
displacement, or serial displacement of those who preceded fixed investment. As distilled 
by Marcuse (2016) gentrification can involve “economic upgrading: up-pricing; physical 
upgrading: redevelopment; and social upgrading: upscaling” but all, for the purposes of 
the very definition of gentrification, lead to displacement of lower income residents (p. 
2). There is no gentrification without displacement. 
A heaving trove of scholarship on gentrification, including Marcuse’s, provides a 
range of perspectives that extend from or contrast Smith’s early work on uneven 
development, and specifically Smith’s (1979) “rent gap” theory of gentrification as a 
causal explanation of the movement of capital to urban centers in the U.K. and U.S. 
These works include demand-side explanations (Ley, 1994) and related debates over the 
social, cultural, political and geographic impacts, drivers, and, more recently, conceptual 
relevance of the term gentrification (Sumka, 1979, Hartman, 1979; Zukin, 1982; Zukin, 
1987; Marcuse, Smith and Williams 1986; Vigdor, Massey, Rivlin 2002; Slater, 2008; 
Lees, Slater, Wyly 2013).  
Smith remains particularly relevant to this case study for contributing a 
compelling theoretical framework to gentrification studies by linking urban change to 
neoliberalism (see 2002). Neoliberalism refers to the subjection of all social value to 
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market fundamentalist logic, much as in the fusing Lefebvre (1970) describes (albeit if 
not resulting in the production of surplus value).  
Federal urban disinvestment and privatization spurred a shift in urban governing 
from the managerial to the entrepreneurial (Harvey, 1978). The most enduring wave of 
gentrification in the US since the 1990s, Hackworth and Smith (2001) demonstrate, was 
brought about by the agency of government in expanding gentrification to a generalized 
scale. Smith contends that development for the middle and upper middle class in 
previously lower income neighborhoods has become part of an international strategy 
forging private investment with public policy (see, for example, World Bank [1993] 
report on how governments could enable finance take over of housing markets in Rolnik 
[2013]).  
In his case study of New York’s Lower East Side, Smith (1996) identifies state 
disciplining and stripping policies that ushered in gentrification. He describes the punitive 
policies of zero tolerance policing, anti-squatting, and welfare controls as part of the 
right-wing revenge, or revanchist take-back of the city following the gains of the civil 
rights movement of the 1960s. Whether an orchestrated “take-back” as Smith describes, 
or a spatial fix for capital surplus demonstrated by Gilmore (2007), criminalization and 
mass incarceration surged in the 1970s and coincided with the dove-tail processes of 
urban disinvestment and gentrification. In recent ground-breaking scholarship on 
eviction, Desmond (2016) claims that mass incarceration for Black men is analogous in 
prevalence as evictions are for Black women in their experiences of serial displacement. 
These processes of encagement and displacement are both formative and symptomatic of 
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homes as places of “organized abandonment,” referred to by Harvey (1989) then Gilmore 
(2008) to explain the development of under-development that prequils gentrification.  
By the early 2000s, in the wake of an enabled housing market of softened state 
regulations, housing advocates in New York City and rent regulated municipalities in 
California came to recognize a surge of major capital investment in multifamily rent 
regulated housing, which they came to call “predatory equity”. Displacement via 
gentrification was nothing new, but mass-buy ups and evictions in large residential rent 
protected properties exemplified an opportunity for the expansion of gentrification. 
Epitomizing the contradictions at the epicenter of the housing crisis, and in stark contrast 
to Glass’s (1964) first conceptualization of gentrification as a phenomenon of individual 
homesteaders, predatory equity relies on the displacement of tenants, en masse, from 
properties ostensibly protected by the state from full market exposure. This capital 
prospecting in rental housing invests in short-term financial extraction and circulated, 
socialized risk.  
 
The Accumulation of Homes  
 
In 2007/2008 when the collapse of the housing market became clear and 
widespread, a growing number of scholars turned to the built environment to grapple with 
how to explain the expansion of market financialization post-1970s. Krippner, an 
economic sociologist, was among the first to take an empirical assessment of the growth 
of the finance industry before the collapse, and to consider the 1980s political context in 
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which this market grew. Krippner (2005) refers to financialization7 as “a pattern of 
accumulation in which profit-making occurs through financial channels rather than 
through trade and commodity production” (p. 181). Financial channels capture the 
movement required of capital, and as a result the financial industry (FIRE) profits, in part 
through collecting fees (Krippner, 2005; Aalbers, 2008; Aalbers, 2009).  
Krippner’s work establishing the long-term developments that led to the existing 
upsurge of the financial industry demonstrates that financialization relies in part on the 
valorization of real assets on which to deploy financial innovations over time. In the 
realm of real estate, the portfolio (and related derivatives) becomes a financial channel to 
realize investment returns in an expansive economy. Returns along with profits from fees 
represent financial capital, or the non-productive income off the movement of economic 
and financial capital through assets, investment, and banking institutions. In the scope of 
financialization channels, short-term liquidity opportunities trumped long term equity 
realization. 
Economist Minsky (1988) in broader strokes also named this shift: “a new money 
capitalism is challenging the dominance of managerial- welfare state capitalism: 
managers of money are replacing managers of industry as the leading players in the 
economy” (p. 5).8 Money managers, Minsky asserted, have come to rely on the financial 
																																																								
7 Aalbers (2015) points out the slipperiness of this term, as both “the explanandum (the phenomenon to be 
explained), and explanans (the thing that explains)” (p.2). For further reading on the production of the 
rentier class, and a broader view of the historical development of capitalism in relationship to 
financialization— by definition an historical process and therefore changing dimension of economy— see 
Arrighi (1994) and Montagne in Erturk and Gabor, eds. (2017, forthcoming). See French, Leyshon and 
Wainwright (2011) for their critique of the disjuncture of financialization from spatial analysis, and their 
analysis of financialization as spatial-temporal fix.  
8 For an historical overview of the arc of managerial capitalism from 1920s to present day, involving the 
rise of shareholders over owners, and concurrent rise of managerial compensation, see Englander and 
Kaufman (2004). 
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industry for employment and profits at exchange points that were made profitable 
regardless of final returns. Indeed, this became the case as reported by the New York 
Times study of how the U.S. top ten public pension funds provided $17 billion in 
“management” fees alone to private equity funds between 2000-2010 (Anderson, 2010). 
The agents or drivers of finance help to reveal the intermediaries who control, as agents 
of finance, the institutional structures of finance, not as causal figures but as movers and 
contributors of the structuring of financializaiton.  
Whereas “managerial capitalism” signified the shift from corporate ownership 
control (i.e. traditional family firms) to intermediariy control, “shareholder capitalism” 
refers to the increased primacy of the investor in debates over corporate governance and 
control (Gelter, 2013). This shift to shareholder primacy is a far call from the idea of 
“pension fund socialism,” which was coined by economic sociologist Drucker (1976). 
Drucker asserted that workers ostensibly control U.S. equities, or publicly traded 
companies, production, and the economy through their pension fund investments. Indeed, 
over the last 30 years unions have pursued shareholder activism instead as a way to 
expand returns to the middle class despite labor’s weakening position in relationship to 
employers, a weakening position that is due in part to the dispossession of workers in the 
prospecting for greatest returns. 
Pension funds at the time of Drucker’s assertion had received increasing attention 
including regulation through the national Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA). ERISA, notably, mandated private funds to make their ultimate fiduciary 
responsibilities to the market as much as to their contributors by making the highest 
returns, the primary function of pension investment. Despite the diminishing number of 
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traditional employer-based defined benefit funds, which since the 1970s have dwindled in 
favor of the private sector’s investment in 401ks, institutional pension funds continued 
largely through the survival of public sector unions. Public sector funds gained traction in 
the total share of funds when private sector unions began to lose numbers in the 1970s 
and 1980s (see for example accounts of union falls in Bronfennbrenner 1998: 262).  
Notwithstanding deunionization, Drucker was right to suggest that pension 
investment is labor’s capital. Moreover, he predicted the rise of U.S. pension funds’ role 
in the economy, which from his writing to the time of the housing crash involved asset 
growth from $871 billion in 1980 to $11.3 trillion in 2007, including $196 billion to $3.1 
trillion for state and local pension funds for those same years (Tonello and Rabimov, 
2010:7). Rather than “socialism,” however, “pension fund capitalism” gained more 
traction in the literature as an optic for understanding the rising role of pension fund 
institutional investors, including both defined contributions (individual) and defined 
benefit fund (private and public employer-based), in shaping global financial markets 
(Clark, 2000; Clark and Hebbs, 2004; Aalbers, 2008; Duménil and Lévy, 2006).  
Still, there was growing optimism in the potential of pension funds to align with 
corporate responsibility (CSR) and socially responsible investment indices (SRI) for 
social effect.9 CalPERS leading activist role in the late 1980s of demanding transparency 
and accountability in corporate governance in public equities had raised expectations 
around the potential of funds’ to be socially responsive in their investments (Hebbs, 
2008). Indeed, CalPERS often pursues shareholder resolutiosn targeting large 
																																																								
9 Haigh and Hazeleton (2004) find the composition of SRI and not SRI funds nearly indistinguishable 
despite the proliferation of SRI funds since 1993; also, per social effects, they find weak outcomes of SRI 
given the greater systemic issues of a deregulated market.  
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corporations, albeit with very limited success. In 2002 the first shareholder resolution 
requested by a public pension fund in the U.S. was passed involving employment anti-
discrimination provisions based on sexual orientation for a publicly listed company 
(Haigen and Hazleton 2004:60). Also, in 2000, CalPERS announced the fund would 
divest from tobacco. Moreover, public pension funds’ targeted urban investment 
programs were seen as a net positive by those promoting social responsibility (See 
Chapter 6 for overview of CalPERS example of the California CURE program); there 
was little scrutiny by scholars of pension fund intermediaries and the implications of 
neighborhood gentrification by pension fund investment despite modest affordable 
housing financing (See examples Hagerman, Clark, Hebb, 2005; Hebb and Sharma, 
2014). 
More recent post-Great Recession attention to pension funds raises the most basic 
questions of austerity politics and pension viability around pensions’ two essential goals, 
(1) affordability for employers, workers, and taxpayers and (2) guarantees of anticipated 
retiree payment (Ambachtsheer, 2012). There is also continued attention in the literature 
to the effect of pension funds’ activism and governance structure in light of financial 
crises (Clark and Urwin, 2010 Domohoff, 2013). The greater the vulnerability of 
pensions to maintaining state support, the more distant pension fund socialism becomes 
as experiment or prospect. The higher the yields required and expected for contributor 
benefits, the greater leverage to be expected, and greater concentration, rather than 
redistribution, of corporate capital. 
Lapavitsas (2009) also reflects on pension contributions in his work on the 
financialization of every day life through what he calls the expropriation of household 
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income for financial assets. For example, the potential for pension fund investment in 
overleveraged residential real estate increased with the expansion of the financial market, 
and vice versa (Rolnik, 2013). Investors in subprime securities, for one, replaced the 
traditional slumlord, albeit by establishing debt tenancy in single-family housing based 
on the illusion of “ownership” (Sassen, 2009). Lenders found profitability in upfront fees 
and investors gambled for returns on exchanges in the secondary market. Whereas this 
trend has been well documented, less attention has been given to the rise of investment in 
multifamily rental housing (see discussion of opportunity potential by Dipasquale and 
Cummings 1992; and New York City examples by Teresa, 2015; and a New York City 
and Berlin comparative discussion by Fields and Uffer, 2016).  
 It was not until the decade before the housing crash that multifamily rental 
housing became attractive to large investors. The dramatic reduction of interest rates in 
1993 followed by interest rate reductions in 2000 and after 9/11, increased the availability 
of finance capital for placement (see herein Chapter 5). An investment conducive-politics 
of softening rent regulation in key states (see discussion of CA example in Chapter 3) 
increased the profitability for investment in multifamily rentals. Moreover, investment in 
even low-demand or lower rent-yield multifamily portfolios presented opportunity for 
cheap credit as cash. In this disjuncture from real estate primers, location simply isn’t 
‘everything’, cash flow is (Linneman, 2004 in Fields and Uffer, 2016). Investors also 
turned to the promising commercial backed mortgage security market, which became 
widely available for multifamily properties beginning in the mid-1990s. The securities 
market created a surge of investment interest that during the peak years of the housing 
bubble (2005-2007) allowed for tremendous cash flow, including capital liquidity at 
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$17.6 billion a year (National Multifamily Housing Council, 2015). At the time of the 
housing crash in 2007, the Federal Reserve reported mortgage debt outstanding for 
multifamily residences amounted to $798 billion, up nearly double from $402 billion in 
200010 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, n.d.). 
This dissertation elaborates upon this line of inquiry through an examination into 
the expropriation of homes: Black and Latino/a homes became investment vehicles, 
remade into real asset portfolios financed in part by workers’ contributions towards and 
desires for living out an old age. This case seeks to extend upon this literature to further 
understand how the financialization of household inhabitance (whether ownership, rental, 
single and multifamily housing) and futures (pensions) reflected calculations of risks and 
returns embedded in the historical and institutional racial valorization of land and people.  
 
The Racial Logic of Capitalism 
 
The case of East Palo Alto reveals racial disparity as not only outcome of class 
disparity, but race as a mode of land and housing organization and value. Political 
scientist Cedric Robinson (1983) was among the first American scholars to distill the 
historical development of capitalism as racial capitalism, in what he calls 
“counterdistinction” to the Marx and Engels’ assumption of an eventual rationalization of 
social relations (2). Robinson explains the inextricable relationship of race and capital as 
an historical phenomenon:  
The development, organization, and expansion of capitalist society pursued 
essentially racial directions, so too did social ideology. As a material force then, it 																																																								
10 Multifamily residences refer to holdings with five or more units. Mortgage debt outstanding for 
multifamily units reported here for all holders for last quarter of year reported. 
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could be expected that racialism would inevitably permeate the social structures 
emergent from capitalism. I have used the term ‘racial capitalism’ to refer to this 
development and to the subsequent structure as a historical agency. (Ibid.) 
 
As such, race is an historical phenomenon (Omni and Winant, 1994; Bonilla-Silva, 2006) 
constructed as if naturalized within relational (Kim, 1999), commodified valorization of 
peoples (Harris, 1993) and through negation (Rediker, 2007; Robinson, 1983). Race, in 
these terms, is not simply a signifier, but an organizing principle of primitive 
accumulation and advanced capitalism.  
Cultural critic and sociologist Stuart Hall likewise raises a central political 
concern of the relations through which race unevenly “fractures,” or “expresses,” class 
struggle. Hall (1980) opposes conceiving race in formulations of totalities, transhistorical 
processes, universal applications, human nature (he deftly calls this one an “alibi”), 
individual psychological terms, and economic reductivism, which are related to 
naturalizing and teleological (inherently racist) explanations for how and why race works 
and what racism accomplishes. This conception draws upon Althusser’s framework of 
“articulations” to intervene in the dominant logic/s of economic versus sociological 
explanations. Hall argues the interconnectedness of historical moment, geography, 
politics, ideology, and economic relations (modes of production) in theorizing how 
differences and racisms may become specifically and distinctively assembled. This 
counters the notion of economics (“base”) as prescriptive of social formations and 
hierarchies.  
Hall turns to Gramsci’s work on ideology to examine how modes of production 
structured in domination have relied on hegemonic processes stating: “Race is…the 
modality through which class is lived” (p. 341). Racisms, while not necessary for 
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capitalism, Hall posits, have served in “different degree and form.” The implications of 
this modality are multiple: centrally, while race functions in structures of domination, it is 
through anti-racism struggle that class struggle may be simultaneously waged.  
More recent work draws from these and other perspectives to engage in race and 
human geography. McKittrick and Woods (2007) in their edited volume Black 
Geographies invoke Fanon (1961) to present an expansive view of the relationship 
between race, space, and place-making: “racialized production of space is made possible 
in the explicit demarcations of the space of les damnés as invisible/forgettable at the same 
time as the invisible/forgettable is producing space— always, and in all sorts of ways” (p. 
7).  The social value of place-making, the very bodies of the place-makers, may be 
invisible, unknown, abandoned (“unescaped” in the case of Katrina), they explain. Yet 
the people who have been hitherto unseen may be excavated in metaphorical and material 
understandings of resistance and the “histories of the everyday” (p. 7). Their framing 
essay raises a central tension between socially contested place-making versus place-
claiming, the latter what they consider a reproduction of a hegemonic ownership logic 
that can portend another’s displacement or invisibility.  
Chakravarrty and Ferreira da Silva (2012) remind us that the financial regime in 
which the housing crisis occurred was embedded in what they call a “logic” of racial risk 
and colonial and imperial architecture of debt (see also Graeber, 2011). Their work draws 
comparisons between the debt obligations of the postcolonial nations and the targeting of 
U.S. Blacks and Latino/as in subprime lending, which widened indebtedness in the U.S. 
Coates (2014), in a highly acclaimed and provocative essay published in The Atlantic, 
 
37	
tied the racial valorization of land and housing in the U.S. to intergenerational life 
chances and as a basis of his case for Black reparations. 
The focus of these works on segregation, debt as servitude, and risk for individual 
homeowners remains applicable to renters and the overleveraging of portfolios by 
instiutional investors. Most relevant is the point made in these works of who is deemed 
immoral, and who is not, for failing to realize an impossible debt obligation, which in 
turn exposes the neoliberal “post racial” fallacy. By extension, in the case of the 
predatory overleveraged multifamily portfolio, the risks are passed onto the renters where 
deferred maintenance results from debt service and low rent yields, where evictions are 
profitable, where renters are disposable and exchangeable until the financial asset, the 
building, their homes, can be exchanged for returns. Speculative investor landlords are 
akin to predatory lenders by blaming renters for their poverty while targeting them for 
their poverty and potential for turn-over, or financial expropriation. 
Several scholars on the racial production of space draw attention to the regional 
interdependence, or racial capital investment in the U.S. metropolis.  Pulido’s (2000) 
study of the regional dimensions of environmental sitings and Gilmore’s (2007) attention 
to regional scale for understanding criminalizaton and incarceration both demonstrate the 
center / periphery spatial racial and economic arrangements (see also Smith’s [1992] 
work on scale) that undergird the context of the city, suburban, exurban, rural regional 
divides and scales. Powell (2009) for one, in departure from much of the U.S. right to the 
city organizing emphasis, calls for a regional, metropolitan equity framework to counter 
the dispossession of minority populations in cities. Like many strategic organizers, 
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however, powell views Black dispossession in cities as directly and historically linked to 
the postwar accumulation of opportunity for white populations in suburbs.  
The “knots” to borrow from Pruitt (2011) of what Harvey (2005) calls 
“accumulation by dispossession” (p. 137), are tightly twisted in processes of 
gentrification, in both means and outcome. The number of people displaced in and 
following the wave of gentrification in the late 1990s in the U.S. surpasses the number of 
those displaced through urban renewal (Smith 2002). Fullilove (2001; 2009) underscores 
the psychic trauma that has been understood as the consequences of past mass urban 
renewal and parallels to experiences of displacement by gentrification. Homogenization 
and reconcentration of poverty are highly visible outcomes of advanced gentrification 
(Lees et al., 2008) that mask the individualized experiences of displacement. In this same 
vein, Geronimus and Thompson (2004) argue for the importance of cultural explanations 
in combination with economic analysis for grasping the “psychic costs” and “weathering” 
of people who experience alienation and racism in community fragmentation and 
dispersal based on mixed-income social engineering initiaitives. 
Piven and Cloward (1968 [1967]) warned that the Civil Rights liberal quest for 
integration was a mistaken strategy for that moment and in the realm of housing in 
particular. At that time a massive return of whites to central city “ghettos,” and dispersal 
of poor urban Blacks to suburbia would be required for such an ideal. The call for 
desegregation, they asserted, masked the enduring and urgent need for better housing for 
the Black urban poor now and where they lived (p. 185-187). This was not support for 
segregation but rather a call for Black control over their housing and support for the 
Black Power movement’s aims, which Tyner (2007) later explains as a radical spatial 
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move from segregation to “collective separatism” (p. 227). Programmatic aims for 
integration in housing, moreover, Piven and Cloward explained, could result in political 
mollification due to diffusion and dispersal of Black votes at a time of strategic 
possibility for Black political control in cities. For this and other reasons pertinent to 
Black political power, they also viewed proposals for metropolitan integration with 
caution.  
Integration as a project of the Civil Rights era became, by some, conceptually 
recuperated as cover for privatization and “ethnic” culture a commodity for 
consumption.11 The integration of neighborhoods during early-stage gentrification has 
been used as an argument for gentrification. Diversity based on cultural displacement in 
early-stage gentrification in U.S. cities is an inverted shift from what de Oliver (2016) 
explains in his staged model of multiculturalism as “a social justice ethic to a middle-
class amenity,” an act, he borrows from hooks, of “’Eating the Other’” (p. 1299-1300). 
Indeed, the prospect of “diversity” in multicultural neighborhoods, often in gentrification 
transition, is sold as appeal to individual white consumers who at the same time displace 
people of color (Smith, 1996). 
 
The Neoliberal Subject & Urban Contestation 
 
Whereas Hall (1980) engages with Gramsci (2010) to explain the work of racial 
ideology, Foucault’s (1994) concept of governmentality provides another way of making 
																																																								
11 This is apparent in the stripping of basic funds to maintain public housing and the destruction of public 
housing in favor of privatization and gentrification, and in the name of poverty de-concentration (Lees, et. 
al., 2008). 
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sense of the complicity of racial ideology cojoined to the policies and institutional project 
of neoliberalism. As an analytic framework, governmentality illuminates the historical 
processes through which individuals play an essential role in governing themselves in 
part through the notions of personal responsibility within an historical racial 
pathologizing of the moralized poor. Foucault refers to governmentality as a technology 
of power of disciplining and self-management of populations. Gentrification can be seen 
as a trope for the dual logics of neoliberalization, including economic deregulation and 
free market dominance on the one hand, and the promotion of individual rights over 
collective rights, and individual responsibility over collective responsibility, on the other.  
Governmentality corresponds with the postmodern theorization of the diffusion of 
power and denotes the self-governing of individuals at the level of everyday life. This 
notion represents a different perspective from a traditional Marxist view, which as 
previously mentioned, focuses on neoliberalism as an elite-project from above. It also 
differs from a Gramscian lens in which mass-based consent is understood as obtained 
through a top-down imposition of falsehoods, or the concealing of contradictions within a 
hierarchical view of power and positionality (ie. former/organic intellectuals) (Gramsci, 
2010). Instead the concept of governmentality and Foucault’s idea of how individual 
bodies become disciplined and instrumentalized in making populations governable—
biopolitics— suggest that individuals become aligned with a new status quo by creating 
and embodying this status quo (Foucault ,2007).  
 It is helpful to quote Brown (2003) at length for an explanation of how neoliberal 
governmentality works at the level of the individual to create a citizen subject that in turn 
produces who s/he has become:  
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In making the individual fully responsible for her/himself, neo-liberalism equates 
moral responsibility with rational action; it relieves the discrepancy between 
economic and moral behavior by configuring morality entirely as a matter of 
rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences. In so doing, it also 
carries responsibility for the self to new heights: the rationally calculating 
individual bears full responsibility for the consequences of his or her action no 
matter how severe the constraints on this action, e.g., lack of skills, education, and 
childcare in a period of high unemployment and limited welfare benefits. 
Correspondingly, a "mismanaged life" becomes a new mode of depoliticizing 
social and economic powers and at the same time reduces political citizenship to 
an unprecedented degree of passivity and political complacency. The model neo-
liberal citizen is one who strategizes for her/ himself among various social, 
political and economic options, not one who strives with others to alter or 
organize these options. (Ibid.:42-43) 
 
Neoliberalism inscribed within the discourses, technologies, and practices of 
governmentality converges dialectically in the subject-making of the neoliberal citizenry 
that Brown describes. Governmentality within neoliberalization therefore suggests a 
constraining and reductive analytic of citizen formation, narrowing the possibilities for 
strategic resistance and change.  
Yet, the technologies of governmentality become operationalized not only 
through instruments and apparatuses but also over and through space, making spatial 
contestations an important aspect for re-thinking the political strategies of social claims 
within the dual logics of neoliberalism and governmentality. Spatial analysis of 
neoliberalization and governmentality would consider how certain places are 
open/guarded for included/excluded subjects during allowed/disallowed times. Spatial 
analysis also raises the issue of the Sovereign, and the “existing” political geography of 
the state with the notion of governmentality. Right to the city, a spatialized analysis of 
urbanization and collective social change possibilities, is useful for revisioning urban 
citizenry and to pry open the possibility for alternative forms and effects of subject-
making in contestations over the racial property regime of gentrification. 
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This dissertation contends that neoliberalism remains unaccomplished as ongoing 
processes. Embedded within neoliberalism and financialization, the urban space becomes 
a dynamic field of power for not only private enterprise, but also for well-positioned local 
government, and threatened inhabitants seeking voice in the contentious making (and 
potential unmaking) of the neoliberal city. The irony of neoliberalism as an ideology of 
market-driven enterprise is that neoliberalism results from policies driven by actors who 
shape its form and function. In this way, neoliberalism is not an elusive force, but instead 
may be made tangible through the policies that invoke it and the nodes of 
interdependencies in command and control (Piven, 2008).  
The case of this dissertation sheds light on what Peck et. al. (2009) terms 
“actually existing” neoliberalism by revealing the mediating actors and multiple interests 
at play in ‘actually existing’ accelerated attempts at gentrification through predatory 
equity. Resistance to serial displacement, including limited successes, suggests 
neoliberalism as processes, providing a departure from an ideal-type of neoliberalism as 
if a totalizing fait accompli, a point emphasized by Holston (2009). Neoliberalism as 
processes is multi-layered, contradictory and contingent, and can be understood through 
changes in institutional arrangements (Peck and Tickell in Gledhill, 2004). Varied state 
formations apply neoliberal policies (such as deregulation, neoregulation, and 
privatization) unevenly and within the interdependent processes and constraints of global 
capital (Ong, 2006). Ong (2006) posits the importance of understanding the role of state 
power in neoliberalization by examining the “hybrid-state” and forms of “neoliberalism 
as exception and exceptions to neoliberalism” (p.3). In this case, although neither 
exception nor exception to neoliberalism in whole cloth, the governing officials in City of 
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East Palo Alto played a key role in attempting to oppose the deregulation of rent 
controlled housing there. 
Rather than operating as empty vessels of capital accumulation, or simply as 
indifferent carriers of the world division of labor, this study follows Brenner and 
Theodore (2000) in arguing that cities are the principle sites of struggle in which 
financialization, austerity, and privatization are tested and resisted. A moment of crisis in 
neoliberalism during the Great Recession also presented opportunity for urban claimants 
to invert the current terms of equity in housing. This study considers the changing city 
through not only institutional arrangements of capital, but how a municipal government 
and tenants attempted to exploit those arrangements and leverage their power through an 
optic of racial justice.   
 
Sociology of the Social Movement Literature 
 
Attention to tenants’ collective action is particularly relevant during a time of 
resurgence in rental demand as an outcome of the 2008 housing crisis that has shifted an 
“ownership nation” to a “renter nation” (see Samara, 2015). Indeed, the U.S. Census 
suggests that the decennial following the Great Recession will be viewed as the “decade 
of the renter” (Levy, 2011). The added pressures of foreclosures and loan restrictions 
since the housing fallout have exacerbated a nationwide acute shortage of affordable 
rental units for low-income renters (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2011; 2011a).   
 What does social movement theory offer for understanding tenant oppositional 
organizing? For more than thirty years, social movement studies in the U.S. have 
principally orbited around resource mobilization theory (RM) and the related political 
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process model that privilege the effects of organizational capacity and political cleavages 
in the electoral arena for realizing movement goals (ie. Zald and McCarthy, 1979; 
McAdam, 2010 [1982]; Morris, 1984; Tilly, 2005). Much of this work assumes rational 
actors and a rational political system, ie., a functioning democracy. The literature 
generally attends to the mechanics of how it is that movements are organized rather than 
why. 
Most notably, this literature remains evasive on questions of power, an irony not 
lost on participants in social movements. Several enduring discussions provide an 
exception in the literature by considering the forms of power available to movement 
participants as a condition for mobilizing resistance and realizing movement goals 
(Gamson, 1968; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Wrong, 1980). For example, in particular 
Piven & Cloward (1977) bring specificity to arguments and examples around why and 
how power becomes realized and operationalized in their work Poor People’s 
Movements. They are centrally concerned with the conditions in which the poor have 
resisted and what they’ve gotten out of it as a result of disruptive power (see also Piven 
and Cloward, 1971; Piven and Cloward 2000; Piven, 2006). Relatedly, and more 
recently, scholars attuned to questions of agency have challenged RM by focusing on 
how participants’ strategic choices affect movement outcomes (ie. Jasper, 2008; Ganz, 
2009). My analysis of organizing responses to the housing crisis draws from this 
literature but contextualizes and emphasizes organizing within the particulars of the 
political economic landscape. The problems tenants confront at the micro scale of their 
buildings reveal fundamental changes in landlordism and the broader processes of 
(persistently) racial neoliberal urban development. 
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Although the sociological literature on tenants remains limited in scope, 
especially in the U.S., significant scholarly work considers and debates tenants as a social 
class, tenancy as revelatory of the structures of ownership relations, and tenant action as 
oppositional social contestation (ie. Engels, 1935 [1872]; Angotti, 1977; Marcuse, 1980; 
Dreier, 1982; Heskin, 1983; Hartman, 1984; Saunders, 1984; Morrisson, 1984; Shlay and 
Faulkner, 1984; Katz and Mayer, 1985; Lipsitz, 1988; Florida and Feldman, 1988; 
Leavitt and Saegert, 1990; Capek and Gilderbloom, 1992). Much of the scholarship on 
urban tenant struggles in the U.S. highlights tenants’ militant tactics during three periods: 
the socialist eviction blockades and rent strikes of the 1930s; “poor people’s movement” 
actions such as the Harlem rent strikes of the 1960s Civil Rights era, and the policy-
oriented and coalition-based tenant advocacy efforts that lobbied legislators for tenant 
protections in the 1970s (Piven and Cloward, 1967; Neagu, 1972; Dreier, 1982; Lawson 
and Naison, 1986; Ceraso, 1999; Bratt, Stone, Hartman, 2006).   
The entry of highly financialized corporate landlords on a large-scale changes the 
landscape for grassroots tenant organizing. Tenant organizing around what was called 
predatory equity during the housing crisis has been distinguished from past tenant 
organizing by the sheer number of rent regulated units in buildings purchased by single 
investment firms: the unprecedented level and severity of harassment of tenants; the 
multiple interests at play involving investors and the servicing and securitization of debt; 
and the ability of large investment firms to withstand short-term financial losses (ie. 
tenants’ rent withholdings and law suits) (ANHD, 2009). 
The literature of “community” contestations pays particular attention to the 
possibilities and pitfalls of tactics, non-for-profit organizational forms, scales of action, 
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and identity-based boundary-making relevant to tenant organizing (ie, Alinksy, 1971; 
Katznelson, 1981; Delgado 1994; Fisher, 1994; Marwell, 2004; Saegert, 2006; Gilmore, 
2006; Incite, 2007; McQuarrie and Marwell, 2009; Defillipis et. al. 2010; McAlevey, 
2015). This literature makes in-roads toward what Bevington and Dixon (2005) call 
“movement relevant theory,” addressing both the theoretical and programmatic problems 
raised in social contestation. Yet, rarely does the literature in community studies or 
community organizing adequately address the questions of scale, important to movement 
formation and radical ‘non-reformist’ reforms. It does, however, point to examples of 
how, even at the local level, people can pry open spaces for opposition and wins. 
 
Models from Labor Studies 
 
In contrast to the social movement literature, conceptions of power are prolific in 
labor studies (ie. Brecher, 2014 [1972]; Juravich and Bronnfenbrenner, 1998; Clawson, 
2003; Olin Wright, 2000; Fung and Olin Wright, 2000; Milkman, 2006). This literature 
includes a large number of workplace-based case studies from which scholars have 
garnered general lessons to inform broader labor strategy. Furthermore, significant 
examples of work in this vein make explicit the relationship of workers’ power and 
conditions in the workplace to larger socio economic processes (ie. Silver, 2003; 
Jayaraman and Ness, 2005; Muñoz, 2008; McCallum, 2013). Urban processes for labor 
receive a great deal of attention by scholars who attend to historical developments of 
cities, and the relationship of urban change to workers’ dilemmas (Parsons, 1984; Logan 
and Molotch, et. al, 1987; Fainstein, Gordon and Harloe, 1992; Fisher, 1994; Radford, 
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1996; Dreier, 2000; Freeman, 2001; Herod, 2001; Clawson, 2003; Botein, 2007; Herod 
and Wright, 2008;).  
Notwithstanding the complexity about labor’s divided interest (as investor and 
tenant) in investor housing, the labor literature also speaks to labor’s strategic 
confrontations against venture capital firms, particularly private equity (ie. Fung, Hebb 
and Rogers, 2001; Bodie, 2008; Lerner, 2010). Strategic corporate research provides 
direction for tenants grappling with the structuring of exploitation, but only within 
organizing through intensive tenant-centered tactics that build momentum, confidence, 
solidarities, and ultimately wins. Juravich describes key areas for nuanced research for 
comprehensive campaigns that expose “profit centers, growth plans, decision makers, and 
key relationships” (in Bronfenbrenner, 2007: 32). These four areas allow for an analysis 
of mediating actors for tenants to develop and deploy strategy. I employ Juravich’s model 
of strategic corporate research in chapter six to identify tenants’ tactical possibilities 
taken from the analysis typical of union corporate campaigns.  
 
The Right to the City  
 
Fundamentally, this dissertation extends from a scholarship of critical urban 
theory that emphasizes how urban processes become shaped through social contestation 
(Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer, 2011). The stakes of this struggle for the poor, and for 
people of color, is the right to the city (Purcell, 2002; Samara, 2007; Harvey, 2008; 
Mayer, 2009; Mitchell, 2003). As Castells (2000) cogently extrapolates, the right to the 
city is for Lefebvre a struggle for not only material existence, but for urban culture. 
Lefebvre fundamentally privileged the city as a space for spontaneity and cultural 
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eruption. “The human being has the need to accumulate energies and to spend them, even 
waste them in play,” he wrote ([1968] 1996:147). The right to the city for Lefebvre, was 
the right to participate in its creation. 
Lefebvre’s theoretical undertaking appropriates space and time to transform the 
city into a sphere for imaginative, artistic ‘lived’ interaction. The right to the city is the 
right to reclaim the urban as a potentially liberatory space of, by and for creative and 
collective social processes: “…[T]hus the city is an oeuvre, closer to a work of art than to 
any simple material product” (Lefebvre [1968] 1996: 101). For Lefebvre, the city was not 
just a product of or site for human relationships; the city was the process of these 
relations.  
Lefebvre called for a radical configuration of time and space that rejects the use of 
the city (whether socialist or capitalist) as an object, as merely a means to material 
existence. Deeply rooted in his work on right to the city are several key reinforcing 
concepts, which remain relevant to today’s urban struggles:  
The right to the city manifests itself as a superior form of rights: right to 
freedom to individualization in socialization, to habitat and to inhabit. The 
right to the oeuvre, to participation and appropriation (clearly distinct 
from the right to property), are implied in the right to the city. (Ibid:173-
174 emphasis in original) 
 
These reciprocal ideas reinforce strategic attention to radical citizenship and use-value, 
relevant to the demands for non-speculative housing raised by urban claimants today. 
Lefebvre’s framework for a right to the city for democratic participation, creative play 
and imagination is inextricably linked to the call and demand for the right to the city 
where “Black Lives Matter.” It is to the history of the construction of East Palo Alto and 
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to the production of land values embedded in historically contingent, relational constructs 
of race that I now turn.  
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CONTROL 
Chapter 3. Creating California: The Racial Logic of Home, Land, and Security12 
 
Chapter Introduction 
East Palo Alto resides at the doorway to Silicon Valley, crossed by the Bayshore 
Highway 101 on its west side, and bordered at its eastern edge by the southern arc of the 
San Francisco Bay. (See map, Figure 
3.1.)  The city’s current economic 
profile reads as literary foil to the 
adjacent, tony cities of Palo Alto and 
Menlo Park where the residents’ median 
household incomes were $122,532 and 
$111,244, respectively (2007-2011 U.S. 
Census). In East Palo Alto, a tiny 
majority-minority city of 28,867 
residents (2012 U.S. Census estimate), the 
median household income of $50,137 
(2007-2011 U.S. Census) was less than 
half of these other cities. Also, in inverse proportions to its neighbors, the majority of 
today’s residents in East Palo Alto are renters (2010 U.S. Census).  
The founding of the small city of East Palo Alto followed a century after the 
adjacent cities’ incorporation and was distinguished by East Palo Alto organizers’ 
																																																								
12 “Geography is not the question, where is Kansas? But, why is Kansas, Kansas?” - Ruth Wilson Gilmore 
(u.d.)   
 
Figure 3.1 San Mateo County, 
California. Source: cc GeoCurrents 
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ideological drive for political self-determination on the heels of the civil rights and Black 
Power movements. Black and Latino organizers called for local authority within a white 
dominated regional and county politics. More broadly, East Palo Alto’s incorporation 
into cityhood took place amidst state specific urbanization processes, and within a history 
triangulated by the California property regimes of settler colonialism, monopoly 
landholding, and privatization/financialization.13 Poignantly, the Page Mill housing 
gamble in the first decade of the 21st century evoked familiar terms of the frontier at the 
turn of the 20th century: Page Mill investors purchased state regulated property in 
monopoly fashion couched in racialized notions of discovery, bravery, and even moral 
duty. Smith’s (1996) theory of urban gentrification as a frontier logic considered such 
discursive tropes in his explanation of the return of capital to cities following periods of 
disinvestment. The frontier metaphor conjures an assumption that the people who live in 
areas targeted for re-investment are unseen, and/ or undervalued, legitimating their 
disciplining, displacement, and outright political and spatial exclusion.  
It is in the very early history of California as border and as frontier where the 
following section begins. The historical overview takes account of how the land area of 
East Palo Alto that was once sacred Native American burial grounds became 
sub/urbanized. The discussion also points to the numerous ways East Palo Alto’s social 
history offers a counterpoint to the well-worn historical narrative of California land use. 
East Palo Alto arose from a small farmers’ movement in a state of land monopoly. The 
town became a center of Japanese horticulture in a landscape of anti-Asian, nativist 
																																																								
13 Constitutive of these relations in California are the multiscalar state policy and institutional apparatuses 
that regulate, allocate, or enforce those connections, thus assigning and producing land values embedded in 
historically contingent social constructs. For a view on the enduring forms of settler colonialism, reliant on 
displacement for land control see Wolfe (1999; 2016).  
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sentiment. In the post-war era, it developed as a majority-minority suburb and a seat of 
Black nationalism in contrast to the mythological racialized notion of postwar American 
suburban ethos and urban pathos. African-American migrants in East Palo Alto 
confronted containment and practiced emplacement. Further, cityhood became 
accomplished by the organizing thrust of tenants, not homeowners, contesting the very 
notion of homeownership as a prerequisite of citizenry. This history provides a context 
for analyzing the Page Mill monopoly buy-up of East Palo Alto’s rental stock as part of a 
speculative and racialized assessment of land value, and for understanding the tenants’ 
organizing response as part of an ongoing struggle for home and land security.  The 
length of historical rendition presented here argues that property regimes necessarily are 
social productions that entail roads taken and not taken; present relations of a given place 
both reflect historical conditions and alter conditions for potentially very different 
futures. 
 
East Palo Alto’s Early History: Territorializing Space, Re-making Place 
 
Land grabs and abandonment mark the early history of East Palo Alto from when 
the Spanish Missionaries first made their way northward from San Diego in 1771, to the 
fatal detriment of the Ohlone/Costanoan people.i  Spanish soldiers purportedly left the 
South Bay area soon after they arrived due to their encounter with an insect infestation in 
abandoned Ohlone dome huts. The huts in the vicinity of East Palo Alto are now believed 
to have served as temporary lodging during funeral rites; East Palo Alto’s downtown was 
an Ohlone burial ground (Baxter, Allen and Hylkema, 2007). 
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The vast ranch that encompassed much of present day San Mateo County 
reflected the Spanish soldiers’ account in its name: Rancho de las Pulgas, Ranch of the 
Fleas (Rigenhagen, 1993). The area remained abandoned for nearly a century following 
Spanish missionary occupation and long after Mexico’s independence from Spain in 
1821. Relatively few people lived on the ranch during American occupation, including in 
1848 when Mexico relinquished California to the U.S., coincidentally within weeks of 
the first gold discovery in northern California.  
Land monopoly in this “free state” stood apart from the 19th century family farm 
model prominent in the midwest and New England regions of the U.S. Concentrated land 
holdings in California resulted in part from a perceived scarcity of water supply and 
pending Mexican landholder claims. Prospects of gold and capitalization of the Pacific 
Railroad further resulted in enormous investor purchases of land available in the public 
domain. The Homestead Act of 1862 only led to widespread disappointment for new 
settlers and former miners in this state, many of whom scape-goated Chinese immigrants 
and Mexicans for their mining losses and narrowing land holding opportunities. (Pisani, 
1996) 
The U.S. had required Mexican landholders in California to submit land deeds for 
approval. Over 9,000,000 acres of Spanish and Mexican land grant claims were approved 
between 1852-1856; contested claims took up to 17 years for a decision (Ibid.: 12). In the 
area where East Palo Alto now stands and its surroundings, the U.S. originally denied the 
Mexican Arguello family two thirds of the total 12 leagues they claimed of Rancho de las 
Pulgas (U.S. House of Representatives, 1884: 1-5). Notably, the ranch included valuable 
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access to the Bay watershed in a region that would in short order experience a population 
surge. 
California’s gold rush and the construction of a wharf in the South Bay had 
brought new settlement to the ranch, and specifically to the area of today’s East Palo 
Alto. Investor Isaiah Woods created the first planned community there after purchasing 
3,500 acres of Rancho de las Pulgas in 1849 with backing by the Adams & Company 
Bank, where Woods was general manager. Paradoxically, the Arguello family and 
descendents had to sell off much of the ranch to American investors like Woods to pay 
for the legal fees involved in their land claims, which went all the way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court (Rigenhagen, 1993).  
Woods was among the 2,298 people who owned more than 1,000 acres of land in 
California by the 1870s; in addition 122 individuals and companies each owned more 
than 20,000 acres of farms and ranches throughout the state (Pisani 1996: 87-89).  
Urbanization in California rose in relationship to land monopoly; ‘49ers without a 
farming future turned to the cities (Ibid.: 92). As a result, by the turn of the century over 
half of the California’s population lived in cities (U.S. Census, retrieved March 3, 2013).  
Woods envisioned a booming regional transportation hub connection with the 
Pacific and Atlantic Railroads (San Mateo County, 1963). He named the town 
“Ravenswood.” East Palo Alto’s transformation from agrarian frontier to urban frontier 
did not follow a straight course despite Woods’ vision of a boomtown. The gold rush had 
helped spur urbanization, but elsewhere, the railroad bypassed Ravenswood entirely.  
Still, agrarian regions and hamlets such as Ravenswood developed in relationship 
to demands of the nearby urban population. San Francisco required increased 
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transportation of the grains and produce harvested from the South Bay. Ravenswood also 
experienced a temporary increase in economic activity due to the traffic of the passenger 
steamer “Jenny Lind” that traveled the ports of the peninsula taking people by boat from 
San Francisco and connecting them to stagecoaches at the Ravenswood wharf for 
continued transport to the state’s original capital, San Jose. But when the state changed its 
capital to Sacramento, and new railroad lines made the steamer obsolete, Ravenswood 
became a virtual ghost town. The wharf became known, as it remains today, as Cooley’s 
Landing after its second owner who put it back to use for agrarian and, temporarily, brick 
shipping.14  (Ibid.)  
Notwithstanding these start-ups, East Palo Alto did not emerge as a growing town 
until the emergence of California’s “little-landers’” movement. The movement was a call 
of the yeoman farmer in the state of big-business land monopoly.  East Palo Alto 
emerged as a town of small farmers through a large purchase of land subdivided for 
“utopian” purposes. Rather than reflecting an evolutionary change from agrarian to 
urban, new settlement in the area presented another path, an experiment in a form of 
urban agriculture that was made possible by the automobile and farming innovations. 
 
The Weeks’ Utopia: A Modern Vision of A Retreat from Urban Life 
 
The streetscape of present-day central East Palo Alto owes its long and narrow 
residential block organization to another “pioneer,” Charles Weeks.  Originally from 
Indiana, Weeks became an innovator in California’s small farmers’ movement. He briefly 
																																																								
14 A brick production outfit employing up to 100 mostly Chinese laborers sent 40 million bricks produced 
between 1874-1884 from clay extracted from Ravenswood (Rigenhagen, 1993) 
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revived the area after purchasing and subdividing a total of 600 acres of Ravenswood 
beginning in 1916 (East Palo Alto Historical and Agricultural Society, et. al. 1997). 
Weeks created what he touted as a utopian poultry colony under the motto “one acre and 
independence” (Stanford Illustrated Review, 1917).  
The one to five acre plots stood in juxtaposition to monopoly agriculture. Weeks’ 
unique chicken coops allowed for minimal land holding; most members owned just one 
acre for intensive farming. The colony, named Runnymede, included a cooperative 
market system, cooperative store, “garden” school and central social hall. The farmers’ 
cash-only land purchases and cooperative organization promoted an image in the 
Runnymede advertisements of both individual self-reliance and democratic community 
(Ibid.).  
The poultry colony remained separate from Ravenswood until the neighboring 
town of Palo Alto threatened to annex parts of both communities; residents came together 
in opposition spurring the first of a half dozen attempts by the town to incorporate. 
Runnymede and Ravenswood residents attempted to incorporate in 1925 to thwart the 
annexation. In a compromise, the two communities came up with a new name: East Palo 
Alto. However, Palo Alto did not follow through with the threat, and East Palo Alto 
failed to incorporate due to conflicts between the Ravenswood and Runnymede residents, 
chiefly concerning the political control of a newly shared school. (Rigenhagen, 1993) 
The name East Palo Alto stuck, even if unincorporated, and the town continued to 
grow into the late 1920s. Residences and business were established around the north area 
of the town by the military post, Camp Fremont, a training grounds for soldiers during 
WWI. In 1927, private developers opened the two-lane Dumbarton toll bridge; it was the 
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first bridge to connect the peninsula to the East Bay. New housing and development grew 
at the foot of the bridge in East Palo Alto. Despite the town’s growing development, 
including East Palo Alto’s first cul de sac, the “Gardens,”and the poultry colony 
continued to distinguish East Palo Alto from the suburban character of the neighboring 
towns of Palo Alto and Menlo Park.  It wasn’t until the Great Depression hit at the end of 
the decade when a great many of the small farmers abandoned the area, which finally 
ended the Runnymede experiment. (Ibid.) 
Weeks’ social enterprise is an often-recalled chapter in East Palo Alto’s popular 
history. Indeed, the “little land” farmers’ movement influenced East Palo Alto land use 
into the 1950s, with some of the same land plots converted to flower nurseries by 
Japanese and Italian truck farmers. Nearly a century later, several East Palo Alto tenant 
activists endearingly referred to the colony as a kind of socialist collective on which the 
City of East Palo Alto became superimposed. Urban agricultural activists also have 
invoked Weeks to highlight the historical legacy of small farming as an integral 
component for the city’s land use future (East Palo Historical and Agricultural Society, 
et. al. 1997).   
Runnymede was an exclusive utopia by race and class, however, and therefore 
stood quite apart from the social justice ideals held by many East Palo Alto activists 
today. So too was the Runnymede motto a far cry from state managed socialism, and 
certainly contrasted with the revolutionary land reforms being played out at the same 
time in the far distant Soviet Union, and much closer Mexican countryside. Instead, 
Weeks’ small-scale colony sought to attract a middle class, the entrepreneurial, urban 
bourgeoise. The egalitarian ideals of the intentional community were premised on 
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existing privilege; membership denoted the status of one’s ability to purposefully 
distance oneself from urban industrial life, if after benefitting from it. The colonists were 
all European descendents who had cash on hand to invest in the land, housing, coops, and 
poultry stock. Europeans descendents continued to be the exclusive landowners in East 
Palo Alto when Runnymede’s long poultry tracks were later converted for floricultural 
production. (Michelson and Solomonson, 1997)  
The fact that East Palo Alto’s agrarian colony was exclusively white despite the 
number of Mexicans and Asians in the state and region, particularly people of Chinese 
and Japanese ancestry, reflected the racialized spatial and residential exclusions 
prominent in developing cities and towns in the western U.S. In the  “yellow peril” era, 
immigrants of Asian ancestry who remained in California faced organized boycotts, 
discrimination, and social exclusion.   
In fact, non-white immigrants to the U.S. were not allowed to purchase land in 
California, and therefore, by state law they would not have had the opportunity to buy 
into the Weeks’ cooperative. Within the U.S., state perpetrated and sanctioned violence, 
including Native American genocide and containment, were constitutive of racialization 
and disciplining processes that became legal doctrine. Historian Eric Foner pointed out 
that "where the social order was least stratified-as in the frontier states [like] California ... 
legal discrimination was most severe" (quoted in Brooks 2009: 12).  Although vigilante 
violence remained a threat to “non-whites” in California, particularly for Mexicans and 
Chinese in the early decades of the 1900s, California’s racial disciplining took shape 
through juridical and statutory means and specifically through the legal regulation of 
where one lived and who could make claim to one’s home or land ownership.  
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Creating the Landless Foreigner  
 
Anti-Asian sentiment by white workers in California had already grown to 
hysterical proportions following the Gold Rush and resulted in The Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1882.  California had entered the union as a free state, espousing the tenets of 
“free labor” undergirding industrial capitalism’s expansion. Growing anti-Chinese 
campaigns resulted from competition between workers in the mining, then factory-based, 
railroad, and port economies. Where Chinese workers previously had labored alongside 
European and European American miners, the decline in mining signaled a decline in 
prospects for upward class mobility for whites who had little access to land for small 
farming. (Ibid.) For European immigrants in California in the late 19th and early 20th 
century becoming “white” was conjoined to maintaining the foreignness of “non-white” 
Asian immigrants. Whiteness as construct amounted to a spatialized political voice 
figuratively and literally.  
San Francisco passed one of the country’s first racial residential zoning 
ordinances against Chinese mobility in 1890 in the wake of the Chinese Exclusion Act 
(Ibid: 24). In later decades before and during WWI, racial bias in zoning became a 
common practice. Zoning itself was a policy in urban planning largely new to the 20th 
century. The 1917 United States Supreme Court decision, Buchanan v. Warley, declared 
zoning restrictions by race unconstitutional, but the decision only addressed zoning. 
Instead, racial discrimination in private agreements became a norm, influencing the 
regional demographics of the Bay area, including the growing towns south of San 
Francisco, such as Palo Alto, Menlo Park and the hamlet of East Palo Alto.   
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Although neighboring Palo Alto, to the west of East Palo Alto, never legislated 
racial exclusion, as several resident committees had threatened (see Chamber of 
Commerce proposal Palo Alto Times January 15, 1921), the small number of Asians and 
even smaller number of African Americans lived apart from whites in the early decades 
of the 20th century. Restrictive covenants prevailed. The covenants were private 
agreements between residents and realtors to exclude Jews, Catholics, Mexicans, Asians, 
and Black people from residing in white neighborhoods. The 1913 California Real Estate 
Law Book provided templates for realtors to copy: “No part of said premises shall be 
sold, leased, or rented, or suffered to be occupied by as tenants for hire or gratuitously, 
any persons not of the white or Caucasian race” (Lincoln 1913: 18, cited in Hernandez 
[2010]; see also Jensen [1969] and Dean [1947]).15 The logic of organizing space by race 
was reproducible. 
U.S. expansionism to the Pacific Ridge, like European imperialism, had fomented 
and rested on nationalist sentiment aligned with a social-Darwinian discourse that 
legitimated colonial conquest and exploitation.  It was in the wake of WWI and 
xenophobic foment that two chapters of the Ku Klux Klan formed in Palo Alto, involving 
hundreds of residents including a handful of members from Stanford University’s faculty. 
The Klan appealed to white nativist wartime and postwar sentiment in California, and 
followed the organization of white laborers opposing Asian migration to the state 
(Bowling, 2012). Stanford University reflected and spurred racialized land use; the 
university refused antidiscrimination measures for its private land leases in its 
development of Stanford Hills in Palo Alto (Lowe, 1989: 57). Beginning in this same 																																																								
15 See also California real estate principles and practices, Schneider (1927). 
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interwar period, the entire nearby town of Menlo Park chose and adhered to a covenant 
template declaring that the only “nonwhite” residents permitted to reside in city 
boundaries were the whites’ domestic servants (Tajiri quoted in Robinson, 2012).   
Racial hierarchy was also prominently asserted through property rights in the 
state’s Alien Land Law, which was first adopted in California in 1913 and revived with 
greater political support in the state in 1920. The state’s “Alien Land Law” ensured that 
remaining agricultural holdings in California would be reserved for whites. The law 
specifically prohibited “aliens ineligible for citizenship” from land purchases. The 
language thereby still permitted European immigrants to own property since the 
Naturalization Act of 1790 exclusively deemed white, free immigrants eligible for 
naturalization.  In this way the land laws specifically targeted the growing number of 
Japanese, many of whom had arrived to California via Hawaii.   
Japanese immigrants were viewed as a new source of exploitable labor by 
ascending white agribusiness following Chinese exclusion (Aoki, 1998). Unlike the wave 
of Chinese migration that followed the gold rush, Japanese women also immigrated to the 
U.S., which meant family formation. In time, some second and third generation Japanese 
American citizens by birthright purchased land individually and collectively for 
agricultural production. For this, Japanese Americans became increasingly perceived as 
competition to individual smaller farmers in a context of corporate-controlled monopoly 
agriculture. Thus, the 1920 version of the California law sought to close loopholes to 
ensure these marked groups among the foreign-born were not purchasing land through 
their US citizen children. (Ibid.)  
As argued by Aoki (1998), the Alien Land Law contributed to a racist structural 
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framework that made possible and deemed rational the mass dispossession of Japanese 
immigrants and Japanese American citizens from the West Coast in WWII.16 While 
Executive Order 9066 was created in Washington, D.C., it was produced through, and 
accepted within, the dominant racial logic reflected in California’s land laws. These laws 
also structured a concept of citizenry that upheld whites’ property rights and whiteness as 
status in the polity. Just as Chinese laborers were pushed from the mines when gold 
became scant, and migration halted based on white labor demands, the land laws ensured 
that the Japanese would not be permitted to compete with white farmers. 
Japanese immigrant floriculturists in East Palo Alto were largely tenant farmers 
when the U.S. armed forces removed them to the confinements of the Heart Mountain 
Detention Center in Wyoming in 1942 (Michelson and Solomonson, 1997). The majority 
of Japanese and Japanese Americans who did return from forced internment to East Palo 
Alto arrived home to a town on the cusp of dramatic change. They took little time to 
develop chrysanthemum production in East Palo Alto and served a national market. They 
accomplished this despite the fact that the California “Alien Land Law” was still in 
effect. Japanese American second generation families eventually purchased East Palo 
Alto plots, setting up greenhouses on Runnymede tracks using cooperative labor pools to 
support the individually owned flower nurseries (Michelson and Solomonson, 1997). The 
Japanese floriculturists became increasingly successful, until the mid 1950s.  
The state’s Supreme Court reversed the Alien Land Law in 1952 on grounds that 
																																																								16	Mexicans	had	been	repatriated	in	the	1930s	in	part	as	a	result	of	pressure	to	accommodate	the	great	number	of	Great	Plains	migrants	that	came	to	California	looking	for	work	following	the	Dust	Bowl.	The	Bracero	program	of	1942,	Aoki	(1998)	reminds	us,	later	provided	a	new	labor	pool	of	Mexicans	to	then	replace	the	detained	Japanese.	Braceros	were	recruited	ostensibly	without	prospect	of	union	recognition	(the	NLRB	didn’t	extend	to	agricultural	laborers),	or	right	to	land	purchase.	They	were	subsequently	deported.	
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it conflicted with the Fourteenth Amendment. In response, in the mid 1950s the Sequoia 
Board of Trustees chose to accommodate the creation of a new high school in East Palo 
Alto by condemning twelve residences and occupying 20 acres of land parcels owned by 
Japanese and Japanese American growers. They chose this land rather than pursue a 
proposal for the use of uninhabited parcel owned by the largest landowner in East Palo 
Alto, the Kavanaugh family. Competition with Europe had become a growing challenge 
for the Japanese floriculturists, but the growers’ dislocation for the school had immediate 
and devastating consequence for the local industry. (Lowe, 1989:66) 
The “Alien Land Law” of exclusion that had prohibited Asian immigrants from 
purchasing land, also cohered with the instituted race-based system of both de jure and de 
facto housing regulation and neighborhood appraisal in U.S. cities. It was in the postwar 
period following WWII that East Palo Alto, like much of the U.S., also experienced 
dramatic demographic shifts. East Palo Alto’s population grew exponentially in this 
period due to Black exodus from the south and inter-city migration from migrants’ first-
stop destination Bay area cities, such as San Francisco, Oakland and Richmond. White 
authority was reinscribed during both the first and second periods of the Great Migration, 
in contrast to some gains in industrial union integration in the war industries. Massive 
social dislocation led to policies that shaped land values based on white demands and 
were carried out via state-licensed realtors, local and federal underwriting guidelines, and 
exclusionary state subsidies.  
 
A National Use for the Home: Federal Interventions in Housing  
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Whereas East Palo Alto’s development trajectory was directly tied to its local and 
state political context, it was the federal intervention in the housing market that led to 
dramatic change in urban and suburban landscapes across the country following the 
social upheavals of war time and postwar migrations, and the interwar Great Depression 
of the 1930s. The New Deal form of federalism, and its local implementation, further 
configured housing prospects of Black migrants, including those who came to northern 
California and eventually to East Palo Alto. The New Deal era housing policies followed 
other examples of federal government intervention in housing, such as in housing 
development for wartime security in WWI. It was following the Depression, however, 
that the federal government created a racialized mapping of financial risk in housing that 
would influence investment strategies then and now at the national scale.  An 
understanding of federal intervention in housing in the first half of the 20th century 
provides an important backdrop to the post WWII trajectory of East Palo Alto’s 
urbanization and tenant-led campaign for cityhood by the century’s end.  
Throughout the U.S. before the 1930s, concerns over housing siting, density, and 
conditions were considered and regulated by localities, the latter specifically in 
relationship to urban social reform movements as well as racialized exclusive covenants. 
A national market of housing finance took form by WWI that would contribute to the 
Great Depression, spur massive social protest including the form of eviction blockades, 
and, ultimately, New Deal housing subsidies and regulation. High labor costs in the 
construction industry, increased costs of timber, and the de-mechanized nature of the 
building industry during WWI led to higher housing costs disproportionate to urban 
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manufacturing wages. Demand for urban housing had rescaled the origins and structuring 
of home loans from the local to the national market. The mortgage industry ensued. 
 Housing became a speculative venture during the Great War, reaching far beyond 
the local bank-borrower. The home loan market shifted from cooperative depositor-based 
mutual associations known as local “Banking & Loans” to larger national commercial 
lenders, including large banks and insurance companies. Increased petty capitalist 
investment in mortgage bonds and the creation of widespread household debt through 
mortgages soared before and after WWI. In 1913, mortgage interest payments became a 
write-off in U.S. income tax law, further incentivizing homeownership and household 
debt (Immergluck, 2010; 2009; 2009a; Radford, 1996). 
During WWI, the federal government responded directly to the crisis of housing 
demand due to its wartime labor implications. Securing the homeland implied securing 
“home” for the war-industry workers. In 1914 the American Federation of Labor passed a 
resolution during its national convention advocating for “the passage of laws that will 
bring about a system of Government loans of money for municipal and private ownership 
of sanitary housing” (quoted in Radford, 1996: 36). But it wasn’t until the heightened 
labor turnovers in the defense industry, particularly at shipbuilding centers, that the Labor 
Department created the United States Housing Corporation (USHC), as well as the 
Emergency Fleet Corporation (EFC) of the U.S. Shipping Board in 1918. The prompt 
undertaking of production resulted in over 15,000 units of family housing construction 
for defense workers, including just under 500 in the Bay Area (Ibid:16).  
The EFC and USHC are significant as federal precedent for intervention in 
meeting housing demand. Frederick Law Olmsted (1919; 1919a) directed the Town 
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Planning Commission for the USHC and wrote of workers’ exhaustion and frustration 
from housing conditions, explaining: “No urge of patriotism or high wages could 
compensate for the overloaded accommodations for individual and family life” 
(1919:28). Although labor largely considered the response tardy and inadequate, the 
federal government intervened in housing directly through these programs to the benefit 
of highly skilled and necessary workers, nearly all white, and also established some 
limited federal rent control laws until they were found unconstitutional in 1924 (Radford, 
1996).  
The federal government had a high stake in labor productivity for the war 
mobilization; for these wartime years the government attempted to regulate labor stability 
and efficiency in part through the housing question. The real estate industry 
unsurprisingly held a strong interest in limiting direct federal subsidies and rent control to 
home occupants. The housing that the federal government controlled and produced was 
turned over to the private market at the end of the war, thus ensuring federal rent ceilings 
would not diminish profit opportunities in the private market. The pressure on housing 
therefore continued following WWI, amidst continued demand that fueled the growth of 
the mortgage industry. Balloon payment requirements in individual mortgages helped 
impel what would become the Depression’s foreclosure crisis. 
The federal government responded to the mass protest movements of the 1930s 
with the New Deal, which in the realm of housing effectively bolstered the private 
market. The response ultimately involved the development of federal public housing 
contingent on urban renewal. Public housing planners refused the model of federal 
housing production for specialized workers as was done, albeit temporarily, in WWI. The 
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federal plans also eschewed the experimental models of mixed income public housing 
and middle class limited equity coops developed early on by the Public Works 
Administration. Instead federal public housing subsidies became available only for the 
very poor, and were, therefore, noncompetitive with the private real estate market. The 
federal response also refused sustained rent control to temper rent gauging. Instead, the 
primary federal response to the Depression was to rationalize the private homebuilding 
and real estate industry’s mortgage practices at the national level.  
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal government rescued Hoover’s flagship 
ideology of individual homeownership from the catastrophe of the Great Depression’s 
foreclosure crisis. FDR’s reforms ultimately demonstrated an insistence on 
homeownership as a core national value, debt through mortgage as an acceptable and 
manageable wage supplement, and the promotion of the mortgage market as a viable, 
profitable industry for those lenders reaching beyond their local depositor market. 
Federalism in housing involved a slate of scaled compromises, ensuring state and local 
authority over public housing sitings that would ensure alignment with existing racial 
segregation patterns. Housing creation of all kinds, in turn, was a boom for the building 
trades, an immediate jobs-creator spurred by the federal subsidies. 
One of the prominently studied applications that came out of the federal response 
was the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) security mapping, publicized by 
urban historian Kenneth Jackson (1980; 1985) who came across the maps during his 
research on suburbanization. HOLC was a much-lauded New Deal federal agency created 
in 1933 to restructure existing mortgages to avoid foreclosures. HOLC provided direct 
federal loans to rescue million borrowers that allowed them to avoid foreclosure (Colton, 
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2002: 2). The agency conducted the massive City Survey Program. HOLC field agents, 
usually coming from the private realtor and building industry, produced a coded A, B, C, 
D ranking system of urban land values differentiated and ranked by race for each city.17 
The Residential Security Maps reproduced and systematized the racial homogenization of 
urban space, neighborhood by neighborhood.   
Indeed, within the first three decades of the 20th century, spatial residential 
segregation by race had become a central standard of the realtor and homebuilding 
industries at multiple scales. As was noted in the cases of Palo Alto and Menlo Park, 
restrictive covenants specifically targeting Asians, Mexicans, Blacks, Jews and Catholics 
were applied at both the neighborhood level and in individual purchase contracts. What 
made HOLC’s efforts stand apart from the locally distributed materials of the California 
Association of Real Estate Boards, or even the widely distributed guidelines of racial 
exclusion promoted by the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), is that 
the HOLC Residential Security Maps were produced to serve the national government’s 
new vested interest in the criteria of local property valuation. The federal government’s 
interest in the housing market had expanded with the New Deal: the stakeholders now 
included the U.S. Treasury.  
FDR’s New Deal policies had set into action federal mortgage programs that 
assumed the risk of private lenders. The state’s differentiation of property valuation by 
race occurred as the federal government guaranteed the private and burgeoning mortgage 
industry. When debt means gambling on the prospects of return, standards for 
differentiated risk must be laid. Local and state-based practices of racialized property 																																																								
17 For further reading on enduring implications of the formalization of risk-mapping see Oliver and Shapiro 
(2006). 
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valuation became embedded in federal underwriting guidelines as a feature of risk 
management. In heuristic fashion, the state deemed “non-white” households as risk in 
order to lift “white” as secure. The two- market system cojoined land and housing 
valorization of some to devalorization of others by race. Property valuation by the state 
through race contrasts the Chicago School’s view of an evolutionary, or natural schema, 
to class, racial and ethnic settlement patterns in industrial cities. The HOLC maps 
depicted a salient constructed racial hierarchy already operationalized within carefully 
worded restrictive covenants. 
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) followed HOLC in 1934 as a vehicle 
to directly insure private mortgages, guaranteeing low risk to private lenders. The 1935 
Federal Housing Administration’s underwriting manual pointedly suggested that private 
deed restrictions do the work of regulating race in residential settlement:  
Protection against adverse influences is obtained by the existence and enforcement of 
proper zoning regulations and appropriate deed restrictions… Important among 
adverse influences are the following: infiltration of inharmonious racial or nationality 
groups; the presence of smoke, odors, fog, etc. (FHA Underwriting Manual, 1935: 
section 309 and section 310 in T-RACES).  
 
White FHA underwriting developers perhaps promulgated language informed by their 
own property interests. The language casted anyone deemed “nonwhite” as interloper. 18 
In suit, FDR’s administration created Fannie Mae in 1938 to launch a 
government-backed secondary mortgage market to facilitate the circulation of mortgages. 
																																																								
18 Of course, the FHA could have done the opposite: the federal government could have included anti-
discrimination measures in its underwriting manual that made discrimination unlawful, specifically in the 
case of federally insured mortgages. In structural terms, Black migrant settlement in the post-war period 
was shaped by job opportunity as well as by racialized residential property relations, including spatial 
marginalization, resilience and rebellion.  
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The purpose of Fannie Mae was to assist housing lenders by buying (and reselling) their 
FHA-insured mortgages. By purchasing and selling the mortgages of private lenders, 
Fannie Mae provided more funds to private banks to make more home loans. The federal 
government became the patron of the national housing market. It was within this national 
housing landscape that Black migrants arrived to California from both rural and urban 
regions of the U.S. South and from California’s nearby East Bay, especially in the post 
WWII era. 
 
Black Migration & Agri-suburbia Transformation 
 
The Second Great Migration between 1940-1970 involved 5 million Black 
migrants from the rural south to northern and western cities (Massey and Denton 1993). 
During and after WWII Black migrants moved in large numbers to Northern California 
from Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana and other southern states for war era industrial jobs 
such as those in the ports of San Francisco and Oakland. Roosevelt had outlawed racial 
discrimination in war industrial plants, giving new opportunity to Black workers in 
factory positions. In addition to prospects of job opportunity, many left the south in 
search of relief from Jim Crow. The Black migration to California in this period led to the 
transformation of the agrarian regions in the South Bay to rural suburbia, edge cities, and 
metropolises (Ruffin II, 2012).  
Until the 1940s, majority Black cities were uncommon in the West (Ibid). When 
the federal Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) conducted its confidential City 
Survey Program of 239 major cities across the U.S. between 1935-1940, Blacks 
accounted for less than 2% of the populations in the major cities of San Francisco, San 
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Jose, Oakland and Berkley in the Bay Area (U.S. Census, 1940). Between 1940-1970 
Black migration transformed the demographics of these cities, and in some cases 
suburbia. In the same period, East Palo Alto went from a small community hamlet of 
about 2,000 in 1940 to a growing suburb of 8,000 in 1950 and 20,250 in 1960, a 
population increase of over 150% in the latter decade (U.S. Census).  
The nation-wide suburban large-scale development that followed WWII was 
made possible through direct public subsidies backed by FHA and VA mortgage 
insurance through the low interest zero down payment provisions of the Servicemen's 
Readjustment Act of 1944 (known as the G.I. Bill). Returning white veterans, in 
particular, benefitted directly from the federal support. Between 1946 and 1960 the 
federal government subsidized low interest rates and insured 350,000 new homes in 
northern California, less than 100 of which went to Blacks (Troy Duster quoted in 
Loewen, 2005: 128).  Realtors and developers promoted homeownership as an extension 
of U.S. patriotism and war economy, an analogue of the American Dream, and a bedrock 
and product of the “free market” system (Freund, 2010). Yet, since the New Deal, the 
private housing market was anything but free of direct state financing and explicit U.S. 
Treasury guarantees. The racially exclusive American Dream was financed heavily and 
selectively by the state. 
The G.I. Bill helped transform the South Bay region’s housing landscape and 
broader economy. This was especially true in the vicinity of East Palo Alto. Blue-collar 
white workers received college opportunity, which served as training for expanding the 
war industry technologies, including that of semi-conductors. In 1947, Stanford 
University received a record number of students in the hard sciences due to the popularity 
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of the G.I. Bill. Silicon Valley visibly emerged in this period due in part to a renewal of 
private “adventure capital,” now known as “venture capital.” By the early 1960s venture 
capital involved institutions taking risks on start-up enterprises exploring untested 
technologies.  Technological advances led to increased manufacturing jobs located, at 
first, in the U.S.  In the area of production, Latino and African American women began to 
take over electronics related assembly-line work in the Valley. In 1964 Romic Chemicals 
opened an industrial waste facility in East Palo Alto, by then a majority African-
American unincorporated town, to handle toxic chemicals used in the semi conductor and 
other electronics production process.  
Joe Eichler, a merchant developer in California, was the exception to racial 
residential exclusion in suburbia that proved the rule. Eichler publicly declared he would 
sell to Black buyers. His position stood in direct opposition to the East Coast developer 
Leavitt, who said via press conference that he would not sell his FHA subsidized 
suburban housing division properties to Blacks (Brodkin, 1998). Yet, unlike Leavittowns, 
most of Eichler’s modernist homes were not meant for the working class, but for the 
rising white-collar workers, including those who made their homes in the emergent 
Silicon Valley. These homes remained out of reach for all but a small number of Blacks 
who did not need mortgages. While Eichler refrained from advertising to African 
Americans specifically, he stood by his word, offering to pay white neighbors to move 
out if they did not want to live near African-American home buyers (Eichler, 1982).   
Eichler’s example did not initiate an integrationist movement among other 
merchant developers or purchasers. Still open housing gained traction as an issue of 
concern for white liberals in California’s Central Valley, including Palo Alto, where a 
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group of Eichler-inspired residents formed the Palo Alto Committee for Open Housing. 
In 1958, the organization of white liberals listed housing available and published letters 
in the Palo Alto Times encouraging non-discrimination in housing (Lowe, 1989:56). 
However, by this time much of the interest by African Americans in the region’s housing 
stock focused on the available housing in the far more affordable town of East Palo Alto. 
Blockbusting was spurred by a deliberate attempt by Blacks in the region to 
resolve the “housing problem.” Many availed themselves of the chance to live outside the 
overcrowded urban ghettos of Oakland and San Francisco. The more affordable housing 
stock of East Palo Alto included “post-revival” bungalow and suburban track housing 
with spacious lawns. African Americans in the region of East Palo Alto were virtually 
exclusively segregated to just a few blocks in the area of Ramona Street in Palo Alto, and 
to a small neighborhood of Redwood City. East Palo Alto was selected as a potential site 
for African Americans to purchase homes by a precursor organizations of the South 
Mateo County National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
and the Council for Civic Unity of Redwood City (Lowe, 1989: 49). Several African-
American families used white stand-ins through the efforts of this interracial organization 
to acquire their homes in East Palo Alto (Ibid). 
Blockbusting eventually changed the face of East Palo Alto through racialized 
panic spurred by realtors. This was recounted in Stanford University’s Committee on the 
Black Performing Arts oral history project and documentary film, Dreams of the City; the 
archives include 80 hours of interviews with some of the East Palo Alto’s oldest Black 
and Latino founders. African-American resident Barbara Mouton explained the 
relationship between redlining and blockbusting: 
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We had a realtor who showed us all around Menlo Park and Palo Alto and there were 
several places we really liked. Next day, she came back very tearful and she said she 
was instructed that she could not show us houses in any place but East Palo Alto. 
(Dreams of a City, [1988] 1996) 
 
It was also noted in other accounts by Black purchasers that realtors largely collaborated 
in determining where Blacks would settle for the realtors’ own tremendous profits (Ibid).  
Ed Becks was an African-American veteran who came to California in 1942 after 
serving in Germany. He explained that he looked to the suburbs for better housing in the 
mid-1950s, which is how he landed in East Palo Alto: “They [realtors] brought busloads 
of Black people from San Francisco and drove up and down the streets, saying these are 
houses that you could buy, but also as a way of threatening the white people who were 
already there” (Ibid; see also Becks in U.S. Commission for Civil Rights, 1967). Houses 
owned by whites were sold in the late 1950s to realtors for 8K who then sold the homes 
to Blacks for an exorbitant 12K, explained Becks. Realtors would go house to house 
convincing white homeowners that their property values would further plummet if they 
did not sell. This in turn back-fired at times for realtors’ profiteering. In the South Bay, 
for example, after realtors spurred panic white homeowners often became their own 
brokers by competing to sell their homes directly to Black buyers at lower prices (Ruffin, 
u.p. dissertation 2007: 276) 
East Palo Alto was enticing for its climate, Bay watershed beauty, comparatively 
affordable housing, and access to jobs available outside the larger shipping and 
production centers of San Francisco, Oakland, and Richmond. Adjacent to the Bayshore 
101, and at the doorstep of burgeoning Silicon Valley, East Palo Alto for one provided 
entry to domestic jobs servicing nearby towns of affluent whites. East Palo Alto Blacks 
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also gained some access to industrial positions such as the Ford Plant that opened in 1955 
in the South Bay town of Milipitas for those residents with their own or shared 
transportation (Ruffin, 2014). By the early 1960s electronics processing also provided 
industrial jobs within and surrounding East Palo Alto. 
Not everyone moved to East Palo Alto to purchase housing, however. Absentee 
white landlords maintained properties that were available to newcomers as rental units. 
These landlords also maintained political power in East Palo Alto despite shifting 
residential demographics, and they used their power to thwart Black residents’ 
incorporation attempts. The dominant political rhetoric in California was steeped in the 
prerogatives of property owners as exemplified by Proposition 14, discussed in the next 
section. Proposition 14 was a racially coded referendum for racial exclusion in rental 
housing, specifically. 
 
The Racist Design of “Fair” Housing 
 
In the 1960s civil rights eralocal organizing throughout California focused on the 
questions of fair employment and segregation in housing and education. From New York, 
Baltimore, St. Louis, to Los Angeles organizing among public housing as well as private 
market renters put working class housing concerns back on the national agenda for the 
first time since the end of WWII and with militancy reminiscent of the organizing thrust 
of the 1930s. Much of the concerns were expressed in terms of discrimination and 
segregation as contributing factors of slum conditions; local efforts gravitated towards a 
broader federal civil rights policy change for open housing.  
Housing was a touchstone civil rights issue in California and led to several 
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statewide initiatives.19 These California-based measures in housing helped to pave the 
way to federal civil rights legislation in housing in 1968. A decade after the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision Shelley v. Kramer outlawed restrictive covenants in 1948, the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act, named after then-California state assembly member Jesse Unruh, 
prohibited discrimination based on race or disability by businesses. Moreover, in 1963, 
after heavy organizing by groups such as the NAACP, and in the wake of the Unruh fair 
employment gains, as well as an even earlier state school desegregation ruling, the 
California legislature passed the California Fair Housing Act, known as the Rumford Act 
(“Fair Employment and Housing Act [Rumford Act],” Gov. Code § 12955, et seq.).  
The Rumford Act, supported by the governor, sought to uphold the Fourteenth 
Amendment and end discrimination in the sale and rental of housing. Republicans in the 
state legislature ensured that the vast number of private housing units would remain 
excluded from the bill, however. The Rumford Act’s groundbreaking antidiscrimination 
measures instead covered multifamily housing of five or more units and public housing, 
only.  
Even these incremental victories came with a backlash, however. For one, 
California’s restrictive covenants, redlining, and blockbusting practices continued. The 
Rumford legislation also rallied realtors to respond to the new state antidiscrimination 
mandate by organizing the 1964 campaign for Proposition 14.20 The state proposition 
would presumably take measure of popular sentiment around civil rights interventions in 																																																								
19 California propositions to curtail the state’s own civil rights gains may have reflected resistance to a 
changing electoral schemata. This is an area for further inquiry and investigation. This is essentially an 
empirical question as to whether and how white power was harnessed through proposition campaigns to 
bypass decisions of their elected leaders who were voted into office through changing racial urban district 
boundaries.  
20 Note: Archive of regional anti-Prop 14 campaign materials at Graduate Theological Seminary, Berkeley 
California. 
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housing in an area of the country viewed as far more “tolerant” of antidiscrimination 
change than the Jim Crow south. For this reason, Californians’ vote on Proposition 14 
came to be seen as a litmus test for the national sentiment for fair housing. 
The referendum asserted a right of property owners to exclude an individual for 
any reason: 
 
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge, 
directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or 
rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to 
such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses. (Art. I, § 26, of the 
California Constitution, 1965) 
 
Rather than explicitly tie the referendum language to race restrictions, the wording 
carefully framed the issue to say that the consumer housing market could not be regulated 
by state intervention, despite the fact that bank underwriting manuals certainly did so 
based on state-sanctioned racialized risk taking. Instead, the language focused on the 
individual property owner, much like the work of restrictive covenants. It was a “right” of 
the property owner to sell or rent at the owner’s discretion. The language obfuscated the 
intent. On the one hand, such language might have been written in oppositional response 
to municipal-backed restrictive covenants; on the other hand, the right to not discriminate 
included the right to discriminate. Yet, there was no right to not be discriminated against 
on the basis of race. The referendum was a carefully worded rejoinder to the state’s 
mandate that one must not discriminate.  
Proposition 14 was named “California Fair Housing Initiative,” in cooptation of 
civil rights language. The rhetoric deployed in support of the bill re-framed the issue as 
fairness to property owners. Casting the “American Dream” as property rights, 
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proponents argued that the individual interests of the current property owner trump the 
rights of any individual to purchase or rent. The owner, not just the consumer, could 
invoke “choice” as part of the free market. Moreover, rather than circulate housing 
exclusion as an issue of race, backers of Proposition 14 articulated the issue as a question 
of a property owner’s right to use one’s own moral judgment in determining who 
deserved a home, and where.  
The campaign rhetoric and images of this notion of “morality” focused on the 
right to choose someone based on virtuous behavior, a trope for the racialized “culture of 
poverty” discourse that would gain traction following Moynihan’s (in)famous report, 
“The Negro Family: The Case for National Action” (March, 1965). Supporters of 
California’s Proposition 14 used images that depicted Blacks as impoverished and that 
connoted behaviors of family dysfunction, as criminal and pathological compared to 
depictions of middle-class righteousness of white suburban families (Theoharis, 2006: 
48). Since, according to Proposition 14, it was the individual property owner’s decision to 
decide whether the consumer met the owner’s standards of moral virtue, the justification 
for housing exclusion was reframed from an explicit emphasis on race to an explicit 
emphasis on character. Such merit by deserving status in this example was a harbinger to 
contemporary neoliberal discourse of meritocracy that masks the social relations of race 
and racism. Racial design, however implicit, has intended and real consequences of 
reproducing racial hierarchy. 
Proposition 14 won. There were nearly 500,000 more signatures collected than 
necessary for the initial petition to allow for the Proposition 14 referendum, portending 
an uphill battle for the Rumford defenders.  Organizers against Proposition 14 turned to a 
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strategy that relied on church networks, CORE, and other civil rights groups, national 
press, and voter mobilization (Ibid). Mid-Peninsula Citizens against Proposition 14, 
reported in the left-leaning Black newspaper, The Crisis, that NAACP members of the 
Santa Clara and San Mateo region responded with a drive that registered 1,000 new 
voters (1964). Despite the coalescence of Black protest movement organizing against 
Proposition 14, and national attention, the measure passed two to one; 75% of all white 
voters supported it (Theoharis 2006).   
The federal government was quick to take notice of the Rumford undercut. U.S. 
Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach recommended to President Johnson to pursue 
federal legislation around housing, as many were linking Proposition 14 to the Watts 
rebellion in Los Angeles in 1965. “The housing issue, as indicated by the vote on 
Proposition 14 in California last year, may well be the most controversial and explosive 
of all civil rights issues” (quoted in Pritchett, 2010: 287). California lost at least $22 
million in federal redevelopment funding immediately following Proposition 14’s 
passage due to noncompliance with federal antidiscrimination provisions included in 
urban public infrastructure programs, ironically to the detriment of urban areas and of 
immediate consequence to Black communities (Ibid).  
In 1966 the California State Supreme Court ruled Proposition 14 as 
unconstitutional, and in 1967 the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision citing that the 
proposition undermined the Fourteenth Amendment. The latter decision created a 
national precedent against state enactment of legislation that would circumvent or 
undermine federal anti-discrimination law. Local authority could not allow discrimination 
where federal legislation prohibited such practices. 
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From Containment to Emplacement 
 
Residents of East Palo Alto had little political voice compared with neighboring 
towns. Unincorporated East Palo Alto relied on the county, San Mateo, for its 
infrastructure support. Miriam Turner was a white woman who was initially attracted to 
East Palo Alto for its affordable housing stock and ample yards. Turner worked with 
white and Black residents alike to stop panic buying and eventually spearheaded an 
interracial alliance that brought residents together in an effort to take control of their 
community through incorporation in 1958 (Dreams of A City 1996). The incorporation 
attempt called it the “City of Ravenswood,” of approximately 12 sq. miles, harkening 
back to its original name. Large property owners led the opposition to incorporation, 
fearing higher taxes. At that time, petitioners had to represent a proportion of propertied-
residents, thus tying formal political participation in cityhood to land holdings. 
(Rigenhagen, 1993)  
The consequences of failing to incorporate would be devastating for the future tax 
base of East Palo Alto, including a total loss of 10 of its 12.5 sq. miles to annexation 
before eventual incorporation 25 years later. Menlo Park took advantage of East Palo 
Alto’s lack of political status, gaining 25% of the East Palo Alto’s land area, including an 
entire industrial park, through annexation, into the 1960s. By the end of the decade, 
Leslie Salt, South Pacific Railroad, Hiller Aircraft, Ideal Cement, and the Bohannon 
Industrial Park, which included Johnson and Johnson, Sierra Electronics, Upjohn and 
Zenith, all transferred to Menlo Park out of East Palo Alto’s unincorporated district, 
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plummeting any potential tax base for an incorporated city in the future (Lowe, 1989: 
147). Palo Alto, located in an entirely separate county, annexed the golf course and 
airport located in East Palo Alto (Ibid). The white, affluent and politically powerful 
neighbors of Menlo Park and Palo Alto stripped the increasingly Black-majority town of 
East Palo Alto of its economic foundation. 
Moreover, East Palo Alto’s small business district had been devastated in the mid-
1950s. The business district grew as a product of the town’s status as the “other side” of 
the tracks of tony Palo Alto. This was due in part to the alcohol prohibitions of Stanford 
University and its surrounding no-liquor zones. Rowdiness would become exported from 
Palo Alto to East Palo Alto to maintain the illusion of superior moral conduct in the 
university town, while residents and students went to booze in the west side section of 
East Palo Alto that had gained the name Whiskey Gulch during Prohibition. In 1956 the 
four-lane expansion of the Bayshore Highway cut through Whiskey Gulch. The urban 
renewal project cleared the business community and what would be a tax base for an 
incorporated East Palo Alto (Palo Alto Times, January 11, 1956; Sedway and Cooke, 
1970). The Bayshore Freeway appropriation of what had been downtown East Palo Alto 
underscored the town’s lack of voice in decision making in their city and within the San 
Mateo County Supervisors.  
 
“We are Nairobi”: Black Power to City Power 
 
In East Palo Alto, African Americans had gained access to comparatively quality 
housing. In an ideological and tactical turn, many Black activists in East Palo Alto by the 
late 1960s shifted their focus from the issue of blockbusting and fair housing to the 
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questions of who controlled the land as well as the decision making of local institutions. 
Indeed, by the late 1960s, East Palo Alto had become a nationally recognized site of 
Black community organization, attracting African-American residents through not only 
low cost housing opportunity, but also through the nationally acclaimed self-organization 
of its own educational system, which included the founding of its own university. 
East Palo Alto’s model community institutions stood as counter to the racist and 
misogynist logic of the “culture of poverty” rhetoric voiced by the Proposition 14 
campaign that attempted to undermine fair rental housing (see description, Chapter 4). 
Still, East Palo Alto was viewed as a ghetto suburb within a regional politics dominated 
by white affluence. East Palo Alto community institutions were shaped by the 
contradictions of the city’s Black majority status yet lack of formal municipal governing 
authority. East Palo Alto residents were propelled to assert community control and 
develop their own institutions as pragmatic, ideological, and tactical endeavors 
undergirded by a politics of self-determination.  
In the early 1960s the East Palo Alto Committee of the Poor organized through a 
civil rights framework primarily against segregation and specifically around the 
intersecting issues of education, police repression, and jobs. Regional civil rights 
organizations such NAACP and CORE chapters led protests resulting in important local 
victories, especially an early victory that involved the hiring of African Americans in 
East Palo Alto supermarket chains (San Jose Mercury News, 1963). The thrust of East 
Palo Alto local civil rights organizing largely focused on educational opportunity, 
however, within two seemingly divergent arenas of organizing: school integration and 
alternative and autonomous institution building.  
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Mothers for Equal Education involved approximately 250 women in East Palo 
Alto in the mid-1960s largely concerned with regional educational equity in light of the 
increasingly Black public school district in East Palo Alto. Dissatisfied with racialized 
low expectations in East Palo Alto public schools, compared with the nearby well-
resourced and predominantly white districts, Black activists linked with white families in 
a “sneak out” effort. A hundred Black students resided with white families and attended 
their schools (interview 2012).  
At a pivotal moment in the education organizing, the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) leader Stokely Charmichael came to East Palo Alto to 
discuss the local activists’ efforts. Charmichael would soon become an honorary prime 
minister of the Black Panther Party. He was recalled for his strong and growing critique 
of integrationist strategies, and for greatly influencing the East Palo Alto activists’ next 
course of action, saying at the meeting, “I don’t understand why you would be working 
this hard to send your children’s minds to be educated by people who have oppressed you 
for four hundred years” (quoted in Biondi 2012: 221). This political intervention 
coincided with the growing burden carried by Black students in the “sneak out” program 
who were exasperated by harassment, violence, and extreme alienation in the white 
communities. Indeed, the relentless abuse and taunting in the white schools ultimately 
compelled the leaders to reconsider their effort (Slater, 1971). 
East Palo Alto’s organizers ultimately helped shaped, and were shaped by, the 
principles of self-reliance espoused by the Bay Area Black Panther Party. East Palo Alto 
became the seat of the San Mateo County Black Action Coalition where future Black 
Panthers Huey Newton and Bobby Seale received training out of East Palo Alto’s St. 
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John’s Church (Batchelder u.p. thesis 1994: 29). National Black Action Conferences 
were held in East Palo Alto for three consecutive years in 1967, 1968, and 1969 using an 
elementary school gymnasium. Later, in the early 1970s, militancy by students and 
residents grew in East Palo Alto, in part around local organizing momentum for the 
desegregation of Ravenswood High School. East Palo Alto also gained further national 
attention as a seat of militant mobilization and protest against the jailing of Black Panther 
leader Angela Davis held at the time in next-door Palo Alto (Aptheker, 1999: 96). 
The agenda of community-service and community-control dominated the East 
Palo Alto organizing influenced by the Black Panthers. Gertrude Wilks, the central leader 
of Mothers for Equal Education had come to the Bay area from Louisiana where she had 
been raised in a sharecropper family (Rickford, 2009). Wilks turned from leading the 
“sneak outs” to develop model schools in East Palo Alto centered on Black pride through 
community-controlled education.21 She began Nairobi Day Schools in 1966, which by 
1968 included an accredited private elementary school program and then a high school 
serving 80 students. The first principal of the Nairobi High School was George Mason 
Murray. Murray served as minister of education in the Black Panthers and had been fired 
from the English department at San Francisco State College, an act that incited a five 
month student strike led by the Black Student Union and Third World Liberation Front 
(San Francisco Strike Daily, 1968; Biondi, 2012: 222).  
The Black-centered movement that was rooted in pride, self-determination, and 
autonomy also led to a referendum to change the name of East Palo Alto to Nairobi in 
1968. The name change idea sparked a campaign that grew out of a planning meeting for 
																																																								
21 See also Ralph J. Bunche Orals History Collection, Wilks Interview Transcript Box RJB 461, p. 95 
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an application to the federal Model City program (Rickford u.p. dissertation, 2009: 139; 
San Mateo County, 1968). According to one analysis, the higher voting age of 21 was the 
main factor that led to its marginal defeat; if 18 had been the voting age, East Palo Alto 
would indeed be known today as Nairobi (Wildflowers, 2013). 
Strongly influenced by the grassroots organizing espoused by SNCC, Stanford 
student Robert Hoover established a separate endeavor, Nairobi College, in East Palo 
Alto in 1969 (Biondi, 2012: 222). Hoover was a member of an activist cadre of families 
in East Palo Alto who called themselves the “Floating Crap Gang” meeting in each 
other’s homes to mediate street gang issues (Rickford u.p. dissertation, 2009: 138). He 
assembled a multiracial coordinating group to launch Nairobi College after first helping 
to establish Nairobi Day school and after serving as a college readiness program director 
at the College of San Mateo near San Francisco, from which he had been fired for his 
political militancy (Ibid.: 274-277).  
Although Nairobi College leveraged Stanford University library access for its 
students, its designated campus was East Palo Alto. “We think that our primary job is to 
train leaders for the Black community,” explained Hoover in an interview for Ebony 
Magazine (Slater, 1971:89). Nairobi College was a two-year college that had an 
enrollment of 300 students in 1971. The college served as a national laboratory and 
training ground in democratic control, and was considered a living example of student 
decision making over hiring and curriculum within a climate of protest and crisis. Nairobi 
College gained national attention as campus activism nationwide demanded Black 
inclusion and protested the Vietnam War (Egerton, 1972).  
While alternative educational institutions in other cities came and left, Nairobi 
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College outlasted most, with a ten year run. One explanation for its comparative success, 
and its downfall, lies in its reliance on outside funding. The college was based on radical 
democracy and Black self-determination, but was imbued with the contradictions of 
support from private capital as well as federal grants (Rickford u.p. dissertation 2009: 
274-277). 
As part of the community thrust for autonomy and control, Black activists from 
East Palo Alto also demanded voice in the white dominated regional polity. In 1967, the 
county responded to residents’ demands for representation by creating an advisory 
committee, the East Palo Alto Municipal Council. Each representative on the committee 
was elected by vote and the county board generally followed the Council’s 
recommendations (Rigenhagen, 1993; East Palo Alto Municipal Council, 1973).  
In his 1969 address to a western regional government conference, Herbert 
Rhodes, elected Chairperson of the East Palo Alto Municipal Council (EPMC), promoted 
the council as a vehicle of participatory democracy but warned against the potential 
containment of the political involvement of East Palo Alto residents. “As I see it 
participatory democracy must not serve to limit the horizons for the fields of action for 
the citizens it is supposed to serve. A political ghetto is no more acceptable than a 
physical or a social ghetto…” (1969:6). Rhodes suggested in this statement that the 
EPMC should not bureaucratize and co-opt political organizing through the council 
structure, but rather help catalyze grassroots political participation from local to the 
regional and larger scales.  
Rhodes’ statements acknowledged the role of East Palo Alto as a political project 
within larger regional and national politics. What was considered an “experiment” for the 
 
87	
board in minority self-rule, albeit advisory, eventually spurred greater interest in 
incorporation. As Ed Becks, one of the first Black migrants to East Palo Alto and a 
mainstay leader in the movement for incorporation, explained, “People have to govern 
themselves. No matter how poorly they do it, no matter how brilliantly they do it, self-
governance has to ultimately be achieved” (Dreams of a City, 1996). An independent 
group, the East Palo Alto Citizen’s Committee launched incorporation planning in 1979. 
The quest for incorporation went hand in hand with the drive for controlling East Palo 
Alto’s land use, and for regulating increasing rents. 
It wouldn’t be until 1983 that East Palo Alto would win the vote for incorporation 
through the political organization of Black and Latino activists and tenants. In the years 
following white flight from East Palo Alto, Black residents organized to transform the 
town from a product of redlining and blockbusting, or containment, to a place for 
making, claiming and controlling their “right to place,” (Samara, 2014) despite 
tremendous obstacles presented by the city’s weak economic foundation. The eventual 
“movement” for cityhood leveraged the sustained organizing that grew from the early 
1960s work such as the work of white and Black residents who marched together against 
“ghettoization” and for open housing in East Palo Alto in 1963. Several of these same 
leaders were among those who inserted their voices in county politics and planned for 
incorporation within a coalition of Black and Latino leadership in the decades that 
followed.  
 
Rent Control Goes Local 
 
In cities throughout the U.S. tenants had mobilized around antidiscrimination 
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actions, disinvestment in public housing in the 1970s, and dislocation by urban renewal 
as “negro removal,” A wave of tenant organizing in California was set in motion in 
response to worsening economic conditions and a political opportunity created by a 
referendum supported by a faction of developers. Rent control became a tool of local 
housing security during a time of rising national job insecurity. Notably, rent control in 
California followed in the footsteps of examples in New York City. Moreover, Nixon’s 
Cost of Living Council at the federal level opened up the possibility of rent control at the 
local level. Nixon temporarily established federal rent control and froze wages for 90 
days beginning in the summer of 1971 in an attempt to curb inflation.22 
Renters faced a tightening housing market in the 1970s and increasing nominal 
rents due to inflation partly based on the energy crisis. Pressure on renters was also 
directly due to a decrease in multifamily housing production and an exponential increase 
in numbers of condominium conversion. Between 1970-1980 in East Palo Alto, and 
across the region, the vacancy rate decreased during this time despite a modest increase 
of construction, mostly condominiums (Community Plan, 1981). Consistent with the 
decade’s trend of condominium conversion across the country, 5% of East Palo Alto’s 
rental units were repurposed as condominiums during the early 1970s (Day and Fogel, 
1981, Urban Law Annual Vol. 21:3:p. 4). In the 1970s alone, the number of 
condominiums across the country grew from 85,000 in 1970 to 723,000 in 1979, more 
than half of which came into being through conversion of rental units  (Ibid.:3,11 n. 29).   
After a decade of rising condominium conversions, jurisdictions across the U.S. 
																																																								
22 Nixon, Richard. "Executive Order 11615 - Providing for Stabilization of Prices, Rents, Wages, and 
Salaries," August 15, 1971. Rent control was completely phased out by 1973. 
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began to regulate condominium registration. This regulation set a precedent and window 
for local authority to review and regulate housing affordability. For example, in San 
Mateo County, approved condominium developments required a 20% set-aside 
agreement with affordability measures for low and moderate-income housing ownership.  
Yet, these set asides generally reflected the politics of racial and class 
containment: set asides applied to the unincorporated areas of the county only. 
Ultimately, even these set asides were made available at market rate and the moderately 
affordable rental units were permanently lost because lower income residents could not 
afford to purchase at the mortgage terms of that period at 15.5% (interest rate on April 
20, 1981) (Community Plan, 1981: 3-11). By 1980 San Mateo County enacted a 
temporary moratorium against condominium conversion in unincorporated areas of the 
county only due to the tightening housing demand on rental housing. Although the 
vacancy rate in East Palo Alto (4.4% in 1980) was higher than the county’s average 
(1.3% in 1980), the incorporated areas of the county, such as the affluent and 
overwhelmingly white city of Menlo Park, did not seek affordability provisions or a 
moratorium on condominium conversion (East Palo Alto Community Plan, 1981: 3-1). 
Renter households would simply need to look elsewhere, namely East Palo Alto. 
Table 3.2 demonstrates the 
challenge of income and home ownership 
in East Palo Alto during this period. 
Based on affordability guidelines, the 
gross median income was insufficient for 
those households to purchase at the 
Table 3.2: East Palo Alto Housing Costs 
and Median Income, 1970 and 1979, 
Source: San Mateo County Planning and 
Development Division, Community Plan, 
1981 
 1970 1979 
Median Home 
Value 
$18,000 $46,000 
Median Rent $147 $280 
Median Income $9,401 $17,623 
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median home price assuming purchase price at no more than 2.5 times one’s annual 
income (Ibid.: 3-11). Yet, the median rent compared to median income did reflect 
affordability at one-fifth the median income, assuming one-third of monthly income 
affordability measure. Rental rates were increasing dramatically and by approximately 
41.5% in just one year between 1978-1979 (Ibid: 3-12). 
The East Palo Alto Community Plan of 1981 underscored the housing crisis for 
the unincorporated town. Although several recommendations were made calling for 
rehabilitation subsidies for homeowners, and an anti-speculation real estate transfer tax, 
rent control was discouraged citing widely publicized assumptions that rent regulations 
reduce quantity and quality of housing.23  
In departure from past mandates resulting in wartime freezes, New Deal 
federalism and the civil rights national legislative victories, in the mid-1970s tenants 
organizing for rent regulation in California mobilized their local bases of power for 
policy change directed at the local level of the city. Statewide efforts had lost and despite 
examples of economic controls by Nixon, there was no traction for an ongoing national 
rent control policy. In fact, a 1976 California state legislative proposal (AB788) would 
have pre-empted localities from initiating rent-control if it had not been vetoed by Jerry 
Brown, purportedly based on direct push-back from the state AFL-CIO president at the 
																																																								
23 For a summary of major research findings from studies for and against rent control conducted in the 
1970s and 1980s, see Appelbaum, Dolny, Dreier, and Gilderbloom (1991; 1992) “Scapegoating Rent 
Control, Masking the Causes of Homelessness,” Briefing Paper. Economic Policy Institute. Washington, 
D.C. A primary reason against rent control cited in the East Palo Alto Community Plan (1981) was landlord 
disincentive to keep up maintenance based on the rental price controls. However, numerous studies have 
demonstrated that there was no correlation between rent control and deterioration as concluded by 
Applebaum, et. al. (1991; 1992) review of the literature. In fact, neighborhoods and cities with rent 
controlled units were less likely to have deferred maintenance due to stronger municipal or state monitoring 
and enforcement provisions for the services for those units (Applebaum and Gilderbloom, 1988: 134-140; 
Gilderbloom and Markham, 1996). 
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time, Jack Henning (Dreier, 1997:17). A similar but more moderate proposal had become 
policy in New York State where the Urstadt law in 1971 prohibited municipalities from 
adapting new rent regulation more stringent than existing regulation in that state. The 
defeat in California of the more restrictive measure, however, gave new confidence to 
emergent tenant organizing efforts around the prospect for local initiatives. Subsequent to 
the governor’s greenlight to pursue local rent control initiatives, tenants leveraged the 
state referendum Proposition 13 passed in 1978 to demand rent control. The right-wing 
developer-backed Proposition 13 provided a new opening. 
Proposition 13 was a change in the California constitution to provide tax relief to 
property owners. Considered nearly forty years later as a major obstacle to California’s 
economic stability, Proposition 13 set out to reduce property taxes by assessing property 
values at the 1975 value, with the maximum increase in value not to exceed 2% per year. 
The tax reduction benefitted existing homeowners as the property tax would be 
reassessed only upon resale. In a sense, Proposition 13 was “tax control” for property 
owners. The loophole of decontrol, or reassessment of the property taxes, was built into 
resale, or vacancy. This decontrol provision was a harbinger of state restrictions on rent 
control decades later. 
The freeze on property taxes was sold to Californians as not only a means to keep 
people in their homes, especially seniors on fixed incomes, but also as a way to reduce 
landlord costs, and thus abate rents. At first, the campaign to convince tenants that rent 
hikes were about tax burdens was effective. Proposition 13’s leader, Howard Jarvis, chief 
executive of the Apartment Association of Los Angeles County, had orchestrated a media 
campaign to that effect (Dreier, 1997: 17). However, when property owners began to reap 
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the impact of the tax reduction benefits, there were no signs that they would share the 
benefits with their tenants. Increasing economic burdens, rising expectations, false 
promises, the political affirmation of local rental regulation initiative, and a radical vision 
by the City of Berkeley for tenant rent relief helped thrust tenants in more than a dozen 
other California cities into responsive action. 
At that time, Berkeley renters were the most organized in the state (Ibid). The city 
first attempted to implement tight rent control in 1972, which was struck down on 
procedural grounds in a California Supreme Court decision in 1976. By 1978, Proposition 
13 altered the landscape, however. Framed as an issue of housing affordability, 
Proposition 13 created a political opportunity organized tenants seized. In 1978, 
Berkeley’s successful ordinance, Measure J, deemed that 80% of the Proposition 13 tax 
relief would go directly to tenants. In suit, by 1985, 14 California cities used the 
justification of Proposition 13 to win some form of local policy for rent control, in 
addition to the 100 California cities that won mobile home rent control policies.  
The call for rent control by East Palo Alto residents created both bridge and 
boundary between Latino activists and established African-American leaders, some of the 
latter of whom were homeowners and viewed renter questions as an increasingly 
otherized, Hispanic issue (personal communication, January 7, 2013). The East Palo Alto 
incorporation effort that finally led to cityhood in 1983 created both coalition and 
controversy among established activists in East Palo Alto. The incorporation 
“movement” involved a Black and Latino coalition of activists whose local political 
expertise and leadership had grown from their organizing experience over the preceding 
decades.  
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Education organizing had already included examples of Black and Latino 
coalition-building throughout the region, including the establishment of Nairobi College 
as at first a multiracial endeavor, and its spin-off sister project, the Hispanic-based 
Venceremos College in nearby Redwood City. But it was not until the late 1970s that the 
Latino population grew in East Palo Alto with increasing visibility, from 5% in 1978 to 
14% in 1980 (Rigenhagen, 1993; 24-25).  As several commentators on the East Palo 
Alto’s incorporation efforts observed, the African-American and Latino composition of 
the organizing work for cityhood ultimately contributed a “unifying” identity within the 
increasingly diverse working class (Batchelder, 1994). Yet the call for incorporation, 
which would involve municipal service authority and include formal representation of 
East Palo Alto in the regional political structure, did not receive the support of all of 
those who had earlier organized around community control.  
An era of demographic change was punctuated by the ongoing segregation 
dilemmas of Ravenswood High School, long a focal point of organizing in East Palo 
Alto. The 1976 closing of Ravenswood High was in retrospect considered by many 
activists there a loss of a pillar social and geographic institution for East Palo Alto’s 
diverse majority-minority community formation, as well as a specific loss of an African-
American cultural institution (Lowe, 1989; Dreams of A City, [1988] 1996; Moraga, 
2002).24 The confluence and complexity of the loss of Ravenswood High School, 																																																								24	The	closing	resulted	from	a	series	of	desegregation	agreements	reached	beginning	in	1971.	Many	Japanese,	Filipino,	and	Samoan	students	were	the	first	who	voluntarily	left	East	Palo	Alto’s	Ravenswood	High	School	as	part	of	the	first	agreement,	an	opt-out	transfer	plan.	That	same	year,	an	opt-in	transfer	effort	led	to	the	bussing	of	volunteer	white	students	from	surrounding	white	districts	to	East	Palo	Alto.		The	inter-district	integration	experiment	was	short	lived,	and	the	loss	of	white	student	volunteer	enrollment	finally	led	to	the	closing	of	Ravenswood	in	1976,	more	than	two	decades	after	Brown	v.	Board	of	Education.	The	majority	African-American	Ravenswood	student	population	merged	with	an	existing	school	outside	East	Palo	Alto	that	had	largely	served	the	Hispanic	student	population	of	east	Menlo	Park.	
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changing demographics, the repression of the Black Freedom Movement, ideological 
splits, and the 1970s recession further added challenges to the organizing among 
established activist leaders in East Palo Alto.  
Notably, the cityhood coalition faced strong opposition from the Nairobi Day 
School founder Gertrude Wilks who became an influential and outspoken voice against 
incorporation. The axis against incorporation was framed along homeowner and landlord 
interests versus tenant “newcomers.” Wilks formed the United Homeowners of East Palo 
Alto to protest incorporation. She argued that property owners would bare the burden of 
resourcing the new city given an insufficient commercial tax base in East Palo Alto. 
Alongside Wilks, absentee landlords were among the strongest opponents of the 
incorporation effort. This was unsurprising given that the incorporation movement raised 
“rent control” as a central tenet of its platform. The organization United Homeowners of 
EPA also firmly opposed rent control (Kenrick, 1996).25  
The opposition was organized. Tri-County Apartment Owners Association raised 
$150,000 for anti-incorporation opposition by implementing an apartment tax on its 
entire membership (Batchelder, 1994: 36). Whereas the San Mateo Board of Supervisors 
stated they would call for the needed referendum vote, the incorporation advocates had to 
present sufficient petitions to meet the requirements of the Local Agency Formation 
Commission (LAFCO): petitioners representing 25% of registered voters, or 25% of the 
landholders representing 25% of the assessed valuation of the land. 
The Woodland Association of Residential Property Owners formed among 
residents of the Westside bordered by the Bayshore expressway in East Palo Alto. This 																																																								
25 For extensive media excerpts and primary source analysis, see San Mercury News and Palo Alto Tribune 
and Calisphere collection. 
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was an area with the greatest number of rental units. This association of landlords 
supported East Palo Alto’s annexation to Menlo Park and also organized against 
incorporation. A 1981 consultant report to LAFCO on the issue of incorporation 
considered the options of incorporation versus annexation to Menlo Park, or the status 
quo. The report concluded that incorporation would bring no significant burden to the 
new city, which the report claimed would “break-even” from its separation from most 
county services (Macdonald, 1981).  
The campaign claimed that the consultants’ report showed that the opposition to 
incorporation was political rather than based on the city’s financial forecast. Support for 
incorporation had grown from an amalgamation of issues: the burdens of multiple service 
fees based on special San Mateo County districts, a quest for majority-minority control 
over local development decisions, and the recognition of the potential of local 
government to allow for policy changes such as rent control. By all accounts, rent control 
was the signature banner of the incorporation campaign (Batchelder, 1994). One EPA 
tenant explained that the issue of rent control galvanized him into support for the 
incorporation campaign based on a simple phone call: 
The woman asked, ‘Did you know that should the vote for incorporation pass, the 
first decision of the newly empowered city council will be to freeze rent and 
initiate the process to rent control?’ In one split nano-second I became a convert 
to incorporation. Mind you, I knew nothing about rent control except for the fact 
that it was something that happened in NYC. (personal communication, June 8, 
2012) 
 
The tenant described himself as a “victimized renter” at the time, and said he would not 
have supported incorporation due to the tax-base insufficiencies if not for the rent control 
component.  
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The tax-based insufficiencies would become of increased concern as federal 
disinvestment from cities persisted nationwide. Moreover, given the property tax 
restrictions of Proposition 13, in the early 1990s California’s state legislature would 
mandate property-tax revenue to provide a revenue stream direcly to the state that would 
prevent collection by municipalities. Localities became increasingly reliant on 
entrepreneurial land use to collect retail sales tax (Wassmer, 2002). East Palo Alto’s 
resounding pro-tenant incorporation efforts offered significant if limited protections for 
individual renters, but importantly for the future of the city’s rental housing stock. The 
significance would become ever more apparent and urgent in the context of increasing 
and concurrent devolution (see Emmeus Davis, 2006), privatization, and fiscalization of 
land use.  
As promised throughout the cityhood campaign, the first East Palo Alto City 
Council adopted the Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance 
(Ordinance No. 17-83) as its first act of cityhood. The city’s ordinance was premised on 
discouraging speculation in housing. The order’s purpose stated this effect: 
to protect residential tenants in the City from unreasonable rent increases by 
discouraging speculation in rental property and stabilizing rent increases; to 
protect tenants from arbitrary, discriminatory or retaliatory evictions; and at the 
same time to assure landlords both a fair return and rental income sufficient to 
cover costs of maintenance and operating expenses as well as the costs of capital 
improvements to their rental properties. (Ord. No. 17-83:3.) 
 
“Just-cause” eviction provisions were important measures for local renters at the time of 
the legislation, but would become especially important ten years later when the state law 
Costa-Hawkins Act would all but gut local rent control. 
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In California the strongest local measures, 14 in all, including the East Palo Alto 
ordinance of 1983, were undercut by the 1995 state vacancy decontrol-recontrol 
provision that is the main thrust of the still existing state-wide Costa-Hawkins Rental 
Housing Act ("Costa-Hawkins," California Civil Code §§1954.50 et seq.) that went into 
effect in 1999.26 Costa-Hawkins created a landlord tool to unravel some of the strongest 
provisions of municipal rental protections: vacancy decontrol. Local ordinances with just 
cause provisions like East Palo Alto became ever more significant to maintain the right to 
stay put (with the exception of owner move in, conversion, or demolition), and prevent 
sudden rent increases. That is, if you were fortunate enough to already have secured a 
rent-regulated place to live at a rent you could afford, your unit would remain affordable 
absent wage loss. 
East Palo Alto had established its ordinance before Costa-Hawkins. It was as an 
active rather than passive measure in a design for affordability that required landlords to 
register rents and respond to tenants’ petitions for repairs. Unlike wartime rent freezes, 
such second phase post-war rent stabilization programs (commonly referred to as rent 
control in California) did not freeze rents, however. In East Palo Alto’s example, rent 
increases are tied to the Consumer Price Index increases.  
Even before Costa-Hawkins, in the first decade of East Palo Alto’s rent control 
implementation, rents across regulated units increased by a cumulative total of 39.4% 
between 1984-1994 (Kazak, 1995). During this same period, in the first ten years of rent 
stabilization in East Palo Alto, tenant turn-over decreased and the rental housing stock 
																																																								
26 Costa Hawkins paralleled the state’s Proposition 13 tax control-decontrol provisions, and New York’s 
similar but more restrictive 1993 vacancy decontrol provisions for means-tested (renter income), 
condominium rentals, and co-op rentals. 
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increased. U.S. Census shows that compared to East Palo Alto’s tenants in 1980, East 
Palo Alto’s tenants in 1990 had remained longer in their units (15% compared to 23% 
had lived in their apartments more than five years in those years, respectively) (Kazak, 
1995; 1999; U.S. Census). Also, there was a 14% increase in rental units available by 
1990 compared with 1980, mostly due to owner conversion to rental (Ibid.). In effect, in 
its first ten years the East Palo Alto rent ordinance defied landlord predictions that the 
ordinance would cause a disincentive to rent, and that landlords would be unable to 
receive fair returns. At the same time, East Palo Alto was able to show that sustained 
tenure for renters had increased, and that projected pressures of gentrification— thought 
to be just around the corner, could be potentially abated. 
What came just around the corner, however, was decontrol through Costa 
Hawkins. Landlords could re-set rents to market rate with every vacancy and subsequent 
new renter.  Yet, in East Palo Alto where rent control exists, the subsequent rents for that 
unit are then re-controlled, and can again increase only up to the maximum allowable 
rent tied to the Consumer Price Index. In this way, Costa Hawkins undercuts local rent 
control’s potential to reduce real rents throughout the city or if brought to regional scale. 
Moreover, new construction by state mandate is exempted from local rent control 
ordinances. Further, as more units were decontrolled, the market rent ceiling became the 
baseline-regulated rent. In other words, the regulated ceiling rent becomes the floor. 
Vacancy decontrol in a housing market positioned for gentrification can discourage 
tenant unity and encourage landlords to push people out.  
Only when ‘no one leaves’ does rent control over time, on the other hand, result 
in potential income redistribution and affordability impact for renters. Likewise, only 
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sustained rent control to scale could reduce real rents through a prevailing affordable rent 
in a jurisdiction. Renter households between 1980-2010 experienced an increase in 
percent of income spent on rent indicating affordability burdens in East Palo Alto and the 
region. One explanation of this is that despite rent control, and notwithstanding 
California’s decontrol provisions, renters were poorer than in years past given that middle 
class renters with means had aspired and realized home ownership in part due to 
predatory lending (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2011; Wyly and Ponder, et. al., 
2012; Schafran and Wegmann, 2012). Even with the rent burden in East Palo Alto, 
average rent in East Palo Alto remained much lower than in San Mateo County, which 
for a family-sized 4 bedroom unit was nearly twice East Palo Alto’s median rent in 2013 
(Rockefeller Harris and Cespedes, 2015:4). 
Table 3.3: East Palo Alto Selected Profile 1980-2010, ACS U.S. Census 
 
East Palo Alto  1980 1990 2000 2010 
White  19.3% 12.1%  6.5% 6.2% 
Black  60.3% 42.9% 22.5% 15.8% 
Latino / Hispanic27 14% 36.4% 58.5% 64.5% 
Asian  5.3% 9.2% 2.2% 3.6% 
Other Race  8% 15.1% 42.3% 9.8% 
Total Population 18,191 23,451 29,506 28,155 
Owner-occupied units 45% 44.6% 43.5% 42.8% 
Renter-occupied units 55% 55.4% 56.5% 57.2% 
Median Gross Rent $278 
(1979 
dollars) 
$586  
(1989 dollars) 
 
$826  
(1999 
dollars) 
$1,154  
(2010 dollars) 
 
Median Gross Rent (2010 
inflation adjusted dollars) 
$778 $948 $1,081 $1,154 
Gross Rent as 35% or more 
of household income (see 
footnote for 2010 
exception) 
38%  40.8% 
 
44.1%  61%  
(as 30% or 
more of 
household 																																																								
27 With the exception of this category, Latino-Hispanic, all other categories by race reported for those who 
self identified as non-Spanish or non-Hispanic origin, alone, for 1980-2010. 
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 income)28  
Gross Rent as 50% or more 
of household income on 
rent 
n/a n/a 23.8%  35.4%  
 
As shown in Figure 3.3 East Palo Alto remains a renter majority city. In 1970, just 
39.3% of East Palo Alto’s housing units were owner-occupied (San Mateo County, 
1981). Ten years later, ownership rates peaked at 45% owner occupancy in 1980; owner 
tenure status has remained nearly the same for thirty years. So too has average median 
income, $52K in 2010 in East Palo Alto compared with $86K in all of San Mateo County 
(ACS, 2010). The greatest change to East Palo Alto has been in rent burden, population 
(up 72%) and race and ethnic composition. At the time of corporate landlord investment 
in the early 2000s, Latinos represented the same proportion of residents that Black 
residents represented at the time of incorporation. Whereas most subprime lending as 
well as public subsidies including Section 8 and public housing were unavailable to many 
immigrants based on noneligible citizen status, rent regulated housing provided an option 
for affordability. Meanwhile, many more Black residents left the city in the 1990s due to 
increased crime, and the greater competition for quality affordable housing in the city. 
Despite this, political control remained largely based on African-American 
representation. 
In 2008, Latinos for the first time gained a majority of East Palo Alto City 
Council seats. Between 1988-2002, during a period of greatest increase in Latino 
population, there were no Latinos represented on the council, which was held by majority 
																																																								
28 n/a = not available for this Decennial year. ACS 2010 (5-Year Estimates) provided for 2010. In this case, 
ACS only reports rent as percentage of household income for percentages 30% or more and 50% or more 
of household income provided. For ACS 2010 61.6% of East Palo Alto renters spent 30% or more of 
household income on rent. 
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or all Black representatives in those years. In 2010, however and at the time of this 
writing, the city council remained majority Black. The living legacy of the city as a seat 
of Black political power in Silicon Valley outlives the changing residential ethnic 
composition of the city. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
Despite notions of California’s progressive liberalism, the state’s historical 
development followed a path-dependent and state-induced racial valorization of land and 
housing. The early history of the state reflects a white settler regime of occupation and 
monopoly land holdings. Yet despite these property arrangements, racialized through the 
state’s Alien Land Law and restrictive covenants, redlining, and legislative attempts, East 
Palo Alto demonstrates an oppositional story that at times blurred periphery and center. 
In the development of Silicon Valley, early small farmers attempted to create their own 
version of utopia. Japanese horticulturalists dominated a segment of worldtrade, Blacks 
created community control projects where white flight created space, and Latinos found 
affordability in a sea of skyrocketing rents, predatory lending, and state abandonment.  
Throughout this narrative, state policy regulated the racialized poor, and their 
discontent, while also protecting privileges of white (majority) homeowners through tax 
incentives and direct property subsidies. Although rent regulation was legislated in East 
Palo Alto to mitigate and even prevent gentrification, Costa-Hawkins allowed for steadily 
increasing rent and rent burdens. This gaping loop-hole that allowed landlords to 
establish market rents as a base rent for regulation with every turnover of a unit signaled 
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new opportunity for real estate investors with capital backing.  
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DECONTROL 
 
Chapter 4. Gambling on the City 
 
Chapter Introduction 
 
East Palo Alto was well known by real estate investors, developers, and lenders 
for its Rent Stabilization Ordinance (RSO), which at the time of Page Mill’s buy-up 
limited rent increases to a rate equivalent to the Bay Area’s overall rate of inflation. As 
detailed in the previous chapter, the ordinance arose as part and parcel to the campaign 
for cityhood just 30 years earlier. Rent control was enacted as a tool to prevent the further 
exploitation of racial containment, 
or historical lack of mobility in the 
region for people of color, and for 
Blacks in particular, on the one 
hand, and to protect city residents 
from displacement due to potential 
gentrification, and racial and class 
displacement, on the other hand. 
This form of rental restriction in 
practice curtailed market rents by 
providing a reduced rent ceiling. 
Perceived instead as “floor,” rental restrictions indicate the possibility of a “rent gap” or 
profits if potential underlying land value could become realized (Smith, 1979). Landlords 
took advantage of this gap through the vacancy decontrol window during tenant turn 
Figure 4.1 Westside of East Palo Alto (Existing 
Conditions Report, February 2014: 1-7)   
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over, which conflicted with East Palo Alto’s own restrictions once Costa Hawkins went 
into full effect in California in 1999. 
Whereas the City of East Palo Alto was produced through defiant responses to 
opportunity disparity in housing for Blacks, Latinos, Japanese and Chinese in the region, 
corporate landlordism in this instance demonstrates a shape-shifting in racial capital 
innovation with political consequence. For East Palo Alto’s majority minority Black and 
Latino city leadership, rent control policy not only had allowed the city to remain a 
bastion of affordability in the region, but it was politically expedient. Affordability and 
security of tenure were and remain necessary measures to hold back Silicon Valley 
hyper-gentrification and thereby sustain majority minority political representation in the 
city and voice in regional politics. The classed and racial project of gentrification and the 
potential scale of displacement in East Palo Alto remains a political threat to the very 
founders of the city, and to the potential for majority minority political control there in 
the future.  
Between 2006-2008 a large corporate landlord, Page Mill II, L.P., a Delaware 
liability company, accrued a relatively huge proportion of concentrated properties in one 
single and narrow corridor of East Palo Alto. (See Figure 4.1.) Altogether, the Page Mill 
II fund’s $270 million purchase represented about half of the city’s entire squat single-
family bungalow, duplex, and multifamily midrise rental stock (American Community 
Survey, 2007). The portfolio comprised 114 land parcels and 185 small to mid size 
buildings, including 1,818 residential rental units of which approximately 1,600 were 
subject to the city’s rent control (Stockbridge Capital Group, 2009). 
This chapter asks the question: “How were tenants impacted and mobilized by 
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this corporate landlord?” This chapter provides an overview of key organizing entities, 
the impact of the organizing model on tenants, and the way in which this landlord’s 
monopoly purchase directly threatened East Palo Alto’s rent control ordinance and renter 
security. Subsequent Chapters 5 and 6 analyze the portfolio capital stakeholders, 
including capital interdependencies, and the points of vulnerability that tenants and the 
City of East Palo Alto leveraged through their oppositional action. 
 
Organizing in East Palo Alto 
 
In 2007, tenant organizing in East Palo Alto was catalyzed specifically around 
Page Mill rent increases, rather than out of an existing organized group of tenants. The 
various entities involved in the Page Mill organizing exemplify some of the differences in 
approaches to social action within and outside the non-profit organizational terrain. The 
groups, unaffiliated with one another except through bridge leaders who participated in 
multiple organizations, provided support to tenants in East Palo Alto, and exemplify the 
types of approaches involved in many urban non-profit and activist sectors of this period 
along the differentiated lines of generation, class, race, and approach. The entities 
involved in the tenant actions against Page Mill ranged from a latent tenant advocacy 
organization that had maintained some infrastructure even through times of abeyance, as 
well as ongoing youth organizing, church congregation organizing, legal services, and a 
small group of tenants who were affiliated with Stanford University. 
Before the Page Mill buy-up, there was no active tenant organization in East Palo 
Alto, save for East Palo Alto’s small network of activists loosely involved with East Palo 
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Alto Council of Tenants (EPACT) who usually met monthly, but sometimes weekly 
during intense activity, and often in the recreation center of a local mobile home park 
(interview, 2012). The all-volunteer EPACT typically sprang into action around specific 
issues led by their president, a vocal civic leader of housing justice who also sat on the 
Rent Stabilization Board for more than a decade. EPACT largely involved the established 
generation of EPA activists, several of whom had entered into formal local political 
office and had been involved in community control, urban agriculture, and incorporation 
efforts. The EPACT work was based on a community advocacy model rather than a 
tenant union or council form. EPACT as an education and outreach-based group lent its 
name to local referenda measures for defending rent control in EPA, galvanized tenants 
and city officials against egregious landlords, and at times held workshops and published 
communiqués to educate tenants on their rights and available legal services. 
A lead organization in the Page Mill campaign was Youth United for Community 
Action (YUCA). YUCA is a youth-led organizing initiative operating from an 
unassuming ranch house in East Palo Alto’s working class east side. Although focusing 
on East Palo Alto, YUCA was and is buoyed by its network with a broader Peninsula and 
Bay area activist community. YUCA had a handful of paid organizers on staff, 650 youth 
members in their teens and twenties (a remarkable number given the small size of East 
Palo Alto), and ran a dedicated leadership and organizing program with core youth 
leaders. They also had a significant local victory under their belt at the time Page Mill 
became a known adversary: the 2007 shutting down of Romic chemical plant. This was 
the plant, that since the 1950s, had made East Palo Alto the dumpster of Silicon Valley 
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toxins.29 An intergenerational effort bringing together YUCA youth and adult 
environmental justice leaders from East Palo Alto and the region led the shut down. The 
ten-year battle honed YUCA leadership’s organizing skills, energized its youth-
development, activated allies including City Council members, and helped to shape its 
mission as a base-building group in East Palo Alto.  
The Romic campaign led to questions of community development, which helped 
to focus YUCA demands around who controlled the Romic land and its use. “We began 
to ask what could be reimagined for that space, by and for the community,” explained 
one organizer who had first been involved in YUCA in her early 20s and remained as a 
paid organizer into her 30s (interview, 2012). She put the Page Mill campaign in the 
context of a longer legacy of activism, “This community hasn’t been afraid of corporate 
bullies. EPA was a city that grew out of self-determination; people had passion, history, 
drive” (personal interview, 2012). YUCA organizers saw the Page Mill fight as an 
extension of their fight against Romic, also an “outsider” entity, and that their role in part 
was to bring the longer organizing history of East Palo Alto’s community control 
movement to the tenants, many of whom were the families of the young people who 
participated in YUCA’s programs. As another YUCA organizer said, “We didn’t shut 
down Romic to clean up EPA for wealthy white people to then move in and gentrify us 
out of our homes” (interview, 2012). She added, “We don’t want to be just about slowing 
the tide of gentrification.” Shutting down and cleaning up Romic was not only about 
																																																								
29 For a discussion of environmental racism through a regional framework of how white people secure 
cleaner spaces for themselves see Laura Pulido (2000) “Rethinking Environmental Racism: White Privilege 
and Urban Development in Southern California,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 
90:1, 12-40 
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worker and environmental health and safety; it was about re-envisioning land use, and 
asserting community democratic control over East Palo Alto.  
Throughout the Page Mill campaign youth leaders gathered in the house-
converted organizing hub for check-ins, tenant clinics, workshops, planning for action 
research, marches, rallies, petition drives, and for a meeting with the portfolio lenders, 
which they hosted. For YUCA, organizing necessitates leadership by people most 
affected by the issue. This was the case from paid staff to youth members. The director of 
YUCA was also a tenant of the Page Mill properties, “It’s a small community in EPA, so 
it’s a different fight for change, when every fight is a scale that impacts the city in a 
concrete way.” Another organizer referring to the Romic campaign put it this way, “Our 
work was not about connecting theory to groundwork, but the other way around” 
(Domingo and Nguyen, 2009:n.p.) 30 They experienced directly the problems and sought 
to develop critical consciousness and experiences of action and change around an 
intersectional understanding of oppression and power. 
This organizer emphasized that YUCA pursues strategy that demands personal 
change as well as change of root-causes: “There’s no turning back. We deal with 
contradictions of the personal and the political.” This definition of power speaks to their 
engagement with the personal: “Power for us is power from within, to ignite something 
positive to think clearly, develop voice, and become a leader by realizing the opportunity 
to advance yourself by advancing others along with you.” Power “within,” is described 
here as self-development motivated by social change, a component of critical youth-
leadership development, and one in which, as Gaventa (2006) notes, “refers to gaining 
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the sense of self-identity, confidence and awareness that is a precondition of action” (p. 
24). Importantly, one’s own voice is contingent upon the development of others, “along 
with you,” YUCA’s organizer had explained.  
Identifying individual problems as intersectional, and social issues at the axis of 
race, class, gender and seeing oneself as an agent in creating change through the mutual 
reinforcement of agency of others not only engages in the “sociological imagination,” but 
a critical sociological imagination and praxis. Importantly, power, a relational concept, 
whether as a concept of fluid, circular, or material resource, is rooted not only in capacity 
but in actualization, which to be strategic and expansive must be undergirded by purpose 
(intent), and effect.31 In the Romic campaign, YUCA’s organizers had already 
demonstrated not only potential but actual power through disruptive tactics blocking 
Romic’s ability to renew its permit, and in so, doing had continued developing individual 
and collective voice and capacity among their members. 
Finding and asserting voice for youth activists and leaders in East Palo Alto was 
operationalized by YUCA in part through participatory action research (PAR). YUCA 
involved youth leaders in Page Mill by asking them to engage first-hand with the issues 
by designing their own research project about themselves and where they lived. They 
knocked on doors, participated in conversations, documented conditions, and asked 
tenants to join ongoing actions against Page Mill. Young people, who most often are 
alienated from decision-making about their lives, were themselves experiencing the 
household stress of families under threat of eviction. YUCA as an organizing project 
																																																								
31 I distinguish different conceptualizations of power in organizing in departure from the 1990s throwback 
term, “empowerment,” see the works of Piven & Cloward (1977), Wrong (1979), Jenkins (2002), and 
Gaventa (2006). 
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provided not only access to decision-makers, but also was a vehicle for group mutual 
support. PAR itself provided a technology for having otherwise difficult conversations 
within their families about their living conditions and the consequences of those 
conditions on their relationships and future. Youth leaders produced their report 
specifically on Page Mill, and later, three short films on local organizing highlighting the 
Romic campaign and urban farming and land use in East Palo Alto. The youth members 
hold regular tours of the former toxic Romic site pointing out redevelopment plans. They 
are the experts on their owns lives and their community. 
Another well-established organizing outfit in the region at the time was Peninsula 
Interfaith Action, known as PIA.32 Although in leadership transition during the time of 
Page Mill’s initial rent increases, PIA later joined in the tenant organizing work. Several 
of their members, congregants of four different East Palo Alto member churches, were 
also Page Mill tenants. One volunteer leader was forced out of her Page Mill apartment 
and the congregation rallied around her to raise the issue of tenant rights in their church 
(personal communication, June 5, 2012). PIA’s lead organizer said fundamentally their 
work for affordable housing has been part of “ …trying to confront a politics in the 
Valley that bends over backwards for its affluent constituency to the total disregard of the 
working class” (Ibid.). PIA’s strategy was based on holding public officials accountable 
to the working class. 
PIA is part of the People Improving Communities Organization (PICO) faith 
based-organizing network that became established in California in the 1970s, first out of 
																																																								
32 The PICO affiliates San Francisco Organizing Project and the Peninsula Interfaith Action merged in 
2014 to form the SFOP/PIA Bay Area organizing outfit. 
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Oakland by Alinskyist John Bauman who was trained by Tom Gaudette.33 At that time in 
East Palo Alto, the Black Power movement and community control movement, and later 
the rent control and incorporation movement, were highly distinguished in ideology, 
strategy and tactics from the systematic and at times pragmatist “organizing” of the 
Alinsky-based formations.34 PICO espoused local organizational development around 
neighborhood and municipal issues, usually detached from ideology and movements. For 
example, the PICO organizers’ first principle of strategy “Small is beautiful” privileges 
immediate and winnable issues of “self-interest,”35 which while holding those in power to 
task, may avoid questioning of the underlying power structure itself.  
In the PICO case, the faith-based network developed and deployed a model that 
identified congregations, and subsequently congregant leaders to surface issues for 
collective action. In East Palo Alto, PIA action included pressuring the city council for a 
fully-equipped grocery store, affordable housing, policing, and the regulation of 
secondary dwelling units. “Congregations choose issues, anything from education reform 
to speed bumps,” explained the PIA organizer. A volunteer leader in the PIA youth 
branch attested that PIA created change by improving sidewalks, a safety issue for 
seniors, and taking part in city beautification efforts (personal communication, June 5, 
2012).  
PIA also had established the organization’s leadership in advocating for housing 
																																																								
33 For an accounting of PICO’s formation and their shift from neighborhood to congregational approach, 
see the compilation by Aaron Shutz and Mike Miller (2014). 
34 In her unpublished thesis Lily Batchelder (1994) argued that though the Alinsky tradition dominated the 
field of community organizing at the time of East Palo Alto’s incorporation movement, activists in East 
Palo Alto drew from their own distinct legacy, tradition, and theory of change. See Batchelder (1994) “The 
Incorporation Movement of East Palo Alto: Renegotiating the Boundaries of Community Organizing 
Theory.” Unpublished thesis, Stanford University. 
35 Aaron Shutz and Mike Miller (2014). 
 
112	
affordability in Silicon Valley, and in 2002 won the creation of a housing trust fund in 
San Mateo County. In their fight against gentrification in East Palo Alto, however, PIA’s 
lead organizer explained that the issues of inequity demanded a new guiding perspective. 
She explained that gentrification structured by race and economy demanded deeper 
understanding.  “One thing we realized is that what PIA hasn’t done a very good job of is 
understanding how racial inequity is produced and created here and the impacts of that 
and asking ourselves what’s at the heart of that,” she explained (Ibid.). Traditional 
demands by PICO for access to resources or decision-makers could not address the 
dimensions of why and how inequity existed in the first place.  
Another effort involved singular voices of more privileged tenants who had also 
experienced the dramatic effects of Page Mill rent increases. This group, EPA Fair Rent 
Coalition, was an informal effort without non-profit status. The group was primarily led 
by a small group of white men who were self-directed and created an online campaign 
hub that produced and compiled media articles, their own analysis of vacancies, and 
resources on tenant rights. The coalition also included YUCA and EPACT. 
The driving impetus by EPA Fair Rent Coalition was transparency and justice. 
They sought to understand as fully as possible the agenda behind the Page Mill 
investment, and disclose these plans along with data on displacement, in order to incur 
“damage,” on the investors as described by one tenant activist, a Stanford PhD candidate 
at the time who led media outreach (interview, 2012). Armed with stats and capacity for 
communications, the group aimed to strike at Page Mill for what they considered to be 
the sinister and illegal gutting of rent control. “In science, if you lie, you get caught,” 
explained the tenant who took on the role of communications director (interview, 2012). 
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His approach to Page Mill was based on a premise that facts speak volumes, and public 
information was key for enhancing democracy and accountability.  
This particular activist also believed “organizing is a science” (interview, 2012). 
His work on the Page Mill campaign demonstrated to him a need for what he described as 
a “parachuting” traveling and organizing training consultancy that could arrive at places 
such as East Palo Alto with honed methodology to arm organizers with expertise and 
capacity to impact media and carry out strategy. Unaffiliated with organizing networks, 
the tenant had a short-term aim that he believed required short-term capacity support: to 
halt the rent increases and evictions.  
Carefully developed press releases and cultivated media contacts by the Fair Rent 
Coalition led to an onslaught of media articles covering Page Mill and tenant actions. 
This also led to responses from Page Mill, including ridicule in the San Francisco 
Chronicle by a reputational management representative that called this particular student 
activist a “one-man action hero” (Abraham, 2009; Hogarth, 2009). The post was seen by 
that tenant as an age-old tactic to single out one individual, weaken his credibility, and 
fan flames of distrust among the East Palo Alto tenants (interview, 2012). 
Unlike YUCA, PIA, or EPACT, many of the Stanford-affiliated tenants who were 
initiators of the Fair Rent Coalition did not have a long-term stake in East Palo Alto. 
(They have all since moved.) Finding themselves as tenants in a crisis of what they 
considered to be illegal rent increases, however, they acted with urgency. They were 
named plaintiffs in a class-action against Page Mill. One tenant who was a start up 
software developer, in considerable debt and in need of affordable housing (Superior 
Court of California Count of Santa Clara, 2008), lent his time and skills to analyze the 
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rent stabilization ordinance and help draft new city legislation. By the time Page Mill was 
facing foreclosure, however, the most visible tenant activist of this group, the 
communications director, was entangled in a controversy that at times distanced him 
from the other organizers.  
Tenants Together, based in San Francisco, had just launched when East Palo Alto 
tenants rallied into action. There had been no statewide tenant advocacy network in 
California, and Dean Preston, previously an attorney for the San Francisco Tenderloin 
Housing Clinic, envisioned a tenants’ movement at a political scale that could counter 
Costa Hawkins and the Ellis Act.  
The creation of the statewide organization was timely in ways that many had not 
anticipated: the national housing crisis was just about to “hit the fan.” The landscape was 
changing. Homeowners were becoming bank tenants and renters. Renters in foreclosed 
properties were threatened by eviction. Greater demand for rental housing would soon 
spur even higher rents causing a renter crisis. Moreover, the statewide proposal to phase 
out local rent control, Proposition 98, would test the state’s appetite for tenant 
protections. At the local level, East Palo Alto provided the nascent Tenants Together an 
opportunity to support a local fight aligned with their state-wide tenant rights goals. 
Tenants Together had just opened shop when the City of East Palo Alto declared a city-
wide moratorium on rent increases. 
YUCA and PIA were at the time the organizations most closely aligned with 
organizing principles: alter power relationships between people and institutions, sustain 
and expand capacity for people most affected by the issues, and win demands through 
collective direct action and other tactics led by people most affected by the issue. Tenants 
 
115	
Together’s approach aligned with organizing and employed staff organizers who worked 
directly with local groups such as those in East Palo Alto. Although Tenants Together 
involves organizational members, not all of these groups are membership base-building 
groups. In this way, Tenants Together’s approach, at the time, could be cast as an 
organization with a network of local and state-based organizations working 
simultaneously to build advocacy and organizing infrastructure for local and statewide 
wins. 
The Fair Rent Coalition worked closely with Tenants Together. Those in 
voluntary roles of staffing the local coalition were also Page Mill tenants and at times 
called themselves organizers. Yet in retrospect, the work of the coalition was ad-hoc, or 
limited to the current campaign, and in addition to the organizing by YUCA and PIA of 
tenants to participate in their organizations, primarily involved advocacy tactics; this 
included expert testimony and drafting proposed policies by the voluntary “organizers” of 
the coalition. They were tenants and spoke on behalf of tenants but without a dedicated 
method for identifying and developing leaders. Nor were they accountable to a larger 
group of tenants, and did not necessarily claim responsibility for the outcomes of their 
efforts.36 
Theories of change inform and link strategy, tactics, methods and organizational 
form. Theories also develop through lived experience of oppression. Discontent varies in 
degree but also in quality. Not everyone’s anger is the same.37 YUCA was a group that 
was anchored in a membership base of people in and of East Palo Alto who had 
																																																								
36 Taking responsibility for outcomes is part of what distinguishes a leader from an activist. See Han 
(2014). 
37 Thank you to my friend Pancho Arguelles for this conversation. 
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experienced their coming of age in a place of housing and safety insecurity. A tenet of 
YUCA’s work had followed in the tradition of Septima Clark and Paulo Freire who 
taught that oppressed people know the answers to their own problems. The Fair Rent 
Coalition, of which YUCA was a member, in contrast, involved some activists who based 
on their own education and drive privileged the expertise of hard facts and the ethos of 
fairness over struggle.  
 
Tenants Speak 
 
“We’re Poor People” 
 
Just as the holidays drew near, in November and December 2007, 1,160 rent 
controlled units across the Page Mill’s holdings in East Palo Alto received rent increase 
notices. Page Mill attempted to justify the increases to the East Palo Alto Rent 
Stabilization Board saying that by combining legal increases that landlords had not taken 
in the past, they attained the maximum allowable rent ceiling. Page Mill, represented by 
the Woodland Park Management Co., claimed these cumulative increases were allowed 
but not taken for previous years. They planned to cash-in on what they considered to be 
“banked” rents, a practice the rent board would later restrict in response to the Page Mill 
attempt.  
Tenants, some threatened by eviction, spurred into action. The standard response 
to contest rent grievances for tenants had been to petition before the rent board. In late 
2007, Stanford Legal Clinic and Community Legal Services took on over 150 such 
petitions by tenants against the rent hikes. Even while petitions were being processed, 
 
117	
tenants were moving (personal communication, January 9, 2014). Many of the petitioners 
were first galvanized in door knocking by YUCA youth leaders and volunteers from 
EPACT. 
Rent hikes across the portfolio were the first signal of Page Mill’s plans to 
undermine rent control and reconfigure East Palo Alto. According to one rent board 
administrator, “The city council saw the issue as a low-income people of color issue, and 
they knew they had to act… and they lived in fear of the Brown Act” (personal 
communication, May 31, 2012). A Brown Act violation involves elected officials 
deliberating outside open forums. The longer the period awaiting results from the 
individual petitions, the greater the possibility that elected officials might deliberate on 
their response outside of a public forum and contend with accusations of violating the 
Act. The city council brought the issue to the fore with an emergency public hearing to 
vote on a moratorium on rent increases to halt Page Mill action. It was one of city 
council’s very first items of business in the New Year.  
Although intended as a temporary stay during the review period of the petitions, 
the effect of the moratorium proposal was to consolidate the individual complaints to 
demonstrate the collective scale of the evictions and rent hikes, and force an affirmative 
reading of the local rent control ordinance in favor of the tenants. The hearing brought 
out approximately 400 tenants who packed the hall and the hallways (personal 
communication, June 5, 2012). This was an overwhelming turn out for a small city of 
approximately 29,000 residents, and represented approximately a third of the units 
affected. 
 
118	
The mayor and city council’s very act to draft legislation and schedule a public 
forum to freeze rents already indicated the stance and position of the city. Only one city 
council member with a history of censure by colleagues (he had been accused of slurs 
and disruptive action) positioned himself as skeptical of the moratorium against Page 
Mill. The council members shot down this council member’s move to contest the ability 
of another council member who was also a Page Mill tenant to participate in the vote 
based on alleged conflict of interest (Special City Council Meeting, January 3, 2008).38  
The attorney for the city made clear there was only one provision that allowed for 
a rent increase for existing tenants, the Consumer Price Index, at the time set at 3.2%: 
 
The purpose of the ordinance, in place since 1983, is to stabilize rent, to prevent 
precisely the situation that you face tonight, which are rents going up to 47 
percent in some instances.  It has worked fairly well for its entire history, until 
now, and the reason it's worked so well is one very clear provision of the 
ordinance that's codified in the East Palo Alto Municipal Code… ‘Once each year 
all landlords shall be permitted to charge rents in excess of that which they were 
lawfully charging the previous year, based upon 100 percent of the change in the 
Consumer Price Index’” (emphasis added, Special City Council Meeting, January 
3, 2008)  
 
Described as the “crux of the ordinance,” landlords tying rent to the CPI could add only 
the CPI determined increase, plus a proportion of the fee for rent registration paid to the 
city to the base rent of what had been paid the previous year, even if that rent was under 
the increase permitted for the previous year. An attorney for Community Legal Services 
																																																								
38 In fact, the same council member requested an opinion by the City attorney regarding whether there 
would be a conflict given the possible effect of a moratorium vote on the council member’s economic 
circumstances in violation of the Fair Political Practices Commission. The City attorney determined the 
economic effect of rent increase or freeze would fall below the Commission’s threshold and gave the 
opinion the council hearing could proceed with the council member’s participation and vote (Desouza and 
Associates transcribed the City of East Palo Alto, Special City Council Meeting, January 3, 2008). 
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echoed this argument, adding that individual petitions were burdensome for the city and 
community’s resources, given the number of individuals affected, and that the matter 
ultimately would be decided in the court’s interpretation of the law. In counter, David 
Taran himself, along with what a tenant described as an “army of lawyers” also attended 
the hearing and presented their case that they were in their rights to raise the rents.  
 A white man surrounded by a legion of attorneys, Taran stood in contrast to the 
standing-room only crowd of majority Latino, Black and Pacific Islander tenants who 
provided testimony one by one of previous homelessness, daily decisions based on 
hunger, prescriptions, or rent, single parenthood, and double and triple work shifts. He 
also stood in contrast to the council make-up, which included at the hearing three Black 
representatives and one Latino; the latter of whom was the current renter, but not 
leaseholder in a Page Mill unit.39 
Taran attempted to present himself as the most reasonable person in the room. He 
asked the city to “Work together in a calm and rational way to address this…” saying 
“This is a mistake to adopt this tonight.” He invited individual tenants to speak to the 
Page Mill management company directly to work out any difficulty. Notably, he had not 
demonstrated the courtesy of explanation or negotiation when his management company 
presented eviction notices, or unlawful detainers. In his statements, Taran ostensibly 
suggested that the proceedings were irrational, the tenants emotionally blinded, and the 
city lacking political sophistication. He admonished the city for keeping itself down: 
 
We do not think that East Palo Alto should be a community that's disadvantaged 
or looked down on by other communities. We want to bring East Palo Alto to a 
standing where it should be, and that's the reason that we're doing this. We're 																																																								
39 Another council member at the time, also African-American, was absent.  
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improving the standards for our tenants, we want to improve their living 
standards, the community. (Special City Council Meeting, January 3, 2008) 
 
In the discourse of settlers, in this statement the general partner of the portfolio implied 
that East Palo Alto elected officials and residents could not know their own interest and 
that Page Mill knew what was best for improving their community. The representatives 
for Page Mill, including Taran and attorneys, spoke early on in the hearing, allowing for 
tenants to respond directly to their statements. 
Tenants repeatedly made statements at the hearing that appealed to city council as 
not only their representatives but as subject of the investor’s plans. Echoing other tenants’ 
statements such as “fight back,” and, “do not be intimidated,” one speaker framed Page 
Mill as not only the tenants’ adversary, but as city council’s adversary: 
 
They question our intelligence; they question your ability to govern. Don't think 
they're not going to go back to their boardroom and laugh at you tomorrow about 
what happened here tonight. Don't prove them right. Don't buckle. Fight. Resist. 
Stand up for our community, because when those people leave and the rest of us 
leave, when the face of East Palo Alto changes, so does the face of the city 
council, and they're going to run some numbers up against you, and it's going to 
be owned by the developers (Special City Council Meeting, January 3, 2008). 
 
This tenant appealed to the city council’s very composition, which he claimed would 
gentrify along with the city. Several other tenants speaking at the hearing referred to Page 
Mill as an “outside corporation,” underscoring to the city council that “None of those 
people live here in East Palo Alto,” and reminding them of the class and race divisions of 
their city while distinguishing themselves from the rest of Silicon Valley: “Things are 
being allowed to happen… stop it… We're poor people. We're not Palo Altans, we're East 
Palo Altans.” Referring to “corporations coming in to buy up” East Palo Alto, another 
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tenant observed, “It's the first step in displacing people of color, low-income people of 
color in this community.” Another resident boldly claimed, “East Palo Alto belongs to us, 
the poor people.” Tenants were unapologetic; no one paid lip service to the landlord’s 
“right to fair returns” or need to profit off their investment, except as a way to explain an 
exploitative system. 
Tenants overwhelmingly presented testimonies of personal hardship. At the same 
time, testimonies questioned the myth of rent control as an income program that replaced 
work or allowed for low-income tenants to live in leisure. Tenants also both critiqued and 
drew upon the narrative of renting as a holding, a temporary position before 
homeownership. Homeownership, the goal, asserted some tenants, was unattainable 
given the proportion of their earnings spent on rent. Tenant after tenant demonstrated that 
they worked maximum hours and could barely afford the prior rents, even if still below 
Silicon Valley full market rates, let alone accrue savings. “How the heck are you going to 
save anything or have anything if you’re going to take 90 percent of your earnings just to 
pay for where you live?” remarked one tenant. Another renter expressed his 
disillusionment and stress with the rent burden, “You're supposed to be able to save 
money living in an apartment, not be broke every paycheck, worrying about the next bill. 
Man, I cannot make it.”  
The testimonies spoke of the psycho-social stress of economic insecurity: “This 
has got me kind of nervous, because I ain’t never been in this position before… this rent 
increase have really taken a load on my mind.” A senior, she remarked how living alone 
would not be feasible with the more than $100 increase she received from Page Mill. She 
noted that other apartments had young workers quadrupled up in the same size one 
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bedroom to share the rent burden, but she was one person.40  Another speaker attested to 
the struggle for seniors who, in particular, had raised their families in East Palo Alto, 
even through the worst of times and were now threatened by displacement. The testimony 
is significant to quote at length because despite many residents’ determination to remain 
in East Palo Alto during periods of disinvestment, a lack of affordable housing would 
make staying during times of so-called investment impossible: 
 
Many of your citizens are simply going to take that notice and leave, rather than 
try to fight, because they don't have the wherewithal. My one neighbor couldn't 
come out because of the weather and there was a hazard that's right outside her 
door, but like it's been the last three or four months that if she buys her medicine 
and pays her rent, she has nothing left for food. So we get together, take her a 
brown bag. But if she has this increase, she's not going to be able to buy food nor 
medicine. Then what? You know, I'm really worried about her, because she's on 
the verge of a breakdown or suicide…She worked here all her life, raised her kids, 
outlived her kids, and now this happens (Special City Council Meeting, January 3, 
2008). 
 
The rent increases were prohibitive for seniors fixed-income households, especially. 
Unlike rent stabilization and rent control laws in New York State, East Palo Alto’s Rent 
Stabilization Ordinance (RSO) did not freeze or cap rents specifically for seniors.  
The moratorium did not pass that first council hearing despite compelling 
testimony, support by the city council staff, and a simple majority. The same council 
member who raised procedural issues and acted disgruntled throughout the hearing 
abstained. Another council member was absent.  One organizer later explained that the 
activists expected the moratorium would be delayed requiring several additional readings 
																																																								
40 Compared to 13% of San Mateo County renters, 42% of renters on East Palo Alto’s west side reported 
overcrowded or extremely overcrowded living conditions. See American Community Survey 2011 (City of 
East Palo Alto, 2013: 7-4). 
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before a final vote (personal communication, May 31, 2012). Instead, however, in a 
surprising move the city council voted on the ordinance the following week during a 
regular session, again packed with tenants. The vote was unanimous 5-0 in favor of a six-
month moratorium on any rent increase in the City of East Palo Alto. 
Doubly Disappeared 
 
Among those who didn’t speak at the hearing were those tenants who already 
moved out. One tenant at the initial moratorium hearing opened up his testimony by 
bringing attention to the displaced: “But I want to tell you about the people that just 
moved out, because the rent is too high for next month. They have probably about 40 
people move out. I've seen at least six move out from my apartment complex, you know, 
and the increase is way too much” (Special City Council Meeting, January 3, 2008). In 
most cases, tenants moved out after receiving the rent increases and “pay or quit” notices 
before eviction proceedings were underway. 
One young resident who moved out later explained that as a result of Page Mill 
rent increases, her home was no longer where she lived. Youth organizers from the 
organization Youth United for Community Action (YUCA) interviewed her as part of 
their participatory action research project they carried out to create a space for the voices 
of people whose ability to remain in East Palo Alto was threatened. Many of the YUCA 
youth leaders were also residents of the Page Mill Woodland Park housing. The young 
former resident explained: 
 
There are five people in total that live with me: my mom, my dad, my sister, my 
little brother, and me... Now I live in Redwood City because my dad couldn’t pay 
the rent increases by Page Mill Properties. My dad tried to fight the increases but 
they would treat him without respect. His dignity was worth more than that to 
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him. 
 
Where I live now is great and everything, but it’s not my house. It will never be 
the same as the other one because I was like a star up in the sky and now I am a 
star falling... It’s as if something inside of me was missing. But even though I live 
there, I still go to East Palo Alto Charter School. I choose to go there and make 
the hour and a half journey. East Palo Alto is my home, and where I wanna be. 
(Homeless Now, 2008:3) 
 
Although the rent increases may have made the situation impossible for her family to 
remain in East Palo Alto, she attributed the impetus for the family’s move to the 
threatened loss of her father’s dignity. In this daughter’s view, in forced displacement her 
father risked losing both dignity and home.  
 While this family was affected by involuntary displacement, another family would 
also lose the opportunity of an affordable rental with this unit’s decontrol. Marcuse 
(1985) distinguishes direct displacement and exclusionary displacement to note this 
difference and effect. The first refers to moving from one’s home for physical or 
economic reasons, the second the inability of the displaced to move to a new home due to 
the gentrification of previously affordable areas, and the inability of another low or 
moderately income household to move into the unit from which that household was 
displaced for that same reason. In this way, displacement begets displacement by 
narrowing housing options, creating a chain of serial displacement and fragmentation. 
 For some, standing up to fight was necessary to retain dignity, regardless of 
moving multiple times, as put by one tenant, “I want my daughter to know that the world 
is not easy, and it's not going to be -- it's going to be difficult for her to keep moving, but 
I want to be an encouragement to her to let her know that with hard work and 
perseverance, you can keep going, and come together as a community and speak out…” 
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(Special City Council Meeting, January 3, 2008). This tenant suggests a stance of 
community creation through the act of speaking out and being active, but also recognized 
that moving was a reality her daughter faced. 
During the years 2007 and 2008, Page Mill ultimately put into effect 170 
evictions, the number documented in San Mateo County Sheriff and Superior Court 
records (Fair Rent Coalition, 2009). The Fair Rent Coalition calculated that more than 
300 units, or an estimated total of 1,500 people, were pushed out of their homes within 
the first two years of Page Mill ownership (personal communication, June 5, 2012). 
While some tenants fought eviction in court, Page Mill continued to serve notices that 
without tenant response resulted in default vacancy wins for Page Mill.  
The larger number of displaced households was due to the number of people who 
moved from their Page Mill units before evictions were set in motion. Far more initial 
notices to “pay or quit” were sent that precipitated the unlawful detainers, the notice of 
eviction. Notices to “pay or quit” require tenant corrective action to landlords within 
three days, and subsequent unlawful detainers require tenant response to the court within 
five days, counting weekends and holidays, according to the rental ordinance and state 
regulations.  
One rent board member at the time estimated that nearly 90% of the evictions 
were the result of tenants who did not respond within the required period (personal 
communication, January 7, 2014). State law mandates the quick response by tenants, and 
any hesitancy by some tenants to appear before court, which includes routine pre-trial 
conference before eviction proceedings, would result in a default judgment. Without 
tenant response to an unlawful detainer, the landlord can take a default judgment for 
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eviction. In East Palo Alto, the sheriff most often makes evictions with notice to vacate 
on Tuesdays, which can mean a turn around of 5-9 days from the unlawful detainer 
response. (Lamont, 2012) 
Several tenants claimed that Page Mill refused to receive their rent checks, a 
common practice for landlords who then claim non-payment (Bernstein-Wax, 2010). 
Other tenants continued to send in the base-rent for the terms of their lease before Page 
Mill rent hikes. One tenant claimed that she received an eviction notice before she could 
move out voluntarily because she was wheel-chair bound and could not pack on her own 
before moving into a homeless shelter (Ibid.).  
 
Individual Responsibility and Regulatory Thickets 
 
The regulation of the rent stabilization ordinance required tenants to be self-
assertive in their housing claims. Here Foucault’s (1994) concept of governmentality, the 
regulation of people’s behavior, or the “conduct of conduct,” aligns with the shift in scale 
and target of state intervention. According to neoliberal discourse, the aim of the state is 
to deregulate. Yet, rather than deregulation, there is a shift in regulation; the target of 
regulation is aimed at people rather than corporations. 
In the case of East Palo Alto, rent control was a regulation reflecting municipal 
authority and the devolution or localization of state power, so that the city or locality 
became the place of contestation. Still, the assertion of individual responsibility was part 
and parcel of the East Palo Alto original RSO, and required an informed tenant citizenry. 
Tenants were the target of regulation around occupancy behavior and in the form of 
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appeals to landlords, who were in turn regulated by rent registration, increase caps, and 
just cause eviction. 
The expedited and multi-tiered process for evictions can be confusing for already 
stressed and stretched tenants, educated or not on their rights, as described. The petitions 
were the prescribed next steps for tenants to challenge a rent increase or unlawful 
detainer. At a hearing for the tenant petitioners against rent increases, Community Legal 
Services representatives explained the difficulty of access to the petition process:  
Even with the help of volunteers, the [petition] process is extremely time-
consuming and onerous, requiring: 
1. Scheduling a time for the tenant to meet with a volunteer; 
2. Arranging for translation services if necessary; 
3. Gathering the necessary documentation; 
4. Explaining the law and process; 
5. Preparing the petition; 
6. Preparing the documentation of the waiver; 
7. Obtaining, if necessary, a check or money order for the filing fee; 
8. Physically filing the petition papers with requisite copies.  
(City of East Palo Alto Rent Stabilization Board, 2008) 
 
For these tenants, many of whom work multiple jobs to pay the existing rent, the process 
is a logistical impossibility. For others, it is intimidating. Still others are concerned about 
retaliation from their landlord and/or building manager (Ibid.). 
In addition to the steps above, petitioners were required to be present at the 
hearing. In this case, the hearing had to be delayed on at least one earlier occasion due to 
the unavailability of working tenants. Page Mill seemingly counted on these delays and 
lack of access by tenants to legal services. In effect, Page Mill would “win by default” 
explained a legal service provider (CalPERS Board of Administration Investment 
Committee Open Session, 2008). In drawn-out petitioner cases and litigation, Page Mill 
also has the upper-hand in creating conditions that pushed tenants out, and the resulting 
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vacancies positioned the properties for market rate rents, and, or, redevelopment. The 
lawyers for the petitioners explained the obstacles to the process and timeliness of 
judgment for all tenants as an argument for full disclosure of all Page Mill rent rolls, even 
for those units that did not include named petitioners.   
The Fourth Shift 
 
Landlords often use the tiring out tactic when they do not have a legitimate claim 
against the tenants. Instead they try to frustrate and overwhelm tenants while also 
potentially tapping into tenants’ fear of exposure in front of the state bureaucracy, if not 
deploying direct harassment and intimidation. Relentless notices to tenants all required 
immediate tenants’ responses to prevent eviction. In East Palo Alto, many tenants had 
been poor or low-income all their lives and were familiar with state bureaucracies. 
Mothers in particular carried multiple burdens that included not only the material rent 
increases, and deferred maintenance, but also the neo-regulatory environment of behavior 
surveillance and self-advocacy. 
When one single mom moved into her apartment just before the Page Mill 
purchase, she had already experienced serial displacements. She had been living with her 
three children, including one teen and two elementary school students in a converted 
garage on the east side of town until she was told the property had been sold and she had 
to leave. Her furthest dislocation though had been almost ten years before when she and 
her son left Michoacán, Mexico. In East Palo Alto, she found work in a night job for an 
office cleaning company. Just after Page Mill increased her rent, her hours were cut. The 
economy was tanking. The rent increase, 20%, twice in one year, was far above the 3.2% 
increase allowed as set by the Consumer Price Index established by the East Palo Alto 
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Rent Stabilization Ordinance at the time. Sara recalled, “I didn’t have a place [to go], 
then thanks to God, I found more work [in houses]… It takes a lot of patience here [EPA 
rent administration]. I don’t know how many times I’ve been at the [legal] offices. The 
owners gave us notices thinking we’d leave” (interview, 2013). Working the bureaucracy 
is what could be called the fourth shift for this working mom. With several jobs, kids to 
care for at home, and unpaid work to supplement their education, she also had spent 
countless and tedious hours at legal clinics and at the rent administration, filing appeals to 
stay in the home that she worked so hard to afford.  
Another mother explained the burden of time for anyone trying to work and enter 
the bureaucracies of the poor. The social worker at her child’s school had told her that 
she needed to spend more time with her children. Instead she found herself spending 
more and more time fighting Page Mill. Meanwhile, she was trying not to let her children 
know of the rent increase and the stress. But she suspected they understood what was 
happening (Homeless Now, 2008). Another single mother with two children explained to 
the city council that tiring out tenants and furthering their marginalization was purposeful 
by Page Mill, not an unintentional consequence of the rent hikes: 
I work every day, and I have to go to work tonight, so I can't stay too much 
longer, but I wanted to be here to voice my opinion. There's no help out there for 
you if you're in the middle and if you're in the midway, and you're working and 
you have kids and you're trying to, you know, survive, and then they throw this at 
you. They pulling you back. They want you to be up underneath the bridge with 
everybody else, you know, but I'm trying. (Special City Council Meeting, January 
3, 2008) 
 
This mother situated herself as doing better than the rest, “underneath the bridge,” yet 
echoed the prevailing sentiment of precarity and exhaustion.  
Citizens’ protections, such as rent regulation, assume a notion of a liberal 
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citizenry comprised by free subjects with what Rose (2006) calls “responsibility, 
autonomy and choice.”41 In this case, the majority of tenants were largely immigrants 
who did not qualify for already limited and shrinking supply of public housing. They did, 
however, rely on state regulation to prevent full marketization of their rental housing. The 
site of family in the reproduction of the self-sufficiency mantra of neoliberalization raises 
fundamental questions of dignity and gendered burdens. Women as mothers in such a 
regime bear the responsibility for the reproduction of self-governing subjects who abide 
by cultural and institutional logics of law and order while also becoming masters of their 
own destinies, self-sufficient and supposedly free from the state.  
In another petitioner’s case, a single mother who was given a Cease Notice by the 
Woodland Management Company feared eviction because security claimed “high level of 
traffic and activity...” that they said was consistent with drug activity. Page Mill later 
defended the action directly to its largest investor saying, “We have zero tolerance policy 
for drug activity on our properties” (Taran, 2009:8; see also Taran, 2009a). Crime, 
especially suspected drug-related activity, was used by Page Mill to justify evictions. 
 
The Landlord’s Playbook 
 
Criminalization for Gentrification 
 
																																																								
41 Nikolas Rose, 1996. ‘Governing ‘‘advanced’’ liberal democracies’, in A. Barry, T. Osborne and N. Rose 
(eds) Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, and Rationalities of Government, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 53. 
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East Palo Alto’s formation as a city was followed by a period marked by 
dispossession over self-determination and community control. The roll-backs of the 
1990s, including a final farewell to the Keynseian welfare state in 1994, coincided with 
the roll out of a state economy based in part on replacing its social welfare with 
investment in mass incarceration (see Gilmore, 2007). In the local context of Silicon 
Valley the decades of growing regional inequality and insecurity through abandonment 
and criminalization of East Palo Alto, ultimately, but not inevitably, produced the 
conditions for predatory speculation of this last regional bastion of rent controlled 
housing. 
East Palo Alto in particular exemplified Wacquant’s (2008) concept of an urban 
space of “advanced insecurity” constituting at once abandonment, dispossession, 
exploitation, state sanctioned violence and street violence in which the most exploited 
and dispossessed members of the population become cast as the greatest threat in the 
expanding scope of public disorder. Moreover, in the circulating discourse of “isolation, 
disorganization, and danger” (August, 2014) state and private interests regularly deployed 
pathologizing language for the exclusion or elimination of poor people from place for 
reinvention of the place for profit. “Crime” could be a sufficient reason to embrace early 
signs of gentrification for many community members, notwithstanding that gentrification 
may result in the displacement (removal) of the community itself, and in turn reproduce 
and exacerbate the conditions of “advanced insecurity” elsewhere. 
 Just before Page Mill’s buy-up, a referendum measure was put forward to 
explicitly make “criminal activity” a reason to take away someone’s home. According to 
the proposed change in the municipal code, Measure E: City of East Palo Alto Drug and 
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Violence-Free Homes Act, “This Act will reduce drug dealing and criminal activity, 
enhance law enforcement, and give landlords the flexibility they need to prevent illegal 
activity while ensuring that they will not use evictions solely to achieve economic gain 
from higher rents” (http://www.smartvoter.org/ 2006/11/07/ ca/sm/meas/E/). On the one 
hand, the act would allow landlords of regulated units greater flexibility to evict tenants 
deemed to be involved in criminal activity, and on the other hand, would delay landlords’ 
ability to subsequently raise rents through decontrol for one year.  
Rosetti Realty sponsored the referendum ostensibly to test rent control. East Palo 
Alto’s largest landlord at the time, Rosetti was planning to sell his properties to Page 
Mill’s purchasing agents and looked to gut the city’s RSO to raise his asking price, 
according to the EPACT tenant advocate who described the act as “from any reason 
eviction to no reason eviction” (personal communication, May 30, 2012). A vote for 
Measure E would ultimately be a vote for apartment turnover for decontrol and market 
rents. The measure was slated for a voter-referendum alongside two other crime-related 
measures that would also potentially mobilize voters with interests in increased policing. 
One measure mandated greater funds for crime enforcement, the other for greater 
preventative social services along with increased policing. 
In an editorial to East Palo Alto Today, the leader of EPACT wrote against 
Measure E saying the effort was “…subverting the very reason East Palo Alto struggled 
for incorporation in the first place more than twenty years ago, namely, for the sake of 
self-determination and the increase of rights, not their reduction” (EPACT, 2006: 23). 
Another letter to the editor also recalled the city’s founding legacy, “We will vote No on 
Measure E because we revere the vision of the incorporators of East Palo Alto. Boldly 
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they stated that only by conscious action to invest in economic and cultural diversity 
would families of modest means and families of color continue to have a home on the 
peninsula” (Cruz and Hyland, 2006: 23). The latter made explicit that the consequence of 
increased evictions premised on criminal activity would be race-based. 
The East Palo Alto City Council and staff attorneys decried the measure’s 
deceptive language; state law would permit market rents through vacancy decontrol 
immediately following eviction. “Arguments against Measure E,” which accompanied 
the text of the act at the ballot box, warned, “Absentee Landlords are using this measure 
to increase the attractiveness of their rental property to other corporate buyers” 
(http://www.smartvoter.org/ 2006/11/07/ca/sm/meas/E/). The elected officials who 
signed the arguments against the measure were well aware of the acquisition of properties 
by Page Mill on the west side and urged tenants and other East Palo Alto voters to 
demonstrate their support of the current city ordinance for just cause eviction. Majority 
approval was required, and the measure failed with 69.7% of East Palo Alto voters voting 
against (Ibid). 
As the tenants experienced in short-order, the Page Mill strategy also attempted to 
tap into the narrative of criminal behavior or pathology of the poor in order to justify 
harassment, rent increases and evictions of tenants within and outside the legal 
stipulations of the city’s existing rent regulations. An attorney for Page Mill described the 
tenants to one reporter as “…drug lords, gang leaders, gang members, drug users and 
other non-upstanding individuals,” explaining that Page Mill Properties inherited the 
existing tenants when we purchased the property, which at the time had the highest crime 
rate in East Palo Alto” (Bernstein-Wax, 2009).  
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Page Mill targeted their harassment on young males, according to one tenant 
activist, “There was a lot of intimidation of young males. They would be detained by 
Page Mill security, would wait for police… there’s a long history of distrust with East 
Palo Alto Police Department, and YUCA met with the police about harassment by the 
security” (interview 2012). Private security guards played a policing role by monitoring 
the tenants as well as the property. Another aspect of harassment for tenants was the new 
regulatory environment. Tenants protested the additional paperwork Page Mill required, 
including car registration for parking (there is no on street parking). This was not always 
available in the renter’s names among undocumented tenants, who in the context not of 
deportation, but of “deportability” (DeGenova, 2007) feared the paperwork requirements 
as proxy for demonstrating citizenship status (personal communication, June 5, 2012). 
Page Mill presented the community as the beneficiaries of their war on blight and 
crime, despite the fact that Page Mill’s plans were predicated on the displacement of 
many of the tenants to reposition the properties for market rents, and of all of them for 
redevelopment. Page Mill’s general counsel did not mention these plans in another media 
placement of their good deeds: “In one instance a gang leader was living in a single 
family home in poor repair. The gang leader was eventually arrested but other members 
of the gang kept congregating by the home, so Page Mill bought the home and then had it 
demolished. Those are the kinds of steps we’re willing to make to improve the 
environment” (Apartment Management Magazine, 2008: 16). Real estate managers and 
investors were the audience for this magazine.  
“Gangsters” like “thugs” are coded language reflecting racial subtleties of 
discourse, othering, and devalorization through the production, real and perceived, of 
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“advanced insecurity.” Indeed, race had been a risk-adjusting factor in the gentrification 
of East Palo Alto. One rent board member put it this way: “[The] sheer number of people 
of color, keep large numbers of affluent people from moving in” (personal 
communication, June 8, 2012). Since the blockbusting of the 1950s, race, along with 
class, had symbolically defined the boundaries of the city in contrast to their white and 
affluent neighbors. The discourse of diversity in new urbanism design ethos of 
gentrification echoes and re-signifies through inversion the racist notion of the “tipping 
point” long-asserted by the real estate industry (Reed, 1999). (The idea that a certain 
percentage of Black residents will make a neighborhood unappealing to whites, or 
devalue real estate.) Page Mill pitched to investors a vision of a new west side for East 
Palo Alto, one of social cleansing that erased the “gangsters” by evicting their families.   
 
Legal Barrage  
 
“Tiring out” was a Page Mill tactic targeting tenants as well as the City of East 
Palo Alto, which would soon become barraged with technical challenges and lawsuits. In 
two letters to the city, the fund’s attorneys sent a list of legal arguments for why the 
moratorium was inadvisable, and then how the moratorium would violate various other 
local and state law (Thompson, 2007; Griffith, 2008). In particular, Page Mill claimed 
that the City violated its own RSO by allowing the city council to interfere with what was 
a voter-mandated legislation that Page Mill argued could only be amended by the voters. 
The Page Mill attorneys further argued that in effect, the city violated local and state law 
by not allowing for even CPI increases during the six month period of moratorium, or 
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vacancy decontrol, a matter pertinent for adjusting any newly vacant apartment to market 
rate as allowed by Costa-Hawkins following evictions or tenant departure.42 
Page Mill put the responsibility for the initial rent increases to which the 
moratorium responded on the city, specifically the city council. In a letter to the mayor, 
Page Mill’s development director explained the rent increases as a response to the city’s 
prior ordinance on the Ellis Act to de-incentivize demolition and shore up just cause 
eviction provisions: 
…we have felt like we were in a race with the City. We can only react to the 
issues and agendas that the City and the Council put forth and we must also 
complete our analysis of these issues within the time frames that the City sets. 
Recently the City adopted the ordinance for the Ellis Act and is in the process of 
adopting a new Density Bonus Ordinance. These ordinances will have a major 
impact on the land values of our properties and will also shape what could be the 
potential highest and best uses in the future. In addition, the Rent Stabilization 
Board took on the "banking" issue, which could have an immediate and extreme 
financial impact on us. I am concerned that the City's recent policy actions and 
their implications will make our residents the unintended "losers" in all of this 
(Thompson, 2007: 2-3).  
 
The ordinance concerning the” Ellis Act” involved a city action three months prior to the 
rent increases. The ordinance clarified landlord responsibilities in the event the landlord 
withdrew a rental unit from rental availability in order to demolish or convert a structure. 
The ordinance called for increased notice, increased relocation payment, and more 
careful review for approval from the city. Although the statewide Ellis Act facilitates the 
																																																								
42 As the director of Berkeley’s Rent Stabilization Administration later pointed out to the City of East Palo 
Alto, “the [Costa-Hawkins] requirement that a rent-controlled rent ceiling be replaced by a market rent 
upon a vacancy is not limited to those situations where the market rent is higher, but applies when the new 
rent is lower as well” (Berkeley Rent Stabilization Program Peer Review of City of East Palo Alto Rent 
Stabilization Program: September 11, 2008: 4). In other words, there was no “banking” un-charged rent to 
charge at a later time. Rent was based on what the landlords determined the market could bare, even if 
well-below what the market may bear in the future. 
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withdrawal of rental units from rent control in case of owner occupancy or demolition, 
the Act provides some municipal leeway for how to implement it. By September 2007, 
the city had decided to replicate the San Francisco’s stricter and court-tested local 
ordinance.  
In a hasty correspondence to the City in anticipation of the rent freeze vote, the 
attorney for Page Mill similarly blamed the tenants’ burden on the city: 
Page Mill is willing and ready to sit down with the City and tenant representatives 
to develop a workable solution but it cannot do so in the face of the City's 
repeated attempts to devalue its significant investments in this community. The 
City's proposed action tonight will ultimately fail in its purpose to protect the 
tenants because they will bare much of the burden of the City's disregard for the 
law. Moreover, the proposed action risks bankrupting the City by adding to its 
already substantial litigation expenses and inviting significant monetary 
judgments. (Griffith, 2008: 5) 
 
The letter made clear that Page Mill would sue the city and maximize rents to further 
cover their legal expenses rather than negotiate terms for mitigating rent increases in the 
future. Neither the tenants nor the city were willing, however, to allow for any increase in 
any case above the letter of the rent control law. 
In addition to petitions by tenants to the Rent Stabilization Board, which included 
six specific administrative proceedings of multiple petitioners, plus unlawful detainer 
hearings, Page Mill filed ten lawsuits against the City of East Palo Alto. The tenant 
petitions alone had taken a large toll on the city’s legal capacity, in addition to the 
landlord’s 41 separate appeal petitions each for a waiver on rent protections due to mostly 
“scheduled” (future) capital improvements, amounting to $11million, which the city 
noted involved “seven bankers’ boxes” of paper work (City of East Palo Alto Office of 
the City Attorney, 2009:2). Notably, if Page Mill had won these cases, the rent 
 
138	
stabilization ordinance would be effectively gutted. The landlord fees associated with 
registering regulated rents would be reduced and there would be no funding source to 
administer the program for any remaining units. The city denied each Page Mill appeal.  
The litigious CEO of Page Mill and General Partner for the fund also had amassed 
a small fortune of legal fees. This became apparent following the collapse of Page Mill in 
late 2009. In a memo from the court’s receiver, the receiver noted “counsel [on behalf of 
Page Mill, LLCs, or individual associated principals] generally asserted that they were 
owed substantial unpaid attorneys fees and costs” (Superior Court of San Mateo County, 
2009: 4). Although Page Mill had warned the City of East Palo Alto two years earlier of 
the monetary costs of legal pursuits, Page Mill representatives had not heeded the 
warning on their own account.  
Page Mill’s legal strategy against the city invoked procedural misconduct around 
rules and regulations governing rent control matters. For example, Page Mill sued the city 
for passing the rent increase moratorium by arguing that the moratorium required a public 
referendum. They also put the city to task in a separate lawsuit for retaining an empty 
seat on the Rent Stabilization Board that according to the RSO was to be filled by a 
landlord representative with holdings in East Palo Alto. In separate suit, Page Mill called 
for a review of new appointments to the board, which they deemed inadmissible based on 
the Rent Stabilization Board’s failure to give the proper number of days notice of the 
appointment hearing.  
Several of Page Mill’s lawsuits against the City of East Palo Alto raised 
allegations of political misconduct. Alleged Brown Act violations involved lack of public 
notice or elected officials meeting privately without public forum. As put by one city 
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council member, “If we were meeting with more than three people, not just you and me 
discussing this, I could be accused of being in violation of the Brown Act” (personal 
communication, June 8, 2012). Holding meetings with several people to strategize, or 
consider draft legislation could be in violation of the Act.  Although designed for 
increasing transparency, public participation and scrutiny of elected officials the Brown 
Act could also be invoked to stall action, or even nullify past action. 
When the city did put forth a public referendum in favor of tightening rent control 
in East Palo Alto to a citywide vote, discussed further in Chapter 6, Page Mill attempted 
to stall and overwhelm the city with another procedural obstacle. Page Mill’s lawyers 
found what one advocate called an “arcane environmental doc” that required that the 
public resolution had to be vetted based on provisions of the Environmental Qualities Act 
that mandated an environmental impact statement (personal communication, January 7, 
2013; San Mateo Superior Court Case, 2009). The fees alone for the city to put the rent 
control resolution on the ballot amounted to $50,000, paid to the county to hold the 
election (personal communication, June 5, 2012). As they stalled the resolution, Page 
Mill continued to evict tenants. 
Tenants whom Page Mill claimed were not covered at all by the RSO filed a class 
action lawsuit against Page Mill and its subsidiaries. Class action litigation had become a 
strategic tool for civil rights claimants following a 1966 Supreme Court rule that allowed 
for unorganized individuals to be presented together as a group of claimants. Class action 
plays a particular role in a country where local justice, as de Tocqueville once noted, still 
reigns (see Lawrence Friedman in Powell and Steinberg, 2006:53). Litigation can allow 
for a particular issue to jump scale, from the local to the national. Local justice by lower 
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courts could hear claims by unorganized individuals on behalf of an entire class, often by 
consumers and workers, even if located across localities. In this case the named plaintiffs 
extended to those similarly situated Page Mill tenants, reaching by impact renters in the 
properties who were not actively organizing.  
One of the most important aspects of the tool, strategic for organizing, involves 
the politics of recognition. The unorganized become a legal entity as a “class,” which 
provides a rendering of affected status for tenants regardless of their participation as 
named plaintiffs, petitioners, or participation in tenant collective action. Most importantly 
for organizing, the process of disclosure during the proceedings, regardless of outcome, 
would lead to the type of exposure Page Mill avoided and could be used potentially as a 
strategic lever for negotiation. Less important was the potential payout for winning class 
members, which in typical class actions tend to be symbolic for the plaintiffs, once 
divided. On the other hand, a mass award including legal fees paid by a losing defendant 
such as Page Mill could have punitive impact for the defendant, and in this case affect 
Page Mill’s ability, and that of subsequent large landlords, to exploit the “mom and pop” 
provision to raise rents in East Palo Alto.  
The “mom and pop” provision of the RSO was established to exempt small (and 
usually local) landlords from the municipal rental restrictions. In the tenants’ class action 
the defendants included the parent entity Page Mill, but also 50 individual LLCs that 
Page Mill had established and that the Wachovia loan agreement recognized as assigned 
borrower entities (Wachovia Assignment of Leases and Rents, 2007). Although David 
Taran was signatory to all LLCs, they were separate conduits for the Page Mill parent 
entity created to take advantage of the exemption of small scale landlords with holdings 
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of four or less units from rent protection.  
The tenants argued that Page Mill was the singular owner of all purchased units, 
and that the RSO should apply to all Page Mill owned properties regardless of unit 
numbers per structure. Two named plaintiffs involved tenants who had helped to form the 
Fair Rent Coalition. The lawsuit also included the declarations of fifteen tenants, 
including the same city council member of East Palo Alto who was a Page Mill tenant. 
Simply put, the tenants claimed that the multiple LLC configurations were a sham. They 
sought over-charge returns plus punitive damages of $500 per tenant, a symbolic but 
important demand that acknowledged the landlord’s intent to evade the law. 
The tenants initially won a preliminary injunction against any rent increases 
during the period of litigation, and a notice that the plaintiffs would likely prevail. 
Substantial evidence had been submitted showing that “separate personalities do not in 
reality exist” thereby affirming that David Taran was the principal for all the LLCs, and 
furthermore affirming that the LLCs were conduits of a single entity, Page Mill (Superior 
Court of the State of California San Mateo County, 2009).  
Taran participated in two separate depositions in the class action suit, which he 
requested be sealed from public record. At the time, Wells Fargo was reviewing whether 
to extend loan repayment options, and Page Mill was seeking additional investment. It 
was imperative to the general partner to keep confidential records, such as the “…balance 
sheets and income statements, loan agreements, organizational charts of defendants' 
corporate structure, LLC agreements, assignment agreements among Defendants' 
property management agreements and a description of an employee incentive program,” 
(San Mateo County Clerk of Superior Court, 2009). Taran was determined to keep these 
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documents sealed naming individual investors, and disclosing the status of financial 
accounts, including a CalPERS appraisal that could reveal the financial precarity of the 
portfolio. Before these depositions, a plaintiff from the case explained that the tenants 
had no idea of the extent or details of the CalPERS involvement or the scope of leverage 
(personal communication, June 5, 2012). It was in the process of discovery of the class 
action that tenants learned of the extent of CalPERS’s investment in Page Mill and the 
original Wachovia loan agreement.  
 
Denying the City 
 
In a city that incorporated in large part for rent control, Page Mill attempted to 
eliminate rent control by denying cityhood. If the City of East Palo Alto would not 
concede to Page Mill’s rent increases, Page Mill would leave East Palo Alto. Attorneys 
for the Woodland Park Management Company submitted a 30-page letter to the San 
Mateo County Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) arguing to remove the 
Woodland Park neighborhood from the East Palo Alto sphere of influence. In other 
words, Page Mill sought to secede the west side. Their argument was premised on present 
and future governmental service inadequacies, largely in policing road and light services. 
They accused the city of prioritizing blight removal but then not allowing Page Mill to 
follow the city’s own recommendations  
Much of the letter attributed increased crime in the city as evidence of a lack of 
adequate law enforcement and crime prevention services. The letter alleged resistance, 
non-cooperation and inept service by the East Palo Alto Police Department in dealing 
with the landlord’s own security officers (Taran, Letter to Local Agency Formation 
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Commission, 2009:9). On other occasions, however, such as in public testimony to 
CalPERS just a few months earlier (see Chapter 7), Page Mill representatives claimed 
that their management of the properties and partnership with the EPA PD resulted in 
reduced crime in the city (CalPERS Board of Administration Investment Committee, 
April 22, 2009:67).  The Fair Rent Coalition made this point in a letter to LAFCO that 
cited Page Mill earlier statements (Fair Rent Coalition, September 12, 2009). Tenant 
advocates had produced their own analysis of crime statistics to the CalPERS Board 
demonstrating an increase in crime citywide and on the west side (CalPERS Board of 
Administration Investment Committee, 2009: 108). The Page Mill attempt to secede from 
East Palo Alto further exposed the City to scrutiny over policing, and if successful would 
have removed the properties from the city’s political boundaries and rent regulating 
authority. The land grab would become not only a denial of homes for those tenants 
facing displacement, but also a denial of cityhood. Ultimately, the head of Local Agency 
Formation Commission made clear that the Page Mill request was unusual, unsound, and 
would be denied, citing LAFCO’s mission to consolidate, not de-centralize services 
(LAFCO Municipal Service Review, October 15, 2009). 
Despite maintaining cityhood for the west side, on other fronts, the city was 
unable to maintain its legal capacity to prevail against Page Mill in court on other fronts. 
The court overturned the rent freeze moratorium and exposed the city to technicalities 
and contradictions in its ordinance following Costa-Hawkins. The city settled with Page 
Mill in November 2008 by dismissing with prejudice its own litigation against the 
landlord that alleged tenants were being charged beyond maximum allowable on rent 
certificates, and more than once in one year. The city’s attorney sent a letter to Page 
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Mill’s general counsel rebuking Page Mill’s message to the media stating that the city’s 
withdrawal indicated admission or concession of the rent hikes: 
 
…What the City concluded was it was not a productive use of resources to pursue 
this particular case since many of the tenants it hoped to help had already vacated 
the rental units or found a way to pay the increases. ‘Spin’ is one thing; outright 
misrepresentations are quite another (Armento, 2008: 1-2). 
 
Nearly a year earlier the city had consulted for a review and revision of its Rent 
Stabilization Ordinance. Rather than fighting Page Mill in court around technical issues 
with an outdated ordinance, the city again took rent control to the ballot box.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Page Mill created an investment portfolio of land and housing from the Westside 
neighborhood of East Palo Alto at a time when city residents experienced both income 
and housing affordability pressures. Women, seniors, and immigrants were particularly 
impacted. Rather than voice their framework and demands around the specifics of the 
Rent Stabilization Ordinance, or housing code reforms, tenants instead expressed their 
right to stay put through the terms of class and race disparities. In a city that was created 
as a result of segregation, tenants asserted their self-determination to remain. Page Mill 
attempted rent increases and evictions in an effort to clear the portfolio for 
redevelopment, and, in the interim, market rents. The management company deployed 
typical tactics of deferred maintenance, criminalization of tenants, and refused rent 
payments in their attempt to displace residents. 
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This chapter demonstrates how tenants pushed the City of East Palo Alto into 
action, including a rent freeze.  As a result, the city became an adversary and target of the 
landlord. The city faced a dozen lawsuits initiated by Page Mill including scrutiny over 
possible violations of the Brown Act. Moreover, the city contended with a petition 
presented by Page Mill before the San Mateo County Local Agency Formation 
Commission to secede the westside from the city itself.  
 
146	
Chapter 5. Building a Portfolio from East Palo Alto 
 
Chapter Introduction 
 
This chapter’s mapping and analysis of the Page Mill fund takes a step back from 
when Page Mill first besieged renters and the City of East Palo Alto with rent increases, 
harassment, evictions, and litigation. The bulk of this chapter takes a different analytic 
view by following the trail of capital transactions to outline the structure of the Page Mill 
portfolio through those actors who held capital claims in the investment. The relationship 
between the fund manager, lenders, and institutional investors helps to explain the 
structuring of speculation that the tenants and the city deciphered, and to which they 
attempted to respond.  
The portfolio analysis raises multi-pronged questions that stem from the 
financialized and racialized production of real estate risk: How did Page Mill create a 
portfolio out of the Westside of East Palo Alto? What are the roles of different capital 
stakeholders in contemporary corporate landlordism? Relatedly, why would California 
Public Employees Retirement Services (CalPERS), the country’s largest public pension 
fund, invest in the dispossession of majority low-income immigrant and Black renters? 
 
Bricks and Mortar or Capital Abstraction 
 
As a single line on a pension fund’s investment ledger, the Page Mill portfolio 
item elides the contentious politics of placemaking and disposession upon which the 
investors’ profit margins relied. The portfolio instead appears in the monolithic terms of 
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asset value and return on investment. Claims by other stakeholders, including tenants, are 
hidden from the ledger accounts. So too are the rulings and proclivities of lawmakers, 
administrators, commissioners, and regulators. Fees exchanged between lenders, 
purchasing agents, investors, brokers, assessors, servicers, derivative traders, and account 
managers are also concealed in the ledger’s bottom line.  
Financial actors, above all, often appear as vague references in a national and 
global “housing market” reified into abstraction and marked by colossal losses or gains. 
These stakeholders are presumed the furthest in social distance from low and middle-
income tenants who call regulated rental housing home. Piven and Cloward (1977) 
suggest financial actors are indeed often out of view to the tenants in the circumstances of 
every day life: 
Tenants recognize the leaking ceilings and cold radiators, and they recognize the 
landlord. They do not recognize the banking, real estate and construction system. No 
small wonder, therefore, that when the poor rebel they rebel against the overseer of 
the poor, or the slumlord, or the middling merchant, not against the banks or the 
governing elites to whom the overseer, the slumlord, and the merchant also defer. In 
other words it is the daily experience of people that shapes their grievances, 
establishes the measure of their demands, and points out the targets of their anger. (p. 
20-21) 
 
Indeed, the most recognizable and immediate targets to tenants in large multifamily 
portfolios most often are those collecting the rent and appearing on behalf of the owner’s 
interests. Piven & Cloward’s observations explain that the poor use the power they have 
within the parameters of their daily interactions and opportunities for action (rent strikes, 
street disruption, housing court, etc.).   
Despite the abstraction of financial structures, the role of capital actors in rental 
housing through and beyond rent collection is highly instructive to tenants threatened by 
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displacement and bearing the greatest costs of corporate landlord speculation. When 
taking measure of the relationships between capital actors, new possibilities for aggrieved 
tenants to identify targets may emerge. In fact, much of the description of the Page Mill 
fund outlined in this chapter reflects the investigation and analysis of tenant leaders who 
ultimately looked beyond the rent collector management company and pursued the Page 
Mill portfolio’s investors and lenders as primary targets. This chapter in particular is 
indebted to those tenants’ discoveries.  
If new financial instruments have led to changing forms and scales of corporate 
landlordism since the time of Piven & Cloward’s account above, the daily experiences of 
the aggrieved in many ways, however, largely remain the same: rent increases, leaking 
ceilings and cold radiators. Yet changes since the 1970s also involve dramatic added and 
exacerbated pressures for low-income tenants in hot markets such as Silicon Valley 
driven by the digital economy, debt-fueled markets, and the stripping of rent protections 
hard won by the very tenant movements that were a focus of Piven & Cloward’s strategic 
endeavors. In this case, investment in the Page Mill high-risk monopoly real estate 
portfolio was made possible in part by labor’s own capital due to changes over the same 
period in CalPERS’ real estate strategy. 
As detailed below, CalPERS, the largest investor in this particular portfolio, 
financed the East Palo Alto tenants’ displacement. In the thirty-year period before the 
2007/2008 housing crash, CalPERS had moved the bulk of its real property investments 
into out-sourced and overleveraged funds such as Page Mill that sought higher gains by 
taking higher risks. The Page Mill portfolio’s investment structure exemplified the 
pension fund’s preferred role as limited partner, an investor and monitor with limited 
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control over the management of the portfolio. CalPERS investment in such portfolios 
contrasted the pension fund’s real estate investments of the past, which emphasized 
investors’ earning through stable if passive rental income and capital appreciation based 
on long-term holdings.  
Such past real estate investments and prospects for returns in the period before the 
1980s were fixed in the spatial and time constraints of capital circulation in the built 
environment (Harvey, 1978; Hagerman et. al. 2005; Krippner, 2005; Sassen, 2008; Fox 
Gotham, 2009; Weber, 2010). When CalPERS was first authorized by California state 
law to invest in real estate in 1953, equity and asset value were expected to result in 
stable if significant portfolio returns over decades, not months or a few years. In the web 
of increasing financial exchange, the typical real estate portfolio of the early 2000s, 
among those representing multifamily property and often properties in pool, instead 
became an investment and credit vehicle through which capital actors came to deploy 
various financial instruments to make sizeable profit in the short term. Corporate 
landlords, shorthand for large investors such as private equity firms and hedge funds, 
increased investment in residential real estate in part as an opportunity to rake in fees and 
place capital for quick, rather than long-term, investment returns. 
This chapter follows the trail of the portfolio transactions and associated primary 
data such as the prospectus, loan agreement, independent auditors’ reports, CalPERS real 
estate unit reports, consultant evaluator reports, depositions, and account manager emails. 
Made visible, these statements call into question gentrification as a process of consumer-
choice, or “natural,” or “free” market fluctuations as determinant of who wins and who 
loses in the gamble over speculative real estate investments. This chapter clarifies the 
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structure of the portfolio itself, which complicated the opportunities and obstacles 
confronted by the largely low-income immigrant and Black tenants in East Palo Alto who 
called the portfolio home.  
 
The Managing Stakeholder, Page Mill Properties II 
 
The Page Mill fund could not be assembled without the availability of investment 
capital and cheap credit in the context of the pre-2007 booming real estate industry. Yet 
the fund’s specific attraction to East Palo Alto rested squarely on the perceived potential 
to thwart municipal authority and, in effect, undermine rental affordability measures. The 
gamble took into account the specific conditions of a location of which the fund’s general 
partner, David Taran, was familiar.  
A Bay Area developer, Taran had established himself as not only a financier in 
the investment world but as a local operator. In an interview for Private Equity Real 
Estate, Taran argued that local operators can be effective at establishing alternative asset 
funds: “[Operators] have a perspective that is more useful, in my mind, than someone 
with a Wall Street background who is just used to placing money…You're making money 
bets. You're making momentum bets. We're not making momentum bets. We're making 
real estate bets” (Lovell, 2005: 22). In this statement, Taran placed himself apart from 
traditional investors moving capital at the turn of the market, and safely out of site of 
local conditions. 
Taran suggested a different expertise necessary for the risk involved in expanding 
private equity funds and their institutional and individual investment partners to move 
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into residential real estate. The rate of return for multifamily housing investment was a 
gamble beyond buying low and selling high, and market fluctuations. In this targeted 
portfolio Taran took into account state and local authority over rent control, housing 
codes, and zoning, in addition to an understanding of financial interfaces, placement fees, 
management fees, investor incentive fees, and the securities and derivatives market. 
Taran planned to amasse properties into a single portfolio for high returns. 
Taran had gained recognition by several large pension funds as a reputable 
general manager based on an earlier “opportunistic,” or high risk, commercial real estate 
fund that closed only a few years prior to the East Palo Alto purchases. In 2003, at the 
upsurge of the real estate bubble of that period, Taran and associates attracted $75million 
of CalPERS investment for the first time. This first Page Mill portfolio was a private 
equity-backed fund that formed part of the larger private equity-backed firm DivcoWest, 
which by 2014 managed $2.5 billion of assets (www.divcowest.com). In addition to the 
CalPERS investment, this fund also attracted more than $100 million total investments by 
the California State Teachers' Retirement System and the Oregon Public Employees' 
Retirement Fund (Security and Exchange Commission, 2002). The fund raised a total of 
$290 million in equity with an anticipated fund total of nearly $700 million including 
debt for commercial real estate purchases in San Francisco, Boston, and other major U.S. 
cities. The fund established Page Mill and likewise Taran and his associates as players in 
the $3 trillion field of institutional pension investments.   
By the time Taran approached CalPERS in 2006 for commitment for the real 
estate fund, “Page Mill II, Limited Partnership,”43 he was known as a serious equity fund 																																																								
43 Initial capital call memoranda use the fund name “Sunstar”. This name was subsequently changed to 
Page Mill II (Private Placement Memorandum, 2006). 
 
152	
manager in and beyond northern California. CalPERS overwhelmingly noted “pros” in its 
“Investment Opportunity Summary” recommending $100million in commitment and 
citing Taran as “an established fund manager with successful track record with CalPERS” 
(Situs Strategic Advisors, 2006). Taran, at the heels of a career in both litigation and 
global manufacturing investments, touted a formidable claim of assembling 
approximately $2.1 billion in real estate assets largely based on his partnership with 
DivcoWest (http://www.pagemill.com).  
The due diligence report developed by CalPERS consultants cited few risks for 
CalPERS investing in this Page Mill fund. Notably, a risk they did highlight pertained to 
a market awash with capital. They raised concern over “the huge quantity of capital 
looking for transactions” and the subsequent demand for efficient exchange (Situs 
Strategic Advisors, 2006:1-2). Property acquisition and placing capital required greater 
speed for greater yield. The due diligence evaluators concluded that the fund would need 
to streamline their transactions and widen their sources of “off-market” properties, or 
undisclosed listings of real estate prospects. In one respect Taran may have heeded this 
concern. The majority of the properties in East Palo Alto were not large enough to 
warrant “off list” premium sourcing but they were not necessarily on the market either. 
Like the straw buyers from the block-busting years of the 1950s, Page Mill agents 
contacted owners directly to make offers without revealing their intended plans (County 
of San Mateo Superior Court, 2007). This time, however, the purchasing agents were 
making offers that in some instances could not be beat and that would assume an influx 
of higher income, and possibly white residents.  
When Page Mill’s real estate managers checked-off their final acquisition lists, 
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the fund had made 101 separate real estate transactions with local and absentee landlords 
capitalized by $114 million of committed equity from CalPERS and individual high net 
worth investors. The fund’s larger vision purportedly involved 140 property tracts within 
a $1.6 billion fund, according to disclosures by a Page Mill purchasing agent, a straw 
buyer (County of San Mateo Superior Court, 2007:19). The agent’s court statements were 
the result of legal action by Taran who accused the agent of acting on Page Mill “trade 
secrets” in order to obtain properties for the agent’s personal gains.  
Page Mill’s purchasing agents were swift in their transactions. Several purchases 
involved East Palo Alto parcels above and beyond Silicon Valley’s standard prices 
including one parcel at $5 million and above per acre (Ibid). One city administrator, who 
was a council member at the time of the purchases, explained how he took notice of the 
buy-ups in 2007 based on the “super high” multifamily purchases that began to surface. 
He was particularly surprised by a purchase that involved a local landlord known to the 
city for her longtime disdain for rent control: 
The owner said [to Page Mill agent] my price is $250K per unit take it or leave it.  
She gave them the number thinking they would just walk away, but they came 
back and said we’ll take it, and her jaw dropped. She said, ‘You’re kidding? 
You’re never going to get this rent back.’ The units were worth at most $130K. 
And boom she was gone (personal communication, June 8, 2012).  
 
The seller was well aware that the net operating income required would need to 
significantly increase to support such a sale price. City officials, including those who had 
worked on the city’s original rent control campaign, became concerned with the plan 
behind the growing purchases. The administrator quoted above anticipated an attack on 
the city’s rental protections: “My understanding was that the business plan included an 
evisceration of the present tenant population that would be replaced by people with 
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money, and ultimately a total evisceration of the rent control law” (Ibid.). It did not seem 
to any of the housing advocates paying close attention to the mounting property 
transactions that such investment could be otherwise viable.  
A 2006 preliminary version of the portfolio prospectus anticipated 13-17% 
internal rate of return for the general partner and the limited partners (Situs Strategic 
Advisors, 2006). Taran and associates later augmented their projection to 30% or even 
double returns on investment for the portfolio (Page Mill Fund II, 2007: 31). On average, 
stocks yielded 12.17% returns over the preceding ten years between 1996-2006 
(Damodaran, 2015). Page Mill projected steep profits for a fund that aimed to exit its 
partnership in five years, or before 2011 (Squar Milner Real Estate Services, GP, 2009). 
Page Mill anticipated another premium institutional investor would purchase the 
aggregated properties by that time (Situs Strategic Advisors, 2006).44   
Why would Page Mill expect such short term returns in the purchase of so many 
rent restricted properties and some at above market prices? Court disclosures reveal in the 
Page Mill prospectus that the business approach indeed translated to an aggressive 
strategy to undermine the city’s existing Rent Stabilization Ordinance and pursue 
evictions (Superior Court of the County of California, 2008). Yet as shown in the former 
and subsequent chapters, the fund’s profitability did not singularly rely on rental 
increases followed by sustained occupancy by market-rate tenants. Several housing 
advocates suspected from the beginning that the eviction of low-income tenants and rent 
																																																								
44 Although the original prospectus outlined the possibility of creating a REIT for public offering as exit 
strategy, CalPERS due diligence consultants remarked that the REIT was no longer a consideration by the 
time CalPERS committed to the fund, and instead the fund would seek a premium investor before the final 
loan payment became due (The Situs Companies, 2006) 
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increases formed part of an overarching strategy to deregulate the units in order to 
eventually demolish or convert the structures. Such an exit strategy of redevelopment 
assumed the investors, rather than the people who live in East Palo Alto, would determine 
the city’s future built landscape and composition. It assumed the dominance of the 
investors as primary actors over tenants, workers, and elected city officials.  
Evidence presented to CalPERS in the Page Mill business plans demonstrates the 
intention for redevelopment. CalPERS summarized the goals of Page Mill II, LP in a 
fiduciary report detailing returns on investments in opportunistic funds. The report 
summarizes that the fund aimed to create value through a focus “on repositioning, re-
development or conversion along with actual development of real estate assets” 
(CalPERS Supplemental Report, 2009). Ultimately, Page Mill planned to sell the 
portfolio with the opportunity for repurposing the underlying land. Redevelopment 
prospects, including the potential for commercial development and/or condominium 
conversions, drove the above-market purchases and future profitability. In one auditor’s 
report that questioned why Page Mill did not seek below market or at-market asking 
prices, Page Mill responded that the purchases were made below potential value (Squar 
Milnor Real Estate Services, 2008: 4).  
All indicators suggest that the monopoly portfolio purchase relied on a profit 
model that measured current value based on future value. This calibrated profitability for 
the portfolio reflects what Levy (2014) calls a logic of future valuation compressed into 
the present, or a projected return on equity as if current value. Calculations of the present 
investment are future-driven.45 The loan went well above normal ratios because it wasn’t 
																																																								
45 In real estate financing this is commonly referred to as discounted cash flows. 
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based on the asset value of the portfolio; it was based on its future value. The rate of 
returns could not be deemed feasible, nor the investment model prudent, based on the net-
operating income at the time of the purchase and debt servicing. As investor partners 
would invariably learn, the costs rose well above the income of the project along with an 
alarming higher ratio of risk, demanding a higher rate of profit, and higher pressure for 
rent increases through deregulation of municipal rent control.  
The second version of the Page Mill II business plan targeted potential investors 
to partner in a sidecar access fund to supplement and ostensibly expand the Page Mill real 
estate portfolio. Sidecars, allowed under the terms of the Page Mill partnership 
agreement, typically distinguish a separate portfolio or portion of a portfolio that involves 
differentiated risk. Investments listed in this “access fund” included the same 
concentrated investments of the Page Mill II fund in East Palo Alto. The different 
placement memoranda, high-net worth investors and a significant credit line were, in 
practice, designated to the same portfolio (Page Mill Fund II, 2007: 25).  The investors in 
this side-car fund included well-known venture capitalists and developers in the region. 
Nineteen investors eventually sued Taran in his attempt to abscond with their capital 
commitment to the sidecar fund, including, among others, 14 Crow Canyon Corp., Diablo 
Capital Venture Fund, Shane Albers, Paul Magliocco, and Vertical Venture Capital LLC.  
The investors for this fund were accredited. In private equity and private real 
estate funds, prospective investors must demonstrate that they have significant funds to 
offset associated risks. Private funds are exempted from much of the U.S. 1940 
Investment Company Act reporting (and review) that was promulgated following the 
1929 crash. Under the Act’s Section 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) exemptions, hedge funds, private 
 
157	
equity, and private real estate funds do not need to register with the SEC if such a fund 
has less than 100 investors (or less than 500 under other provisions), does not widely 
advertise its fund (retains exclusivity) and qualifies all investors based on income tests. 
At the time of the Qualification Statement, the income tests were stipulated at 
$200,000/year or $300,000/year with spouse, or net worth test of $1 million individually 
or jointly with spouse. Institutional investors required $5 million in investable assets to 
qualify.  
Page Mill cited the private fund exemption Section 3(c)(1) in its Subscription 
Agreement and Qualification Statement signed by CalPERS and individual investors, in 
which the investors also submit to the understanding that, “an investment in the Interest is 
highly speculative and may result in a complete loss of its investment” (Page Mill 
Properties II, L.P. Subscription Agreement, u.d.:3). The income test and financial literacy 
of the investors aims to ensure the investors can afford total loss.46 
These funds are generally comprised of multiple limited partnerships that are 
short-term, and given the SEC exemption, are more likely to escape public scrutiny. 
Unlike stocks, private funds are not publically traded and the pitch by the general partner 
or brokers to recruit investors takes place in a performance of exclusivity under the cloak 
of “trade secrets,” often in off-site, rented hotel business rooms. One private equity real 
estate broker not associated with Page Mill explained a typical private equity real estate 
pitch: “It is about building relationships so that I can call on an investor, they will show 
																																																								
46 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2011 requires greater regulation of private funds, including investor adviser 
registration, and requirements for advisers to maintain records, if not report those records to the SEC. In 
certain cases of “systemic risk” to the entire financial system, the Dodd-Frank Act also would require 
disclosure of those records to the SEC. Many caveats restrict public access to those records, which for 
example, cannot be obtained from the SEC through an exemption from the Freedom of Information Act. 
See Coffee (2011).  
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for the general partner’s presentation, and they will pledge a commitment to the fund 
because timing and opportunity is right” (interview, April 2015). The solicited investor 
then pledges capital commitments for the slated opportunities. 
When an investor provides equity, there is an expected pay-back. This is why debt 
burdens, further discussed below, do not always capture the predatory and speculative 
structuring of real estate investor portfolios: it is not only the lender or securities investor 
that expects repayment with interest, equity providers expect repayment too. Typically a 
fund makes due on its distribution of returns to the investors first, then to the investor 
manager in the form of tax-favorable carried interest. The waterfall of returns, as this 
period is described, incorporates rate hurdles to pay returns to investors before a return of 
initial capital followed by continued performance-based returns to the investors and 
manager. In addition to Page Mill’s 1.5% annual management fee, Page Mill is 
guaranteed half of all profits after initial 8% preferred return to limited partners, until the 
general manager receives at least 20% of distributions. Thereafter, based on this model, 
Page Mill would receive 20% of additional profits (Real Estate Alert, 2009:2).  
Taran explicitly sold the venture to the access fund investment partners claiming 
Woodland Park was “poised for gentrification” (Bernstein-Wax, 2010).  Paul Magliocco, 
a Page Mill investor associated with the angel investment firm Keiretsu Forum noted in a 
court declaration that "I personally would never have invested in the fund had I known 
about the scheme to evade the rent control laws… from a purely economic perspective, it 
rendered the investment far too risky. At least equally importantly, I find the scheme 
morally offensive" (Ibid). Despite such statements to the contrary, the established, 
sophisticated high-net investors were likely to have invested precisely because of the 
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potential for gentrification, the elimination of rent control and redevelopment as the very 
premise for returns. 
Just before the housing crash, the west section of East Palo Alto would be a likely 
spot to promote gentrification within the tight Silicon Valley housing market. East Palo 
Alto’s Woodland Park neighborhood lies between Palo Alto and Bayside highway that 
leads north to San Francisco and south to San Jose. The neighborhood is contiguous with 
the even more affluent city of Menlo Park.  Significantly, the Woodland Park area is a 
stone’s throw from the Four Seasons Hotel and office complex where Taran first made 
his pitch to the sidecar investors, a vast yet tucked away development project facing Palo 
Alto.  According to the city’s own General Plan adopted in 1999, and the most current 
plan at the time of the Page Mill purchases, parts of the Woodland Park neighborhood 
adjacent to the University Circle hotel and office complex were slated for commercial 
rezoning (City of East Palo Alto, Cottland, Beland Associates, 1999: 24).  
This rezoning did not actually happen, however, as Taran and associates could 
observe in 2006. The area outside University Circle retained zoning districts for medium 
to high-density residential housing throughout Woodland Park. This area was the home 
of low-income households. Indeed, Page Mill’s plans outlined in Taran’s pitch to the 
sidecar fund’s prospective investors called for residential redevelopment. 
Ultimately, Taran’s “trade secrets” amounted to Page Mill’s intention to acquire 
monopoly ownership of all available land and property on the west side of East Palo Alto. 
Taran understood that the portfolio’s potential market value did not equal the sum of the 
future value of the total individual properties. Instead, the portfolio’s maximum profits 
depended on the concentrated purchase for redevelopment. Aggregation allowed for 
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scalable redevelopment of the entire neighborhood. Page Mill banked on tenant vacancy 
in order to reposition the properties for redevelopment. Tenant vacancy carried risks, 
however. Vacancy would mean constraint or opportunity contingent upon the ability for 
the investor to service debts without rental income, to leverage the properties for 
additional conversion funds, or to make a short-term sale. The tenants’ homes in 
aggregate became a vehicle to maximize financialization, or, the further commodification 
of the portfolio for greater exchange and associated fees. Amassed as a portfolio fund, the 
properties could become a single vehicle for various financial instruments tied to 
significant loans. 
 
The Lender Stakeholder, Wachovia 
 
The burdens on this portfolio suggest a different financial relationship from the 
landlord tenant primary interdependence around the need and demand for rent income to 
support debt servicing, management, and maintenance for long-term real estate 
investment. The debt-fueled mortgage-backed securities market allows for additional 
points of exchange for capital by multiplying opportunities for putting capital in motion. 
Leverage and the securitization of debt involve greatest potential gains in shortest amount 
of time, through short-term cash flow, fee collection, and more opportunity for exchange. 
In the short view, leverage, including leverage above purchase cost, creates cash flow 
from property investment that is otherwise fixed or illiquid until sale. A detailed view of 
the loan agreement provides a window into the way in which debt creates opportunity for 
greater profits, and fees, and also incentivizes eliminating rent control. 
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General Manager David Taran’s strategy, according to his attorney, was to 
“leverage the leveraged” (Bernstein-Wax, 2010). In August 2006, the Royal Bank of 
Scotland subsidiary Greenwich Capital provided a subscription line of credit to Page Mill 
for preliminary financing capacity, first at $90 million but subsequently reduced to $30 
million (PMP II Fund Overview and Summary of Investments, 2007: 14). One year later, 
thanks to the CalPERS $100 million equity commitment, Page Mill Properties II, LP 
through a single purpose entity “Old York Financial Services LLC” became the guarantor 
of a $242,952,461.00 loan from Wachovia Bank (now Wells Fargo), $220.7 million of 
which was committed towards the portfolio’s $271 million purchase price (Wachovia 
Bank National Assocation, 2007). The $100 million commitment from CalPERS 
ultimately represented 86% of the equity in the fund (Stockbridge Capital Group, 2009). 
David Taran, on the other hand, was required to commit no less than $10 million to the 
fund (Agreement of Limited Partnership between Page Mill Properties II, 2006: 21), of 
which he contributed less than $2 million by December 31, 2007 (Pricewatercoopers, 
LLC, 2008: 12). Through the separate sidecar alternative investment vehicle Page Mill 
Access Fund (est. 2007), Page Mill II also attracted an additional credit line from City 
National Bank of $30 million, of which $14.8 million was released. The sidecar fund 
brokered commitments of an additional $30 million from accredited high net worth 
individuals and pooled venture capital. 
The structure of multifamily loans such as the large Wachovia loan is predicated 
on a market that circulates capital as credit. Commercial loans generally do not see 
incremental repayment in full over the lifespan of the loan, but instead are structured for 
regular monthly servicing followed by a large pay down or full repayment at the end of 
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its 3-10 year term. Such a short span would rarely if ever allow for payment of all interest 
and principal over its maturity.  A looming repayment typically requires a sale, a new 
loan, or refinancing at the end of the original loan’s short term (Congressional Oversight 
Report on Commercial Real Estate Losses and the Risk to Financial Stability, 2010:8). 
Debt begets new debt in such a structure. Typically, the income generated by rents 
provides for monthly servicing on a multifamily commercial loan’s interest, or on interest 
and principal. The property is the collateral for the debt and appreciation in property 
values can create favorable terms for the borrower on a new loan to repay the original, or 
for refinancing. 
In this example, the loan agreement between Wachovia and Old York Financial 
LLC, established by Page Mill, was disbursed through a series of advances for Page 
Mill’s bulk property purchases in East Palo Alto. The loan amount was used for purposes 
beyond the acquisition. The debt of the original loan was permitted within cash flow 
calculations as reserves for this portfolio. The lender also provided stipulations for loan 
advances in the event of the need to pay for debt servicing. Under these terms, the loan 
itself could be used to pay for a limited number of servicing payments to avoid default 
(Wachovia Bank National Association, 2007). 
This circulation of debt perpetuates a much larger pyramid scheme, in which 
tenants often have a debt burden of their own. The tenants, profiled in Chapter 5, were 
among the most susceptible to debt schemes as low-income workers in need of wage 
supplements. Indeed, across the country, higher income renters began purchasing housing 
in the 1970s and again in the 1990s through first time homeowner programs initiated in 
the later period by Bush and Clinton administrations and the subprime market. Notably, 
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very low income renters and undocumented workers could not afford or qualify for these 
programs and remained renters. At the same time, rent increases during the 1990s led to 
an affordability crisis for those tenants (Hockett, McElwee, et. al., 2005).  
Among low-income renters, even regulated rents could also be prohibitive 
without an economy of credit that includes debt as wage supplement in the various forms 
of payday loans, student loans, and individual credit cards. In California, according to the 
California Department of Corporations, the payday loan industry reached nearly $3 
billion by 2007, often involving compounded interest rates in the triple digits (de Sa, 
2011). Tenants’ contribution of rental income to the cash flow of the portfolio was 
ostensibly, if partially, debt-based just as the service to the original mortgage may come 
from a credit subscription line or the original mortgage itself. In this formulation, higher 
leverage was also predicated on high(er) rents, which in all likelihood would involve 
increasing debt burden for tenants as well, regardless of underlying property value. As 
noted below, real estate losses for the institutional investor, CalPERS, were exacerbated 
by additional leverage CalPERS took on and was mandated to repay. Meanwhile, debt 
taken on by municipal governments supplemented the municipalities’ stretched 
operational budgets, and local governments’ obligatory contribution payments to 
CalPERS for workers’ retirement security.47 
Page Mill private placement memoranda, the Wachovia loan agreement, and 
CalPERS’ internal reports all demonstrate excessive risk and over-leverage for the 
portfolio fund. High concentration of debt in the portfolio meant that more rental income 
																																																								
47 Three California municipalities, Vallejo, Stockton, and San Bernardino, filed for bankruptcy by 2015, 
each citing high pension costs for municipal budget woes. 
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would be used for debt servicing, at the cost of operating expenses and overall portfolio 
stability during the servicing period before property resale. Greater debt also meant 
greater exposure with potential asset devaluation. At the time of the Wachovia loan in 
2007 two primary calculations typically gauged risk for underwriting in the commercial 
market and helped to establish the terms for the maximum available loan: the Loan to 
Value (LTV) and debt service coverage ratios. A third ratio, the debt yield, gained import 
following the housing downturn but was also used in Wachovia’s underwriting for this 
loan. A closer look at the underwriting for the Wachovia loan demonstrates the extent of 
the inflated debt provided for this portfolio.  
Unlike residential loans that generally involve higher LTV ratios based on an 
expected long-term amortization span for loan repayment, i.e. 30 years, multifamily 
commercial loans generally have lower LTV ratios.48 The released Wachovia loan 
agreement with Page Mill does not include the terms of the promissory note such as debt 
servicing schedule, but some publically known elements of the note include the $50 
million balloon repayment by the fund by August, 2009, and full repayment by 2011 
(Taran, 2009). The loan therefore required a significant pay down two years from 
origination, and would come due in full within five years of origination. 
The Wachovia loan agreement specified all initial and future borrowing base 
properties for this Page Mill fund. The loan stipulations prohibited the LTV ratio from 
exceeding 85%. Based on the borrowing properties exhibit, the portfolio was financed at 
an initial 82% LTV ratio reflecting the total Wachovia loan allocation to purchase price. 
																																																								
48 As put by Immergluck (2015), the higher LTV ratio is based on the idea that homeowners are less likely 
to view the property solely as an investment, and less likely to walk away if underwater (personal 
communication). 
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Yet, altogether all loans including subscription lines obtained for the portfolio amounted 
to $287.2 million, well over the portfolio’s total purchase price and appraised value. The 
total LTV for the portfolio as a statement of total debt versus purchase price, in lieu of 
appraisal value before sale, was approximately 106%. In this estimation, the portfolio 
was underwater at origination unless significant added-value redevelopment would take 
place with the additional credit.49 Such leverage determination above CalPERS’ own 
stated limit of 75% LTV was allowed for in the partnership agreement “[…if] appropriate 
for strategic or other appropriate business reasons” as determined by the General Partner 
David Taran, and approved by the Limited Partnership (Page Mill Properties II, LP, 
2006: 47).  
A second measurement of risk in this portfolio’s underwriting, the debt service 
coverage ratio50 (DSCR), also corresponded to a future-driven economy marked by 
present-day financialization, or opportunities to circulate capital. A DSCR value 
considers the annual net operating income and annual loan servicing, indicating cash-
flow availability and thus the overall strength of the portfolio to support debt servicing 
through existing revenue sources. The Federal Reserve found in the period between 
2005-2007 “…lenders would base reported DSCRs on estimates of future rents, rather 
than on current or historical rental income” (Black et.al., 2012: 3). This was seemingly 
																																																								
49 In its private placement memorandum overview to individual investors dated several months prior to the 
Wachovia loan agreement, Page Mill deemed a Loan to Cost (not value) projection of 80% for the portfolio 
(Wachovia National Bank Associaition, 2007). Loan to Cost (LTC) includes operating expenses such as 
budgeted tenant improvements above purchase acquisition (Loan Agreement, 2007: 6). This ratio shows 
greater leverage than the Wachovia loan agreement’s stipulation of a maximum 75% LTC ratio for the 
borrowing properties. 
50 See http://www.uhab.org/sites/default/files/banking_on_gentrification.pdf for a visual graphic of the 
definition of DSCR. The graphic depicts debt versus income and was developed by Stabilizing New York 
City, a coalition of 14 organizing, legal and advocacy organizations in New York City fighting predatory 
equity in that city (Banking on Gentrification: A Report from the Stabilizing NYC Coalition, June 18, 
2016:3). 
 
166	
the case for this portfolio in which neither the LTV nor DSCR could be reconciled at 
regulated rents. The DSCR stipulated by the Wachovia loan agreement projected a 
negative cash flow between .60-.80:1.00 for the first two years given purchase, 
management start-up and capital costs following the first loan advance, and 1.00:1.00 
following year two (Wachovia National Bank Association, 2007).51 In the net operating 
income to total debt service ratio, only 60-80% of the annual debt servicing costs would 
be met in years one and two. Despite this upside down ratio, the Wachovia loan would be 
deemed rational in light of competitive low-interest commercial property lending rates 
and what appeared to be the ever-rising mortgage-backed securities markets at the time of 
origination. Yet with the existing debt including the subscription lines from City National 
Bank and Royal Bank of Scotland, the Wachovia loan could only be construed as 
unmitigated and excess risk.52  
Amplified risk on investment created greater pressure on increasing rents during 
the investment period. The lender was aware of the rent control protections that limited 
increases to rent income, and provided a brief summary description of the East Palo Alto 
																																																								
51 A DSCR ratio less than 1.00 reflects insufficient annual cash flow to support debt servicing and 
extremely high risk of default. The bank may have allowed for such a low DSCR given the $100million 
equity commitment from CalPERS that preceded the loan. The calculation assumes an eventual increase in 
cash flow based on increase in rents and decrease or stabilization of operating expenses over time. Net 
operating income does not include as expense the debt servicing or capital expenditures, such as one-time 
improvements. 
52 Another indicator, debt yield, also demonstrated high risk for this portfolio. Debt yield measures 
profitability for the lender in the case of borrower default. This ratio is especially relevant to such a large 
loan. The ratio estimates how much a lender can expect in returns over the course of holding the properties 
following default in that event. Wachovia provided stipulation for the portfolio of no less than 7% debt 
yield in the third year, and thereafter 8% (Ibid.: 15). This ratio estimates that the bank would receive 7-8% 
in returns if Page Mill defaulted after the second year. There was not specified debt yield for the first two 
years in the agreement. Although the loan agreement did not cite the projected net operating income for the 
borrowing properties the debt yield estimation allows for a backwards calculation. At a 7% debt yield, the 
minimum net operating income would be approximately $17 million for a $242.9 million loan. The 
portfolio, in these terms, would generate $17 million in revenue after expenses. The debt yield was 
insupportable even at such low terms. 
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Rent Stabilization Ordinance in the loan agreement. Although the Wachovia loan 
agreement required a listing of all properties that fall under the ordinance, only five 
properties were listed. It is unclear whether the remaining properties were later added to 
the agreement exhibit. Due diligence investigation by the lender and the borrower 
investors also required disclosure of all lease agreements for each property (Wachovia 
National Bank Association, 2007: 18-19). The lack of a complete list of the properties 
covered by the ordinance suggests blatant disregard of the existing rent regulations that 
covered the majority of the borrowing and future borrowing properties listed by the 
borrower. Any strategy of rent increases based on deregulation or increase to maximum 
legal rents, however, would be based on future rental income anticipated by the bank and 
borrower rather than the rental income at time of the loan and purchase. Although 
inconclusive, the incorrect number of properties may indicate the borrower’s future 
projection of how many fewer units would be covered by the RSO as calculation of 
future-based rent following deregulation rather than current rent.  
Why would Wachovia provide such a high-risk and large loan in a city known for 
its rent regulation? Just as Page Mill’s portfolio of East Palo Alto rental stock was a 
speculative investment, so too was Wachovia’s loan to Page Mill’s speculative 
investment portfolio bolstered by an assumption of value appreciation, continued debt 
demand, and circulation based on low interest rates and corresponding robust securities 
and servicing market. The bank, like the investors, sought to amplify leverage to amplify 
profits. This was especially true for the securitization of loans; the larger the loan, the 
larger the fees and cash flow from securities. Wells Fargo, in this instance, however, 
ultimately became the greatest beneficiary in this high stakes gamble. As discussed in the 
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following chapter, this banking entity later purchased Wachovia debt for pennies on the 
dollar and with federal subsidy. 
Wachovia’s specific interests can be viewed through its interrelated profits from 
increased leverage including interest payments and fees captured by money managers in 
the loan transaction. For example, the lender received incentive fees in the immediate 
closing of the loan. The borrower here purchased points upfront from Wachovia at 
$21,135,716.00 for an interest rate cap at 6.25% per annum over the period of the loan 
(Wachovia National Bank Association, 2007: 10). Application fees, appraisal fees and 
closing costs were also part of the loan structure at the borrower’s expense. In this case 
some fee costs were allocated as deferred financing fees, which became amortized over 
the life of the loan, thereby incorporating the fees into the loan amount bearing interest 
(Pricewatercoopers LLC, 2008: 17). The borrower also provided fees to sell or swap 
interest rate caps as derivatives contingent upon the loan covenants, with the aim to 
reduce the impact of increases of interest rates on long-term debt (Ibid.: 9).  
Lenders further benefit from such related fees and anticipate fees accrued in the 
future exchange of servicing rights, which represents another separate market of 
exchange deploying the loan agreement. This market entails the selling and purchasing of 
contract rights for servicing mortgage payment collections from the borrower (Howley 
and Gittelsohn, 2013). Yet still the most compelling reason for Wachovia to issue a loan 
structured with such over-leverage was the ability for the bank to create paper: a primary 
driver of real estate lending is the ability to pool and securitize the loan. The security 
derivative takes the loan off the lender’s ledger. 
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The Opening of Securities for Liquidity 
 
The circulation of debt grew by the early 1980s, when Freddie Mac first issued 
collateralized mortgage obligations, or CMOs, in which securities could be segmented to 
distribute and differentiate risk (Immergluck, 2009: 461). Lenders and investors had more 
incentive to securitize residential mortgages and commercial real estate loans as vehicles 
for investment in the secondary market. Wall Street was making massive profits through 
CMOs in a boom that just among government-sponsored, mortgage backed securities 
escalated in value from $200 million in 1980 to more than $4 trillion in 2007 (Sanchez, 
et. al., 2010: 105).  
Commercial real estate securities followed residential mortgage backed securities 
and gained traction as a fix to the savings & loans crisis. The Resolution Trust 
Corporation was established in 1989 to take over the failed thrifts, nearly half of which 
were multi-family and commercial loans (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2005). 
The Resolution Trust Corporation liquidated the failed loans through securitization, 
eventually making gains for the U.S. Treasury and overwhelmingly realizing investor 
profit. These securitizations differed from traditional commercial-backed mortgage bonds 
because the securities were based on pooled loans and properties rather than on a single 
mortgage and property.  
By the time the Resolution Trust Corporation liquidated the bulk of the distressed 
loans, the commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) had begun to play a rising 
role in financing new loans. In 2005 the FDIC reported on the self-propagation of the 
CMBS market in its review of the Resolution Trust Corporation’s securitization program. 
“Large commercial banks are now underwriting and originating commercial mortgage 
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loans specifically for securitization” (Ibid.: 420). New commercial loans were financed 
by securities through the pooling and selling of existing loans. The securities market in 
turn expanded through the availability of new loans to pool and sell, and put capital in 
motion where capital exchange was otherwise constrained by illiquidity. In 2007, the 
same year that Page Mill received its loan, multifamily portfolio purchases grew to $56 
billion, “more than twice as much as any previous year” (Joint Center for Housing 
Studies, 2009:ii).  
 Some of the same institutions underwriting residential and commercial mortgages 
also purchased mortgage-backed securities (Fannie Mae, 2014). By the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the underwriting involved escalated risks or subprime lending. Between 
2005-2007, Wachovia was the leading underwriter in the CBMS market with $81 billion 
of commercial mortgage-backed bonds according to data analysis by Bloomberg 
(Campbell, 2010). Just months before Wachovia issued the loan for the PMP II portfolio 
purchases, Wachovia had demonstrated the institution’s tremendous confidence in the 
market by leading the largest CBMS transaction in history. In that deal, Wachovia pooled 
$7.9 billion in loans to form a single security, involving half of the approximately $3 
billion of financing for the Peter Cooper Stuyvesant Town purchase that later went 
underwater (Securities and Exchange Commission, Pooling and Servicing Agreement, 
March 1, 2007). CalPERS lost its total investment in that high-risk deal: $500 million. 
In the immediate period following the Page Mill loan issuance, the near total shut 
down of the CMBS market in the fall of 2007 would have made securitization of the 
Wachovia loan to Page Mill’s portfolio highly unlikely, however. Indeed, there were no 
certificate issuances for this loan disclosed through the Security and Exchange 
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Commission.  Notwithstanding the collapse, all indications point to the likelihood of 
Wachovia transferring the loan for securitization based on the bank’s surge in mortgage-
baked securities pools at that time. Wachovia agreements issued on the titles for different 
property purchased in East Palo Alto stipulate Wachovia’s securitization rights for the 
loan (Wachovia Bank National Association, 2007; Superior Court, 2008). Securitization 
would have allowed for Wachovia to move the loan off its books while maintaining 
servicing.  
Securitization provides another example of financialization at the node between 
lending and investment. Subprime loans created greater risk for investors, but also 
heightened returns and the pace of moving capital, which in turn allowed for the 
origination of new loans. Rating agencies assess and disburse risk in pooled loans and 
account for the amount of risk by investor class attributed to different tranches, or cuts, 
within the pools. The complexity of tranches further concentrates risk for those investors 
in the lowest tranches (Benmelech, Efraim and Dlugosz, 2010: 164). However, even 
those who invested in AAA rated superior tranches lost in the downturn. This was due in 
part because much of the AAA rated tranches were the upper-rated tranches of what were 
aggregated B-rated pooled loans. In this structured trick of mirrors, even institutions that 
were restricted to investing in AAA debt obligations could invest in high-risk, B-rated 
pools. The pooled commercial mortgage- backed securities were far more likely to be 
purchased by premium institutional investors than commercial banks (Stanton and 
Wallace, 2012). CalPERS was a leading institutional investor in these ultimately doomed 
loans. Notably, in July 2009, CalPERS sued raters over highly graded ratings assigned to 
poor performing structured investment vehicles.   
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Figure 5.1 demonstrates the sharp decline of CalPERS funds in mortgage back-
securities (including residential and commercial) paralleling the near collapse and re-
emergence of this market. CalPERS funded this particular portfolio at the height of its 
investment in mortgage backed-securities of more than $18 billion. Investment in over-
leveraged real estate by CalPERS coincided with the pension fund’s rise in investment in 
mortgage back-securities. By all appearances the underwriting for the Wachovia loan for 
the Page Mill portfolio represented a high-risk loan given the over-leverage, rental 
restrictions, building conditions as well as the short-term period of the loan (Black, Chu, 
et. al., 2011). Notably, most multifamily loans involve the short-term balloon payment at 
the 5, 7, 10 year terms that require refinancing (Joint Center of Housing Studies, 2009). 
 
The CalPERS initial capital investment in Page Mill was but one small piece in a 
much, much larger CalPERS international and domestic real estate investment portfolio 
that was itself leveraged by the pension fund. In many instances, CalPERS’s own 
“equity” investments were drawn from credit. The CalPERS credit-based investments in 
turn allowed for invested funds to obtain financing for asset purchases and development. 
In an overview of CalPERS losses following the housing downturn, the Wall Street 
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Journal reported that an average sixty percent of the money invested in residential real 
estate funds by CalPERS was borrowed (Corkery and Karmin, 2008). Likewise, up to 
fifty percent of CalPERS investments in commercial real estate was borrowed (Ibid.). 
The equity infusions that investors coveted from CalPERS in order to gain leverage were, 
in part, and sometimes in large part, also debt in appearance as investment capital.  
 
The Billionaire Limited Partner, CalPERS 
 
CalPERS is a significant institutional investor in the U.S. and world economy, 
representing the largest U.S. public sector pension with $299.4 billion of assets 
(CalPERS, 2014). The fund is commonly referred to as the “gorilla” in the field of 
institutional investors, holding a significant portion of the world’s largest 113 public 
sector funds that together represented $5.8 trillion of managed assets in 2013, or 39%, of 
the $14.9 trillion of managed assets held by the world’s 300 largest pension funds that 
year (Pension and Investments and Towers Watson, 2014). In the area of real estate, 
thirty years out from the inception year of its current real property portfolio in 1983, 
CalPERS had become the 12th largest single real estate investor, globally (CALPERS, 
Real Estate Strategic Plan, February 14, 2011).   
CalPERS first grew as a result of low risk investments, investing in fixed bonds, 
and long-term real estate (1953), and finally, stocks (1967). The risks associated with 
overleveraged real estate investments stood in stark relief to the stable, long-term 
components of CalPERS mandate, and instead reflected increasing pressures and 
incentives for greater returns within a shorter period. The example of increasing risk 
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resurfaces a sizeable question on the mission and purpose of public pension institutions: 
Are public pension funds an investment vehicle for workers’ security or capital? Do 
institutional investment funds simply adhere to market structures, or shape market 
structures (and investment chances)? What are the consequences for workers in not just 
whether their investment fund realizes returns on investment but how those returns are 
produced? Does workers’ capital invest in the theft of workers’ capital? 
Two periods of real estate demonstrate the increase of both leverage and risk in 
CalPERS’ real estate division. The early 1980s-2001 opened a period of external real 
estate management including money managers, consultants and placement agents. 
CalPERS’ current property portfolio’s inception year signifies the timing of the shift from 
comparatively stable long-term real estate investments. This period also saw the first 
shifting effects of Proposition 21. In 1984 this measure had allowed CalPERS to take on 
greater risks in investment. The greater latitude for investment allocation was sold to 
California legislators as a means to reap higher returns, and increase worker benefits 
(Malagna, 2013). The latter period 2002-2009 continued this trend but was marked by a 
decision to increase opportunistic funds and decrease oversight requirements. CalPERS 
peaked its investments in higher risk alternative, opportunistic real estate funds just 
before the housing crash in 2007, including at the beginning of the end of the boom in 
highly overleveraged funds such as Page Mill. 
CalPERS real estate investments fall under core, specialized value-added, and 
opportunistic classes (a range of increasing risk). For example, CalPERS classified the 
vehicle for investment in East Palo Alto, Page Mill II, as an “opportunistic fund” of 
anticipated higher returns based on higher risk. CalPERS real estate opportunistic 
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endeavors generally follow the “J curve” effect, anticipating few or negligible returns 
early on given institutional fees and absolute returns of 13% or more after fees through 
their short life-cycles (CalPERS, 2006). Investors refer to these opportunity funds as 
private equity real estate funds (Anson, 2011). In the case of CalPERS, private equity 
funds are disaggregated from real estate funds by investment unit and are listed 
separately from real estate under alternative assets. Although the returns on investment 
for these alternative assets funds are made transparent, the returns on their individual 
portfolios are not.53 These funds may include a range of investments including real estate 
portfolios, securities, and corporate buyouts. Page Mill II’s Limited Partnership 
agreement described its own structure as a “venture capital operating company” 
(Agreement of Limited Partnership with Page Mill Properties II, L.P, 2006: 22). 
Although CalPERS may assemble and manage a real estate portfolio in-house, 
since the 1990s external managers have overwhelmingly handled CalPERS's investments 
in alternative investment classes and real estate by forming limited partnerships for the 
investment of CalPERS funds. These funds were also critiqued for their colossal losses. 
Between 1998-2010 the $3.2 trillion global investment management firm, Black Rock 
Advisors, managed CalPERS’ core (non opportunistic) $1 billion multifamily portfolio 
investments. CalPERS notably lost its investment in Peter Cooper Village through its 
Black Rock partner in one of the largest real estate transactions in real estate history. In 
the same year, CalPERS lost $970 million through another partnership with adviser, 
Macfarlane Partners (Corkery, 2009). At a smaller scale, this was the case in the 
CalPERS investment in the private venture capital firm Page Mill that offered CalPERS a 																																																								
53 Chapter 5 discusses CalPERS classification of this particular portfolio in East Palo Alto as a venture 
capital fund and the implication of the asset class for CA transparency law. 
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limited partnership defined in a private placement agreement. The partnership limited 
CalPERS control over the assets within a more complex co-investment model and 
governance structure.  
 External management-induced fees accompanied outsourced investments. For 
example, for the Page Mill II portfolio, CalPERS and other limited partners did provide 
for multiple fees paid out to the general principal, David Taran, while also bearing the 
expenses for, but limited control over, the portfolio fund. In addition to the management 
fee, the general partner received property management fees, leasing fees, construction 
management fees, and redevelopment fees. In just over the first year of the project 
origination, the general principal accrued $7,137,000 in fees of which, at that time, 
$1,899,000 in management fees had been paid out by the partnership. (Squar Milner Real 
Estate Services, GP, 2008: 7).  
In 2000, CalPERS’s 13-person board had begun to delegate more investment 
decisions directly to the staff who then became direct targets of placement agent lobbyists 
who receive commission from investors for brokering deals (cite). Increased scrutiny 
over this practice of external management fees and controversy over “pay to play” 
placement fees following losses led to public outcry and reviews of many of CalPERS’s 
funds managed by external firms. In the case of Page Mill II, the partnership agreement 
allowed for placement agent costs and fees, but there was no agent of record for the 
portfolio (Agreement of Limited Partnership with Page Mill Properties II, L.P., 2006: 
31).  
Michael McCook was the senior investment officer for the real estate division 
during the period of Page Mill II investment. Considered one of the “30 most influential 
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people in private equity real estate” by Private Equity Real Estate (November, 2006), 
McCook’s self-reported and nominal gifts from those who sought out his influence reads 
like a daybook marking dates and meetings with gifts received including meals, golf 
outings, wine, and cigars from partners including Macfarlane Partners, San Francisco, 
KR Capital Agra, India, AIG Hong Kong, Page Mill, DIVCO (of which David Taran was 
a co-founder and partner before Page Mill II), Apollo, CB Richard Ellis, Deutche Bank, 
Resmark, Hines Beijing and Shanghai, Capri Capital, Rreef, Nomura Real Estate Tokyo, 
and Consolidated Capital of Amsterdam (McCook, 2006; McCook, 2006a; McCook, 
2006b). These self-reports make clear both the legal limits of gifts to McCook and the 
interpersonal, relational work of investment strategy.   
McCook oversaw the shift in the real estate division to higher risk.54 Within its 
real estate assets classification the real estate unit defines opportunistic funds as an 
alternative asset: “An established investment program temporarily investing outside its 
benchmark or asset category based on current favorable market conditions” (CalPERS, 
2013). CalPERS consultants deemed mezzanine debt, international real estate in Japan 
and Europe, and U.S. distressed properties or distressed sellers as opportunities of highest 
returns within this higher risk program. Ironically, in the realm of real estate, the highest 
amount of debt as indicated by high loan to value ratios, were often loaded onto the 
riskiest distressed properties.  
For example, the loan-to-value percent for CalPERS entire real estate investments 
reported for the year 2000 was 9.4% LTV. This low-risk, stable LTV compares with the 
real estate portfolio’s escalated leverage of 64% LTV in 2008. In 2008 the average loan 
																																																								
54 As previously noted, CalPERS separates real estate from other alternative investment funds. 
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to value rate of all opportunistic class funds was 70%. For that same year, CalPERS’ 
guaranteed and non-guaranteed debt for real estate was $24 billion, compared to $1.2 
billion in the year 2000 (CalPERS Real Estate Unit Review, 2009). 
Public pensions began to turn to opportunistic asset and alternative assets classes 
as a way to recoup lost stock returns in index funds in the economic wake of the deflated 
tech bubble in the spring of 2000, and the 9/11 terrorist attack the following year 
(Williams Walsh, 2004). The outpouring of both equity and debt capital into the real 
estate market following the downturn of stocks also meant lower yields from CalPERS 
core-assets. CalPERS in 2004 sold $16 billion of core-assets and leveraged the remaining 
portfolio to support what became a $30 billion investment in high-risk real estate 
(CalPERS Real Estate Unit Review, 2009).  Arguably, CalPERS also sought quick 
returns after failing to reap the gains of 1990s stock boom. A former chief investment 
officer for California’s Teachers Employee Retirement System (CalSTERS) stated in an 
interview with Reuters, this failure, led by CalPERS, propelled Wall Street in the years to 
come:  
Had public pension funds locked in profits then [1990s], pension fund boards 
years later would have thought twice about buying into opaque investments and 
Wall Street may not have been so inventive... It would not have been necessary to 
create these overly risky products with the intent to recover from what they 
missed. (Christie, Henderson, Alban, 2009)  
 
Instead, following initial investment in private equity in 1990, CalPERS led pension 
funds into hedge fund and the higher risk opportunistic real estate investments beginning 
in the early 2000s. Ironically given the strategy of private equity, CalPERS investment in 
venture capital, particularly finance was seen as aligned with its “Double Bottom Line” 
policy in 2000 to invest in socially responsible, non-polluting industries. See figure 5.2. 
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for CalPERS allocations by investment area. 
 
 In 2002, CalPERS allocated its first investments in the newly created “real estate 
opportunistic fund.” CalPERS cited potential for returns well above the 13% benchmark 
and in the 20-30% range for this new opportunistic class. For example, one opportunity 
cited in an internal report on higher risk investments was to provide mezzanine bridge 
loans to commercial investors facing what CalPERS calle  d conservative underwriting at 
the time. Among its first opportunistic domestic real estate funds in this new class was 
CalPERS’ investment in the first Page Mill Fund in 2002. At that time, CalPERS 
allocated a total of $500 million in opportunistic real estate investments. CalPERS 
identified funds for such investments in 2002 by leveraging core investments. In this 
structuring, stable real estate funds would be used as collateral for debt used as capital to 
invest in higher risk opportunities (Members of the Investment Committee, CALPERS, 
2004).  
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Figure 5.2. CalPERS Investment Areas by Allocation 
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By 2006 high-risk opportunity funds represented 15% of CalPERS’ total real 
estate portfolio, or $1.6 billion, and by 2010 represented 40% of the total real estate 
portfolio (CalPERS, 2006). As evidence of the loosening of monitoring at CalPERS, only 
opportunistic real estate investments over $200 million required CalPERS Investment 
Committee Board approval by the time the program was formalized in 2006 (Ibid.). In 
classes considered less risky, such as core property, CalPERS would allow up to $1.8 
billion in a single deal without investment committee approval (Jacobius, 2009). In 
contrast, in the period before 2002, most of the CalPERS domestic real estate investment 
pertained to commercial office buildings for rent generating income with relatively little 
debt; any investment over $50 million had to be approved by the board (Robinson and 
Marois, 2010).  
Another consideration for investment and risk managers in the CalPERS real 
estate unit was compensation tied to return on investment. When CalPERS’ potential 
beneficiaries profited in the short term from high-risk investment, so too did its senior 
investors. Performance incentives in the real estate unit were tied directly to gains in the 
real property asset classes. In the case of CalPERS senior investment manager Ted 
Eliopoulous, 20% of his performance based review score for compensation was based on 
non-core, opportunistic returns (CalPERS, 2009). Although this could also amount to 
losses in compensation, investment officers were rarely hurt by their gambles. 
Eliopoulous oversaw the real estate unit during the housing downturn and faced 
CalPERS’ record loss of 47.9% of its real estate asset value in the year 2008, but he was 
still awarded a $93,941 bonus that year (Pensions & Investments, 2010).  
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If core real estate had been long considered a stable assets class at the time David 
Taran presented to CalPERS Page Mill Properties II as an investment opportunity, non-
core or “opportunistic” real estate was another matter. Although CalPERS’ real estate 
assets did not meet their benchmarks and suffered tremendous losses for core and non-
core classes beginning in 2007, the opportunistic class lost most significantly. The 
consultants CalPERS hired to conduct a due diligence report in anticipation of a 
subscription agreement with Page Mill noted the vulnerabilities facing CalPERS with 
such an investment in non-core, opportunistic classes. They provided a rationale for their 
services, stating:  
Long ago adjudicated as an Alternative Asset Class, real estate has only recently 
been more able to standardize and gain certain efficiencies, which have the 
capabilities of being quantified and duplicated. However, non-core investments 
add a more complex asset management and monitoring dimension. We have 
approached this assignment with this in mind. (Situs Strategic Advisors, 2006: 1) 
 
Despite the consultant advisors’ claim that greater risk and complexity of risk and 
governance required increased monitoring, CalPERS real estate unit did quite the 
opposite in this period, even as “opportunistic” real estate funds and securities purchases 
went into free fall.  
For example, three years after the fund initiation when the CalPERS real estate 
unit sought clarity on the Page Mill portfolio value, the fund’s general partner rebutted 
saying the CalPERS real estate unit held no authority to conduct an appraisal because the 
portfolio did not fall under the same scrutiny obligations of CalPERS “core” assets 
(Shore, 2009:1).  The higher the risk, the less monitoring the real estate unit mandated, or 
in this case, was permitted to undertake in its role as limited partner. 
CalPERS ultimately lost all equity in the Page Mill fund. In the structure of 
 
182	
venture capital funds or private equity real estate, limited partners such as CalPERS have 
little authority over the General Partner. Despite holding the largest share, CalPERS’ 
voice and control in the management and governance of this portfolio was circumscribed 
by their position as limited partner as described in the partners’ terms of agreement with 
David Taran.  
The 1.68 million California public sector worker contributors to CalPERS, who 
are disproportionately people of color, contribute through their deferred compensation the 
investment capital that makes up the CalPERS pension fund. They assume future 
earnings from CalPERS investments by money managers tasked to invest their deferred 
wages. Ultimately, as fiduciaries of workers’ capital, “[t]he primary component of [public 
pension funds’] duty is to ensure the best long-term, risk-adjusted rate of return for the 
plan’s assets” (Silvers, Patterson and Mason, 2001: 203).  Not withstanding fiduciary 
responsibility to the workers, in a debt-sourced economy workers are at the bottom of the 
market pyramid scheme. The burdens of retirement payout and potential income security 
can be shifted from the employers to the workers and larger number of CA residents. In 
the case of California, the state guarantees CalPERS solvency, making all California 
residents the greatest stakeholders by number in its investment strategy.55 Much of the 
debt burden for over-leveraged investments fall onto municipalities who must take on 
their own debt to support contributions to CalPERS. 
Although most pension funds first gained their wealth and garnered state and 
labor investment through long-term investment strategies and earnings, the financial 
																																																								
55 Pension funds, the world’s greatest single source of investment capital shape capital markets and exploit 
them (Fung, Hebb, Rogers, 2001), in this case premising homes as commodity and people as expendible.  
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crisis of the early 2000s exposed an economy predicated on other people’s money, risk, 
debt, and short-termism. Such high-risk was not induced by the capital innovation in 
debt-backed financialization alone. This portfolio must be understood along the lines of 
the preceding racial contours of urban, then suburban, disinvestment. This context 
intersects with state signals of weakening rental protections; a long-established reliance 
on workers to plan ahead for themselves for retirement by producing contributions to 
institutional investment capital during their productive years; plus a reliance on 
municipalities to supplement contributions to the fund by taking on their own municipal 
debt. As municipalities take on greater debt to pay for debt-backed pensions and the 
devolution of basic services, “Wall Street” private interests hold influence over local 
governments exchanging credit-worthiness for increased austerity and privatization (see 
Hackworth, 2007).  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 This portfolio description identified the primary capital stakeholders in the portfolio 
construction, the general partner, the lender, and the institutional investor. Beyond the 
speculation of property for short term gains, this portfolio overview demonstrated how 
the general partner leveraged labor’s capital via CalPERS for access to credit, which in 
turn potentially supported a securities market in which CalPERS was highly invested, and 
whose investments formed part of a larger market of exchange of debt, real property, 
bonds, and commodities.  
Figure 5.3 summarizes the primary capital stakeholders of the portfolio fund 
detailed above in this chapter: the fund manager, limited partners, and lenders. The 
 
184	
arrows depicted in figure 5.3 indicate interdependencies and broad capital flows rather 
than a chronology or processes of the portfolio assemblage.56  
The Page Mill general manager, David Taran, established this particular “venture 
capital fund.” The general manager 
retained total management and 
control of the fund during the period 
of assembling and operating the 
portfolio. There were multiple 
transactions of exchange, initiated by 
the fund’s general manager.  
The fund’s general manager 
relied on the properties’ rental income 
at minimum for immediate debt 
servicing; tenants in turn claimed 
residence. The manager sought 
investment in Page Mill by CalPERS 
and individual high-net worth investors, the latter of whom largely made commitments to 
the portfolio’s side-car fund, “Page Mill Access Fund.” In turn, initial capital 
commitment allowed the general partner to obtain greater leverage, including the largest 
note from Wells Fargo/Wachovia. Credit allowed for property acquisition and funds to 
reposition the properties for redevelopment.  
																																																								
56 The governance portfolio structure of the fund establishes the separate Page Mill Access and Page Mill 
Properties funds that become a single entity for borrowing purposes; leverage therefore became attributed 
to separate LLCs all controlled by the general manager (Stockbridge Capital, 2009). 
Figure	5.3	“Portfolio	Stakeholder	Structure”	
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The pension fund, the majority investor, for its part collected a portion of state 
workers’ wages, along with state employer contributions, in exchange for a promise of 
retirement income to member workers in the future. Satisfactory returns from such 
investments as the Page Mill portfolio would contribute to the CalPERS assets pool for 
pensioner payments and investment equity.  
The capacity for capital exchange and fee collection throughout the period of the 
Page Mill portfolio, rather than as solely in the acquisition and disposition book-ends of 
the deal, the latter being when investment managers anticipated the greater waterfall of 
returns, was largely based on the ongoing influx of capitalization through new investors 
and leverage. In the time span of the holdings, lenders and the general fund manager 
interfaced with brokers in the intermediary markets of servicing, interest rate swaps, and, 
potentially for the lender, the creation and selling of securities. In the figure 5.4, another 
double arrow depicts potential interdependencies among the portfolio actors: the lenders 
and a larger pool of investors beyond those indicated in the figure, investment bankers 
and pension funds. The arrow line is depicted as broken because the interdependency is 
not between the specific investors and the lenders of this portfolio deal, but between 
lenders and investors in securities. The double arrow indicates the lending imperative for 
creating paper in the securities market, and vice versa. Lending originators have come to 
rely on this circulation of capital in the secondary market. Lenders also rely on deposits 
from consumers serviced by banks to guard the consumers’ interest-bearing wages, and 
who en-masse rely on consumer credit as wage supplements.  
In the sketch of such a pyramid scheme, tenants, homeowners, workers and 
consumers are the base on which value extraction and the debt economy rests. 
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Ultimately, the scale and debt structure of the large, concentrated, and over-leveraged 
portfolio created greater impetus for Page Mill to suppress tenant collective action to 
defend and expand rent control. As investors’ contributions and debt amplified so too did 
the fund manager’s drive to eliminate rent control and create a portfolio attractive to 
prospective developers for amplified returns. Indeed, the general manager sought to 
secede the underlying land of the portfolio from the City of East Palo Alto in order to 
break away from the city’s rent ordinance.  
Although Page Mill anticipated subverting rent regulations and increasing rent in 
the short term, the arrow between the fund manager and the tenants in this figure was 
breached: ostensibly, the general manager had no intention of retaining tenants’ rights to 
occupy their homes in exchange for rent, nor did the general manager plan on remaining 
the tenants’ landlord for long. Instead, unfolding events first discussed in Chapter 4 
exposed the investment strategy’s intermediate objective: to wholly displace the tenant 
population. 
Page Mill sought to both profit from and overhaul state protections established for 
renters. Undergirding this investment model was a racial organization of real estate risk 
extended from preceding California property regimes and broader U.S. housing and 
urban policy. The potential for return on investment ultimately relied on the historical and 
ongoing otherizing of Black and immigrant renters, devalued by race, income, and 
citizenry as part and parcel to re-valuing the land and housing for new, ostensibly white 
and higher income residents. Segregation as containment marked the boundaries and 
ratios of value, rent control abated gentrification but at the same time became a reason for 
speculation. 
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Chapter 6. Leveraging Points of Vulnerability 
 
 
Chapter Introduction 
 
This chapter extends the discussion of tenant action in East Palo Alto. Tenants 
deciphered the portfolio stakeholders outlined in Chapter 5 enabling them to create a 
crisis for investors. When informed tenants organize strategically, they can exploit 
vulnerabilities among targets and create new opportunities to actualize their collective 
tenant power. Although no singular approach prevailed as a “winning strategy,” for the 
Page Mill tenants and their advocates, together their efforts created a whirl of activity that 
ultimately propelled a crisis of profitability and control for the investors. As put by the 
lead organizer for the statewide tenant-organizing outfit, Tenants Together: “The Page 
Mill business plan didn’t allow for these kinds of delays by tenants. Tenants fought 
back…they would have gotten reinvestment funds if we hadn’t fought back” (personal 
communication, June 7, 2012). Reinvestment funds would have allowed for Page Mill to 
continue ownership over the portfolio and wait out the financial crisis to sell the portfolio 
to a premium investor for development. Without the reinvestment funds, Page Mill faced 
the crisis of foreclosure and total investment loss for all investors.  
Through their own actions, tenants won time to remain, claim, and expand their 
rights as renters and as residents of East Palo Alto. In succession, tenants won a 
temporary moratorium on rent increases, and, significantly, a city moratorium on 
development. This chapter recounts why wielding the city’s power mattered to tenant 
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action, and in particular, how their actions resulted in new guidelines by the state’s two 
largest public pension funds, CalPERS and CalSTERS to prevent predatory equity 
investment. They also created a new opportunity through the crisis of foreclosure to 
affirm rent control, and ensure the city’s westside rent-controlled properties would not be 
demolished by redevelopment. 
Tenant action also resulted in greater transparency concerning workers’ 
contributions to the Page Mill venture. Tenant action pulled back the curtain on the 
portfolio’s stakes and stakeholders to reveal Page Mill’s “trade secrets.” The trade secrets 
amounted to a prototypical example of what housing advocates have called “predatory 
equity,” as described in Chapter 5’s overview of the portfolio’s financial details and 
business model. These details shed light on the social actors and structures involved in 
large, overleveraged, private portfolio real estate funds and thus revealed the multiple 
points of vulnerability for the investor landlords. Although tenants may count traditional 
direct action such as the rent strike and eviction blockades as central bases of power, 
renters in the Page Mill portfolio calculated that the traditional tenant/landlord 
interdependency of rent exchange was not their most significant or sole leverage point for 
securing their demands. Instead, in this case, the investment structure offered 
opportunities for the tenants to exert political pressure and leverage other financial 
constraints on the fund by targeting the city and state.  
This chapter asks, “What were the points of vulnerability within the corporate 
structure of this predatory equity scheme?” To answer this question, this chapter borrows 
extensively from Juravich’s (2007) strategic corporate research framework developed for 
union campaigns, and specifically from a U.S. perspective. Juravich argues that as 
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corporate structures change, so too must labor tactics. This analytic framework pays 
particular attention to relational, interdependent, secondary targets, or those actors who 
are leverage points or intermediaries who may disrupt or block the primary target 
(primary decision maker) as a result of governance or state oversight authorities. In the 
portfolio structure described here, the general manager, or principal, of the fund was not 
the sole or even primary target of the tenants. Tenants wielded leverage on the city, the 
public pension fund, and the state (and to a lesser extent, the lender). As in workplace 
campaigns involving immigrant workers in the service industry (see for example Fine, 
2011; Gordon and Fine, 2010; Fine, 2005), tenants found in the case of this corporate 
portfolio structure that the state matters. 
Renters organizing in East Palo Alto did not deploy Juravich’s specific 
framework, or develop a comprehensive strategic research strategy from the onset. Still, 
several activist tenant leaders did play the role of strategic corporate researchers in their 
quest for transparency and data, including the Stanford graduate students involved in the 
Fair Rent Coalition. Transparency caused reputational damage and threatened targets, but 
could not result in the desired outcomes without the people most affected by the threat to 
their housing organizing around collective demands. Juravich’s premise that the 
corporate structure should inform strategy is only as effective as the organizing work that 
allows tenants to leverage points of vulnerability in the corporate structure. Beyond 
rational choices based on strategic options that calculate opportunity and risks, effective 
organizing rooted in social movement vision is a highly oppositional process for realizing 
power based also on identity formation, solidarities, ideology, and consciousness (see in 
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the labor literature, for example Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin, 2003; Voss and Sherman, 
2000; Fantasia, 1988). 
The following sections extend Juravich’s framework to this tenant organizing 
campaign targeting the venture capital investors. This analysis centers tenants, workers, 
and voting constituents as those who attempted to act upon points of vulnerability 
through the secondary (city and state) and primary (investor) targets to meet their 
demands. At the level of the city, the investors were vulnerable to tenant political 
pressure vis a vis two primary areas of municipal authority. The first local authority 
limits rental income; the second power limits redevelopment potential. Limits on rent and 
restriction on development made property disposition, refinancing, and fresh equity less 
likely for the general partner whose overleveraged portfolio required new capital infusion 
or sale.  
Another secondary leverage point for the City of East Palo Alto and tenants was 
through negotiations over litigation, discussed previously in Chapter 4. The city’s 
capacity and power to litigate or respond to litigation could increase the city’s negotiating 
power based on disclosure demands. For example, the city pressured the investor by 
demanding documentation of its business model. Through disclosure, the city and tenants 
first learned the extent of CalPERS’s investment and leverage amount by the primary 
lender.  
After a discussion of these areas of power for the City of East Palo Alto, the 
second section of this chapter discusses the limited partner role of the public pension fund 
CalPERS. CalPERS exposed the fund to a point of vulnerability beyond municipal 
regulation. This is a pension fund that is at once a limited partner in this private portfolio 
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corporate structure and an arm of the state. CalPERS is led by public sector union 
leadership at the service of state and municipal workers, accountable to state legislature 
oversight, and guaranteed by California taxpayers.  
Less impactful, but nonetheless forceful, were tenants’ and city demands on the 
lender target. The lender was a point of vulnerability for the investors even following the 
loan agreement; at the time when the investors’ balloon payment came due, the note 
holder could negotiate refinancing or proceed with foreclosure. The lender, or, in this 
case, debt purchaser, ultimately determined the control over the portfolio through its 
transfer to a new purchaser following foreclosure. 
 
Wielding the City 
 
That the City of East Palo Alto defended its rent control was an unexpected 
challenge for Page Mill. In fact, Page Mill’s general manager had highlighted in the 
fund’s prospectus their anticipated private-public partnership with the city that would 
allow them to usher in development plans and attract a premium purchaser.  
The city used its authority to limit the portfolio’s net operating income, which the 
general partner relied upon for debt servicing in the short term, but more importantly as 
an added value of income potential for attracting a premium purchaser in the near future. 
This mattered for a business model that predicated its current debt threshold on future 
earnings, rather than present conditions (see Chapter 5). 
One point of vulnerability for the investors included the just cause provisions that 
protected tenants from eviction. The just cause provisions in the city’s rent regulation 
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could impede income potential. No-cause eviction would facilitate tenancy succession 
and vacancy decontrol that would otherwise allow the landlord to raise rents to market 
rates. In this case the city blocked some rent increases and some, but not all, evictions. 
These efforts only partially deterred secondary displacements. Additional eviction 
protection, including increased remuneration for tenants facing the state Ellis Act (tenant 
evictions through property demolition), was passed proactively by the city during the 
Page Mill’s initial phase of the property acquisition. The intent of that initial shoring up 
of eviction protection was also to encumber property repurposing and development. 
These tenant protections were then immediately followed by Page Mill rent increases, 
which led to the city’s emergency moratorium on rent increases, and referendum on a 
new and stronger ordinance in suit. 
 Twenty years had passed since the original RSO’s passage in 1988. During the 
short ownership tenure by Page Mill, the City of East Palo Alto was pressed to tighten the 
ordinance to comply with state law.  Once the Page Mill portfolio was defunct, the City 
remained in a hurry to issue the new ordinance ahead of the change in ownership of the 
portfolio properties. A clear message was intended to prospective bidders: the City of 
East Palo Alto would not allow a large landlord to steamroll the city and gut rent control. 
Any acquisitions of the portfolio properties would be made with full knowledge of the 
regulated base rents and incremental increases allowed.  
Not only did the City take the bold stand freezing rent through the initial 
moratorium vote described in Chapter 4, they requested that the City of Berkeley Rent 
Stabilization Board review their RSO to ensure compliance with state law and maximize 
all due tenant protections. Their first attempt to hold a voter referendum to introduce 
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amendments to the ordinance and strengthen tenant protections was halted by Page Mill’s 
legal action. Page Mill cited a provision mandating an environmental impact statement to 
precede the referendum. Notwithstanding Page Mill’s attempts to sabotage the ordinance, 
on June 8, 2010 the new ordinance reached the electorate; 79% of East Palo Alto voters 
approved the revised and strengthened Rent Stabilization and Just Cause for Eviction 
Ordinance in the City of East Palo Alto.  
The new ordinance accomplished several goals for the City of East Palo Alto. For 
one, the 2010 ordinance reasserted popular support for rent control in the city. It 
demonstrated that the city’s elected officials who had worked against Page Mill’s 
increases indeed had done so with the support of the vast majority of the city’s voting 
residents. Second, the new ordinance resolved important inconsistencies that were 
brought to the city’s attention by Berkeley’s review of the East Palo Alto’s Rent 
Stabilization Ordinance.57 The new version clarified language to comply with the state’s 
limitations on vacancy control that went into effect with the 1996 Costa-Hawkins law. 
Third, the new ordinance provided stronger protections and benefits for tenants while 
maintaining a landlord’s right to fair returns. 
The ordinance reduced the amount of annual rent increases allowed from 100% of 
the Consumer Price Index to 80% of the CPI, a small additional savings for tenants that 
the city argued still allowed for fair return on rents. The ordinance also strengthened Just 
Cause Eviction and strengthened measures against retaliation and harassment of tenants. 
This new RSO included language that made explicit the ability for tenants to withhold 
																																																								
57 This review was paid for by the City of East Palo Alto at their request. 
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rent based on erroneous increases, habitability citations, or landlord failure to submit 
proper rent registration.  
The new ordinance was followed in 2012 by the city’s marked disincentives for 
the redevelopment of multifamily properties by increasing city oversight and relocation 
supports required for displaced tenants. In 2014, the city also passed the Tenants 
Protection Act to address “the imbalance of market and bargaining power between 
landlords and tenants” (City of East Palo Alto Municipal Code Ordinance No. 374, May 
6, 2014:1). The ordinance asserted and affirmed a tenant’s right to organize. The 
ordinance further clarified the prohibition of landlord harassment, including utility pass-
throughs and cut-offs, lockouts of tenants, or discrimination of tenants with children, or 
student status.  It also made landlord harassment in form of retaliation a criminal offense. 
Most notably, the ordinance put new prohibitions on demolition of multifamily units, and 
upped relocation provisions and oversight in the case of demolition. The city ensured that 
undocumented residents would receive the same protections as citizens by prohibiting 
inquiries into documentation status for relocation supports (Municipal Code Ordinance 
No. 374, May 6, 2014:1.).  
A second authority held by the city involves rezoning and redevelopment. 
Rezoning for new development would require changes in the city’s general plan, and 
ensuing changes to water, sewer, and other infrastructure services to the portfolio’s 
consolidated geographic area. The investors relied on the city to demonstrate favorable 
conditions for reinvestment and development; this was also part and parcel to the 
business plan to attract a premium investor for development. Public-private partnerships 
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allow developers to work directly through the city to pursue redevelopment funds 
including bond financing for new city services.  
Although such partnerships for mixed-use, commercial or residential development 
may promise the expansion of the city’s commercial tax base and employment 
opportunities, the city had refused partnership with Page Mill. Moreover, Page Mill 
argued that the City had stalled in working with the fund around basic infrastructure 
projects including lighting, and services such as the police (see Chapter 4). The city 
explicitly and strategically took time, or stalled, on development rezoning. 
YUCA spearheaded a coalition, Transform and Build East Palo Alto, to mobilize 
and shape community input into the city’s general planning update that was slated to 
include the west side. The organizing and mobilization of residents was co-led with PIA 
organizers. YUCA along with PIA mobilized standing room town hall and city council 
hearings. For one, the city responded by freezing west side development and declaring a 
moratorium on any development for two years. Later, the city would extend the 
development ban until the completion of the Westside Area Plan.  
At the same time as affordable housing remained urgent to the city, the prospects 
of creating additional affordable housing by new construction were diminishing. In 2012, 
the state halted state subsidy for affordable housing, dissolving the local redevelopment 
agency. In response, East Palo Alto established an ordinance for a tax “set aside” on 
market rate new constructions. The “set aside” would allow the city to develop a mere 
118 below-market units by 2022 (City of East Palo Alto Ordinance No. 379, 2012). This 
paltry number in a six-year projection reflects the limitations of the city without state 
supports to redistribute resources or incentivize the production of affordable housing.  
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In the community input process for the Westside Area Plan, the City attempted to 
create a participatory process to tap into the organizing capacity that grew from tenant 
action around Page Mill. In 2015, residents marched under the banner of “Black Power, 
Brown Power, Poly Power” (Dreeman, 2015) to protest gentrification and to call attention 
to stakes of the plan for the city: the legacy of majority-minority power in a capital-rich 
Silicon Valley region dominated by white policy makers. 
In 2015 the city released the plan that prevented the demolition or conversion of 
the rent-controlled units. The plan allows for new mixed-use development to surround the 
existing rent controlled multifamily units but maintains and protects those units. These 
are the very units of the Page Mill portfolio that were otherwise slated for repurposing. In 
this way, the tenants not only bought time through the city’s authority over development, 
in the general plan they also secured the potential of tenants to remain in the rent 
controlled units to benefit from the area’s redevelopment plans without fear of losing 
their homes due to rent increases or demolition evictions. 
In addition to its own regulatory authority, the city also exerted political pressure 
on the institutional investor, CalPERS. East Palo Alto is a stakeholder in CalPERS as a 
contributor to public employee pensions. However, the city could not directly influence 
CalPERS by withholding pension contributions except, perhaps, under federal 
bankruptcy protections. (At the time of this writing such a possibility was under review in 
San Bernardino, CA.) 
 
Targeting the Pension Fund Investor 
 
 
197	
Tenants Together worked with YUCA and the Fair Rent Coalition to target 
CalPERS. The groups researched the predatory equity deals in New York City, and 
learned from the work spearheaded by UHAB to target the NYC Comptroller. The 
comptroller there took initiative against “predatory equity” based on news that NYC 
teachers’ pensions had likewise been invested in similar overleveraged deals that 
undermined rent regulation there. That comptroller, who at the time was a contender for 
mayor, drafted a letter arguing against city public pension fund investment in predatory 
equity; at the time city pensions were invested in approximately 15,000 residential rental 
units (Office of the New York City Comptroller, 2008:1). Moreover, the comptroller 
created an “opt-out” policy for pension funds regarding predatory investment, increased 
pension fund engagement with unscrupulous housing managers and promotion of its 
Economically Targeted Investment (ETI) program for middle to low-income housing 
preservation (Ibid.:2). The Fair Rent Coalition tenant advocates in California shared the 
New York letter directly with CalPERS. 
In the summer of 2008, Tenants Together hosted a meeting in their offices with a 
YUCA organizer, a tenant activist with the Fair Rent Coalition and several other Page 
Mill tenants to convey their concerns with CalPERS real estate unit personnel, including 
senior investment officer Ted Eliopolous.  CalPERS had reason to meet with YUCA and 
Tenants Together, which were membership-based organizations. Tenants Together, 
although new as an entity, included long-time advocates who were aligned with unions 
and other state-wide advocacy groups that often worked in coalition involving state 
legislators in Sacramento. They called on CalPERS to withdraw from the portfolio.  
A year after the initial rent increases and the City of East Palo Alto’s subsequent 
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ordinance to freeze rents, the city and SEIU released at the same time resolutions 
protesting CalPERS’ initial investment and calling for CalPERS action. The resolutions 
were passed to leverage political accountability vis a vis CalPERS. The director of the 
Western States SEIU Capital Stewardship Program had put tenant advocates in touch 
with CalPERS Board members, and communicated directly with CalPERS’ C.E.O. 
regarding their own concerns with the Page Mill investment, which the union considered 
predatory equity (Marguerite Young email to Anne Stousball, CalPERS CEO, December 
12, 2008). 
The City of East Palo Alto’s resolution framed the CalPERS investment in Page 
Mill as counter to CalPERS’ own principles (City of East Palo Alto, 2008). The 
resolution recalled the fact that just a few months prior to establishing the Page Mill fund, 
CalPERS had become signatory to the United Nations Principles for Responsible 
Investment (UN PRI). The UN PRI provides a normative framework for socially 
responsive governance, relying on principles of transparency and a self-reporting 
assessment by investors to disclose progress (Richardson, 2008). In 2006, just months 
prior to the Page Mill agreement, the PRI was unveiled at the New York Stock Exchange 
with a CalPERS’s Board member, representatives from other PRI signatories and UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan (CalPERS, 2006; Seee Vorhees, 2015).  
The resolution also referenced the CalPERS California Urban Real Estate Fund 
(CURE), an initiative by the pension fund that “implicitly,” according to the city 
resolution, “recognizes the value of promoting affordable housing” (City of East Palo 
Alto, 2008). The CURE program followed a number of CalPERS state-based 
development initiatives that responded to the L.A. riots in 1992. CalPERS first 
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established the Economically Targeted Investment initiative, a stimulus investment 
program that “includes job creation, development, and savings; business creation; 
increases or improvement in the stock of affordable housing; and improvement of the 
infrastructure” (CalPERS in Hebb, 2005: 10). The success of that program, in 
relationship to returns on investment led to the 1995 initiative, the California Urban 
Investment Partners, followed in 2000 by the California Urban Real Estate Fund (CURE) 
program, which the city referenced in the resolution. 
Since 2000, the CalPERS’ CURE program invested in moderate, low income, and 
senior housing, and slated funding in the AFL-CIO Housing Trust for affordable housing, 
in addition to retail and other commercial in-fill developments (Hebb 2005). Non-profits 
that received CURE funds did not necessarily develop residential and commercial 
projects as an alternative to the speculative market. The program was designed for 
revitalization, and aimed to support minority entrepreneurs, but was also viewed as an 
effort in “pursuit of financial returns and gentrification” (Peterson, 2010).   
once a neighborhood has begun to show early signs of revitalization potential, 
CalPERS is prepared to bring considerable investment dollars that enable early 
development to move to the next level (Hebb 2005: 20). 
 
CalPERS distinguished “early development” as a period indicative of stalled 
gentrification that needed greater catalyst. Although investment in the CURE fund was 
designed as geographic-specific to target opportunities for under-invested communities, it 
is not clear if such investment benefitted the people living in those communities or to 
what extent. In any case, Page Mill was designated as an opportunistic fund (see Chapter 
4). Notwithstanding its risk-ratio, as a California-based residential portfolio, it was 
subjected to a review under the CURE fund. Under pressure by tenants, the City of East 
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Palo Alto, and SEIU, CalPERS began their review of Page Mill’s portfolio with the 
CURE rationale. CalPERS hired external consultants in January 2008 for the CURE 
review, which they then extended into a fuller investigation by Stockbridge Capital (JC to 
DT, email “Cure Fund Program Assessment” Phase I, January 14, 2008). 
The city’s point of reference to the CURE fund drew attention to the fact that 
Page Mill’s strategy of targeted urban in-fill and revitalization flew in the face of the 
affordability goals established by this well-known and growing CalPERS California 
investment program. A CalPERS Board member also referenced the CURE program for 
“underserved communities” when she stated to the CalPERS Investment Committee, “So 
this [Page Mill] is, you know, absolutely at odds with our general practice” (Mathur, 
December 15, 2008). The city and SEIU deployed their resolutions to remind CalPERS 
and the public that East Palo Alto, as a place of investment, was the home of CalPERS 
workers and tax payers who contributed to and guaranteed the pension fund.  
SEIU Local 521 represents 25,000 CalPERS plan members in the region, 
including city workers. Approached by Tenants Together, Local 521’s executive board 
passed a simultaneous resolution, which included language excerpted here that echoed 
tenants’ immediate demands: 
Further resolved, that the SEIU L521 Executive Board expresses concern that 
CalPERS has invested the retirement funds of L521 members in a real estate 
investment that threatens to displace East Palo Alto residents including SEIU 
L521 members;  
and, be it FURTHER RESOLVED, that the SEIU L521 Executive Board calls on 
CalPERS to take an active role to ensure that Page Mill Properties rescinds rent 
increases in excess of 3.2%, ceases evictions of tenants who refuse to pay the 
disputed increases, and publicly discloses plans for its acquired properties in EPA. 
(December 14, 2008) 
 
As the above excerpt demonstrates, in a feedback loop, Page Mill tenants who were 
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CalPERS plan members ostensibly invested in their own displacement. “It’s like I’m 
paying for these people to give me the boot,” explained an African American member of 
the local home care workers and a Page Mill tenant who attended a protest organized by 
YUCA. (Sheyner, 2009). Although tenant leaders were unclear of the total number of 
plan members who resided in the Page Mill units, City of East Palo Alto officials made it 
clear that city workers, including elected officials, were plan contributors. The Capital 
Stewardship Program Director for the Local explained that the resolution “was 
unanimously approved because of the imminent threat will make members homeless...” 
(communication to Andrew Blue, December 14, 2008). That same year, a Local 521 
member became the retiree representative on the CalPERS Board, which administers the 
CalPERS pension fund.  
 In preparation for a CalPERS Investment Committee Board meeting where the 
East Palo Alto mayor and tenants would speak, the portfolio manager and senior 
investment officer for CalPERS Real Estate Unite apprised the board members of the 
events surrounding the fund. They gave notice to the board that the Stanford Legal Clinic 
had prepared a letter against predatory investment by the pension fund that they expected 
to be signed by California congressional leaders, including Anna G. Eshoo and Senators 
Boxer and Feinstein. (Eshoo later made a public statement of concern, but did not send 
the letter.) They also informed the board that they had confirmed through their contacts 
with SEIU that union members were Page Mill tenants. For some board members, the 
ostensible investment in their contributors’ displacement may have been the least of their 
mounting concerns, however.  
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Home of the Financial Crisis 
 
 “We know it's bad news today, very bad news.” This statement opened the 
CalPERS Investment Committee meeting in the last month of 2008 (CalPERS Board of 
Administration Investment Committee Open Session, December 15, 2008: 5). The bad 
news continued for five hours of open session. All eyes were on the national economic 
landscape. Not one commercial loan had been securitized for six months, more than half 
a million jobs in the U.S. had been lost in just the month prior, and earlier that month the 
S&P had plunged despite some fleeting signs of positive gains (Wei and Hilsenrath, 
2008). CalPERS had just reported 103% losses in real estate assets for its previous fiscal 
year, based in part on over-leveraged housing investments, including debt CalPERS was 
obligated to pay-off in addition to losses from expected returns (Corkery, Carmen, 
Rundle and Lublin, 2008). Mortgage-backed securities were under scrutiny, with even 
greater losses predicted for the following quarter.  
At the end of this open session the CalPERS investment committee members 
turned their attention from what they carefully constructed in their public comments as 
external events, outside of their control, to a very specific illustration of CalPERS’s own 
hand in the failing economy. CalPERS board members had very good reason to be 
concerned with Page Mill’s evictions of East Palo Alto residents via CalPERS funds.  
Six of the thirteen member CalPERS Board were elected by the CalPERS 
membership and like other appointed board members played a political role as well as a 
fiduciary role in their positions. Board members represented CalPERS to state legislators, 
advocated for workers’ pension benefits, and, significantly, held full authority over 
investment allocations. In 1984 Proposition 21 had allowed the CalPERS Board this 
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authority and flexibility in investment allocation. As a result of Proposition 21, the 
CalPERS Board had become a stalwart leader in shareholder and investment activism. 
Many of the trustees were labor leaders with political interests. In the years following 
Proposition 21, labor leader board members ushered campaigns for divestment from 
tobacco and from developing countries with poor labor practices. Although Proposition 
21 allowed board members flexibility, they also became personally liable for imprudent 
investments. This was the compromise the board received in Proposition 21.  
When representatives from Tenants Together, the Fair Rent Coalition, the City of 
East Palo Alto, and Community Legal Services addressed the CalPERS Board Investment 
Committee, they were aware of the board’s investment oversight role. They exposed the 
board to the vulnerabilities of reputational damage for not only the investment fund, but 
for the board members as individual fiduciary agents. They also raised the questions of 
vulnerabilities of the fund manager, including the possibility of CalPERS divestment 
from the fund, or take-over of the fund. Remarkably at this time of national economic 
crisis, the East Palo Alto public officials and tenant advocates were the sole public 
commentators for that session.  They had the full attention of the CalPERS board and 
attending media for this portion of the public agenda. 
The newly elected mayor of East Palo Alto, the Page Mill tenant who was a 
council member during the moratorium debate a year earlier, read the city’s proposed 
resolution before the board. The mayor accused Page Mill of tenant harassment saying 
the investor landlords had “unleashed a frontal attack on the city government and on the 
tenants,” who he explained were “the working people… who do all the service work for 
the surrounding communities, who provide the labor pool” (CalPERS Board of 
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Administration Investment Committee Open Session, December 15, 2008). He 
underscored CalPERS accountability to his community: “We particularly find it ironic in 
the small community like ours, again where our employees are all CalPERS members, 
where we have many union members who are also members of CalPERS, again, as I 
mentioned that are mostly low income, moderate income…” The mayor himself was a 
CalPERS contributing member and Page Mill tenant. Ultimately, the mayor called on 
CalPERS to review its divestment policies and use this opportunity as a test case in 
exerting their investor power even if as a limited partner. 
The director from Tenants Together pointed out in his testimony to the Board that 
the New York City Controller had established predatory-free guidelines in response to 
city pension fund investment in rent regulated housing there. Tenants Together organizers 
had been active in strategy discussions via conference calls with New York groups such 
as the Urban Homestead Assistance Board and participated in their predatory equity 
tracking and strategizing (personal interview, May 24, 2012). The Tenants Together 
director explained that New York City had set up the guidelines so that “funds weren't in 
this situation of finding themselves fueling this type of rent increase and displacement 
often of the very people for whom the pension funds are set up.” The Tenants Together 
speaker may have struck a nerve bringing up New York City funds as pro-active in their 
response to tenants there. 
Board member George Diehr interrupted the public speaker to distance the fund 
from the Page Mill investment strategy:  
…you know, your statement that PERS has invested public employee pension 
dollars in predatory landlord practices - I'll let the staff speak - but it makes it 
sound like we -- or that was our goal when we made the investment… you'll have 
to decide the language here… (December 15, 2008) 
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Diehr was addressing the tenants and advocates as much as the media in the room. His 
statement put the tenants on notice questioning their rhetoric, while denying CalPERS’s 
own responsibility with how their capital was ultimately invested.  
Although the real estate portfolio manager at this time was not the same person at 
CalPERS who initiated the partnership with Page Mill, many of the investment 
committee members were the same people who oversaw the real estate investment 
policies that increased opportunistic investment, and had approved the Page Mill 
partnership at the fund’s inception. Subsequent court disclosures demonstrated that the 
Page Mill business plan was predicated on tenants’ displacement, and by the summer of 
2009, Page Mill had prepared for a condominium conversion through a subdivision of 
more than 200 of the portfolio’s units (Department of Real Estate for the State of 
California, 2009). Still, notwithstanding the board members’ knowledge of these details, 
to deny intent, was an allusion to unintentional consequences. This is a common catch-all 
phrase for dispossession, premature death, and all related traumas that occur based on any 
policy where responsibility and accountability are denied. 
 The Stanford University graduate student who took on the role of 
communications coordinator for the Fair Rent Coalition also spoke. He explained before 
the board that he had done door knocking with organizers and youth leaders from YUCA 
to determine the vacancy rate of the portfolio. A Page Mill tenant himself, he had 
witnessed his neighbors leaving their homes. His census resulted in what he found to be a 
24% vacancy rate, up from the 2% vacancy rate just before the portfolio purchases. Using 
his own extrapolations, he reported to the committee that an estimated 1500 individuals 
had been displaced based on these vacancies. In an email correspondence, the same 
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tenant later sent spreadsheets to the board members and CalPERS real estate unit staff of 
“verified” vacant unit numbers disaggregated by small versus large multi-families, which 
demonstrated 22-24% vacancy rate at the time (Fair Rent Coalition, 2009). Later, in 
2013, the City of East Palo Alto concurred. They explained the 2010 Census city 
undercount as an anomaly due directly to displacements from Page Mill (City of East 
Palo Alto Existing Conditions Report, 2013: 7-1). 
A second CalPERS investment committee member to speak expressed distress at 
these findings, and said that CalPERS was constrained by legal limitations as a limited 
partner in a comingled fund (CalPERS Board of Administration Investment Committee 
Open Session, December 15, 2008). She also pointed out her concern that the reputational 
damage threatened to devalue the portfolio. There was no commitment by CalPERS to 
take action except to meet with the partner to share these concerns, and to have this 
example inform future investment decisions.  
The director of Tenants Together did not allow the session to end on that 
statement. He re-asserted that CalPERS needed to consider greater proactive steps in this 
particular portfolio case, which he claimed could involve an investigation by the state’s 
Attorney General in unfair business practices (CalPERS Board of Administration 
Investment Committee Open Session, December 15, 2008). There was no precedent for a 
lawsuit against the CalPERS Board for imprudent investment since Proposition 21 had 
allowed for such action. Indeed, CalPERS Board members may not have been concerned 
at the personal level for monetary consequence given that they held insurance to cover 
liability. However, for appointed and elected members, implications of imprudence 
mattered for their continued board service. The Fair Rent Coalition would later ask for all 
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delegation authority documents for the board members, chief investment officers, and 
portfolio managers at the time of the initial agreement in preparation or warning of 
potential suit (Fair Rent Coalition, 2009b). The Tenants Together director also warned 
the Board of potential increased liability and fund impact for all investors; the longer they 
waited to act, the more tenants would be displaced. The fund would be responsible to 
ensure tenants’ right to return to units of similar rent and size for those who were illegally 
pushed out, a protection granted under East Palo Alto’s rental ordinance. 
In the following month, the Fair Rent Coalition’s communication director 
escalated pressure on CalPERS. He wrote to CalPERS saying that he had been in contact 
with a reporter from The New York Times who was very interested in writing a story on 
CalPERS’ investment in the portfolio. He attended the next CalPERS Board meeting 
where he distributed handouts of the portfolio’s vacancy rate and rent increase figures. 
He bypassed the public information officers and corresponded directly with the portfolio 
investment manager, often providing accounts of personal incidents.  
For example, this tenant treated CalPERS as landlord. He called CalPERS directly 
to allege harassment by an undercover security agent moonlighting for Page Mill who he 
learned was a lieutenant for the Palo Alto Police Department. The tenant activist took 
photos of the security agent and claimed that the agent was following him as response to 
his advocacy and communication with CalPERS (Fair Rent Coalition, 2009a). He sent 
urgent emails as well, in one stating, “the situation on the ground is changing hourly,” 
and requested that the portfolio manager call the head of the Palo Alto police department 
where the tenant had filed a complaint against the harassment (Fair Rent Coalition, 
2009).  
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At the same time, tenant advocates attempted to understand the stakes of 
CalPERS and their own vulnerabilities in the fund. In another email to the portfolio 
manager, the same Fair Rent Coalition communications director speculated that CalPERS 
was reluctant to exit the fund because CalPERS had acted as guarantor for the Wachovia 
$242 million loan. He requested access to the prospectus and additional portfolio details 
including:  
email and other written correspondence, investment offering papers list of 
partners contractual agreements meeting minutes and phone logs… and all 
information that is matter of public record regarding the debt financing used in 
Page Mill Properties II LP, loan numbers, and amounts terms of repayment 
guarantor obligations  etc. (Fair Rent Coalition, 2009c) 
 
CalPERS staff sent the request to legal counsel. They did not provide all of the 
documents, and did not provide details on CalPERS’ role with the lender, Wells Fargo. 
Tenant activists continued to speculate that CalPERS was bound to the Page Mill strategy 
as not only an investor, but as a loan guarantor, which would double CalPERS’ losses. At 
the same time, they believed that if this was the CalPERS role, then the limited partner 
could assert greater leverage with the lender and assume authority and control over the 
partnership. CalPERS was not the guarantor or signatory of the loan, however, a point 
CalPERS did not readily address. 
 The general partner, CFO, and other managers for the fund also communicated 
directly with the CalPERS real estate unit staff. Taran had requested a copy of the 
transcript from the tenant advocates’ testimony, and in a response letter to CalPERS, 
Taran defended the fund strategy: “To conclude that [our] effort is predatory is to doom 
thousands of East Palo Altans to permanent garbage-strewn, gang-ridden slums where the 
only investment capital comes from drug dealing and assorted criminal activities” (Taran, 
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2009: 6). Taran accepted the “possibility” of discomfort that tenants might feel as the 
investors acted as “agents of change” (Ibid). Again, Taran presented his mission as 
improving the lives of the tenants and the larger community, despite the fact that those he 
claimed would benefit from future improvements included those tenants being displaced 
from the rental units.  
 
Calling the Pension Fund “Landlord” 
 
 Over the course of Page Mill’s ownership, the portfolio manager contended with 
emails from activists, journalists, CalPERS consultants, legal staff, information officers, 
internal real estate unit colleagues, and board members inquiring about Page Mill and 
CalPERS’s next steps. Tenants Together had contacted several CalPERS board members 
to continue to push the limited partner to take action and follow through on its authority 
to remove the general partner. YUCA youth leaders shared their participatory action 
research booklet with CalPERS officials and California congressional representatives, 
documenting the impact of the rent increases on their own families (Williams, 2009). 
This report, called “Homeless Now?” also included testimony from tenants who were 
YUCA members who had since left their Page Mill homes due to the rent increases (see 
Chapter 5). The report was published in English and Spanish and included photographs of 
unit conditions, attesting to deferred maintenance and lack of subsequent repairs by Page 
Mill. Again, Page Mill tenants called the pension fund as accountable to them, naming 
the pension fund a landlord party. 
The CalPERS portfolio manager distinguished the communications director from 
the Fair Rent Coalition from other activists, including YUCA organizers, in part as an 
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effect of the incident around extortion allegations described in Chapter 5. The CalPERS 
portfolio manager warned an assistant to the board president that the communications 
director from the Fair Rent Coalition may be untrustworthy, saying “We should be very 
cautious about him as allegations of impropriety have been raised about him… while 
each of these groups/people are against Page Mill, they do not necessarily support one 
another’s cause” (CalPERS, 2009).  Although the CalPERS officials may have sensed a 
lack of cohesion among the organizers, the engaged commitment by the multiple 
advocates, including the Fair Rent Coalition Stanford students, would remain consistent 
and continue to escalate with street action and advocacy to the state legislature over the 
next year. 
Tenants Together approached several CalPERS Board members individually to 
further press their demands. When the tenant leaders came to understand that divestment 
was not an option that CalPERS would consider at the time, they shifted to the demand 
that CalPERS take over the portfolio. They demanded CalPERS take all possible action 
to remove the general manager by charging the manager with lawless conduct. After 
receiving an inquiry from a board member as to whether this was a viable option, the 
CalPERS portfolio manager reminded her again of the points made to the board regarding 
CalPERS need to negotiate with other limited partners: 
 
[a] key element of the briefing memo is that CaIPERS is not the only limited 
partner in the Page Mill fund. The presence of other limited partners is 
complicating factor that exposes CaIPERS to legal risk should certain actions be 
taken such as removing and replacing the manager of the fund (CalPERS, 2009).  
 
CalPERS heeded caution but continued to investigate the bases for taking over the fund. 
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CalPERS real estate unit managers were aware and wary of the impending $50 million 
paydown due that August. In a letter to Page Mill the portfolio manager expressed 
concern that CalPERS had provided $95million of their $100million commitment to the 
fund, yet, “We have seen nothing from you indicating how you intend to handle this debt 
payment” (CalPERS, 2009a). If CalPERS took over as general partner, they could find 
themselves in a position of liability, including for debt servicing. In fact, other partners 
who later refused capital calls on their commitment when cash was due were court-
mandated to pay-up.   
One of the key points of vulnerability for the fund was the growing tension 
between CalPERS and the fund manager due to tenant pressure and reputational damage. 
Page Mill’s plan, save for negotiating favorable refinancing terms with the lender or 
finding another premium investor or purchaser, was to request additional capital 
investment from CalPERS. This was ultimately denied. By that spring, CalPERS put 
plainly their frustration to Page Mill and said that the General Partner needed to mend the 
relationship with the tenants and the City of East Palo Alto: 
We believe that the continued controversy surrounding the property is having an 
adverse effect on the value of the property and its prospects. You are correct that 
we at CalPERS are working overtime to protect CaIPERS assets but we are 
particularly concerned about the performance and stability of the Partnership. 
Simply put it is unclear to us whether your implementation of the current 
investment strategy and operation of the project are effective or yielding 
appropriate results. (CalPERS, 2009b) 
 
The CalPERS real estate unit saw the reputational damage as not only a public relations 
and political problem for the pension fund, but also a fiduciary issue resulting in the 
devalorization of the units.  
The CalPERS consultants were well aware of the rental income losses and 
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recommended decontrol increases to Page Mill: “Given the large number of vacant units 
(390+ a couple of weeks ago), it's critical that they meet current market rent levels 
vacancies” (Otto. 2009). In this way, in the Stockbridge Consulting group’s email memo, 
they concurred with market conversion. Rather than allowing for market rentals, the 
vacancy levels instead led to rental income losses as few people sought to rent from the 
disreputable landlord. Page Mill’s tactics also had led to strengthened city monitoring and 
enforcement of the ordinance that reversed hundreds of rent increases for units still 
occupied.   
Moreover, because the Page Mill plan relied on repositioning the property for a 
development purchaser, the portfolio relied on attracting another premium investor. Page 
Mill had aggregated properties and land, but clearly the city demonstrated they were not a 
willing partner to negotiate potential rezoning or other infrastructure adaptations to 
support a developers’ vision if predicated on tenant displacement. Meanwhile, Page Mill 
continued to target tenant activists. 
Several tenants, including the communications director for the coalition received 
a “Notice to Cease” letter from the management company. The rental management 
company claimed harassment by tenants who they said prohibited regular business and 
whose actions would thereby result in their eviction: 
You are repeatedly making false accusations and malicious reports to 
management staff which is nuisance and interferes with our ongoing business 
operations and the ability of our staff to effectively perform their assigned job 
duties. If you do not cease this behavior your tenancy will be terminated and 
eviction proceedings will commence immediately upon subsequent violation. 
(Page Mill Properties, 2009) 
 
Tenants forwarded these notices to CalPERS. CalPERS received these concerns from 
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tenants, along with a slew of news articles on mismanagement and deferred maintenance, 
from the over-charging of fence repair and paint color consultation (alleged at $20,000 
per month) by and to the management company, to inspections by health officials who 
gave citations for green and blue algae in the pools (www.pagemillwatch.com; CalPERS 
Global Real Estate Unit, 2009; Bernstein Wax, 2009). Local business journals and media 
outlets continued to prepare accounts of CalPERS evicting poor tenants in East Palo Alto 
via the Page Mill fund such as the article titled, “The pension fund evictions,” in the San 
Francisco Bay Guardian (Riddle, 2009).  
Emails in preparation for the April 2009 Investment Board meeting reflected the 
tension of the financial crisis for the CalPERS real estate unit staff. The media trail 
following CalPERS exposed the impact of the crisis on the pension and the pension’s 
responsibility for its own real estate losses. Page Mill also presented at the CalPERS 
Investment Committee in an attempt to control their image making. 
According to Chief Investment Officer Joe Diehr, the CalPERS Board had been 
briefed on the Page Mill matter several days before the meeting. At this particular 
meeting, Diehr introduced the public commentators invited by Page Mill as tenants of 
Page Mill. In fact none of the speakers on behalf of Page Mill identified themselves as 
tenants. Instead, they were current and former EPA residents either employed by Page 
Mill or partners of Page Mill who had been provided space free of rent to conduct 
community and police outreach activities. At least one of these activities was in part paid 
for by the East Palo Alto Police Department and Department of Justice as crime diversion 
activity akin to the “weed and seed” programs across the country.  
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One speaker attested that the comments were scripted. The speakers provided a 
testament to Page Mill’s work to repair relationships with the East Palo Alto community. 
One misidentified “tenant” was the associate director of an organization founded by 
Taran’s wife, Project Happiness. The program promotes emotional resilience through 
inspirational literature and training. He called for the tenant and city’s cooperation with 
Page Mill, rather than “confrontation” and gave an example of an impromptu kids’ 
holiday gathering he volunteered at on behalf of Page Mill for tenant families. The East 
Palo Alto Police Department organized the party with Page Mill  (CalPERS Board of 
Administration Investment Committee Open Session, April 22, 2009: 57). Another 
speaker, an employee of the property management company said, “They’ve done a 
tremendous job at clearing up the city” (CalPERS Board Meeting Transcript, April, 22, 
2009: 59). Using this word choice describing tenant change the speaker implied that 
displacement had positive effects. One after another, the speakers testified to Page Mill’s 
hand in clearing or cleaning up East Palo Alto as an act of corporate responsibility.  
One speaker who was a co-founder of the foundation Until There’s A Cure, which 
was established to raise money for AIDS, pleaded with CalPERS to stay strong in the 
face of the tenants’ concerns: 
I asked CalPERS to stay with your heart and with the vision. I honestly would 
never be associated with a company that was doing that Page Mill has been 
accused of. And I really believe in Page Mill and in David Taran and I think 
they’re brave. And it’s not an easy job. And it’s not an easy city. But they’re 
doing really good things. And please, please stay and be part of that vision. (April 
11, 2009: 65) 
 
The speaker suggested here an assumption that CalPERS might withdraw support for the 
fund, perhaps take control of the fund, or perhaps ultimately refuse reinvestment. Another 
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portion of the testimony from this speaker referenced that Page Mill had committed to 
housing twenty people through a local Shelter Network in the portfolio’s vacant units. 
Ironically, several other tenants who could not make payment due to Page Mill’s rent 
increases earlier had claimed they had no choice but to move into shelters (YUCA, 
interview 2012; Bernstein Wax April 21, 2010). 
When a CalPERS Board Member asked the Page Mill general counsel to address 
the vacancy factor, the Board President interrupted, “I don’t think it’s proper to get into 
that discussion now, thank you,” to which the inquiring board member deferred. This 
data-point was considered confidential to the fund, as it could potentially damage the 
portfolio value revealing corresponding rental income losses. Page Mill was wary of 
CalPERS’s attempts to appraise the properties for that same reason.  
Despite the generally hospitable and supportive reception by the board, the 
meeting was followed by curt email exchanges between the CalPERS real estate staff and 
the general partner on the financial status of the portfolio. Taran had asserted that the 
portfolio was considered an alternative, opportunistic asset, not core, and was therefore 
exempted from CalPERS mandates to appraise core assets (Taran, 2009b). CalPERS 
disagreed, “Your letter seems to imply that CaIPERS monitoring of its investment by 
conducting an appraisal of the properties of the Partnership could somehow be violation 
of the partnership for the Partnership. Nothing could be further from the truth” 
(CalPERS, 2009d). Page Mill responded, “What we do have an issue with is any 
contention that Page Mill as the General Partner does not have the exclusive and sole 
right and responsibility to value the Fund’s assets” (Shore, 2009:1). He continued by way 
of warning, “We trust you do not want to do anything to violate the LP agreement nor do 
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anything that may be harmful to the investments in any way” (Ibid.:2). Page Mill stated 
that an appraisal of its asset value and cash flow losses would have adverse effects; such 
an appraisal would make reinvestment from an institutional investor, refinancing from 
Wachovia, or purchasing by a premium investor all the more unlikely. 
Although CalPERS was not the manager of the fund, they had committed 
consultant resources to conduct a full review of the fund in an attempt to secure their 
investment, and as a direct result of tenant pressure. The appraisal review would prepare 
CalPERS to better advise Page Mill on investment strategy and would inform their own 
internal decision as to whether they would take action to reinvest or take action against 
the general partner, including his removal. The latter option was the main alternative to 
the present course that the real estate unit staff had planned to explore (CalPERS, 2009e). 
In addition to their own appraisal, the consultants also developed financial forecasts to 
present to Wachovia. The forecasts would be based on investment cash flows for 
baseline, optimistic and pessimistic scenarios (Otto, 2009a). After Wachovia’s agreement 
to open negotiation discussions with Page Mill, the general partner reported to CalPERS 
that he was “cautiously optimistic” that Wachovia would extend the $50million pay down 
due date (Taran, 2009c: 2).  
While the general partner presented himself as unfrazzled, CalPERS real estate 
staff team was in a scramble. A point of vulnerability for CalPERS was the California 
State Legislature and their oversight capacity. California State Assembly member Ira 
Ruskin had received messages of pressing concern from Tenants Together and Local 521 
and called on CalPERS to attend a meeting in his office to discuss the investment. In an 
internal email thread to prepare the CalPERS “message box” for Ruskin, one real estate 
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unit staff member suggested not to include the General Partner in the meeting:  
I don’t see any advantage in bringing him up with us at this point because at the 
end of the day if Ruskin feels the tenants’ issues are valid he has no real recourse 
against the GP. Instead, he will want to know what CalPERS can do to rectify the 
situation (CalPERS, 2009e). 
 
CalPERS repeated the same statement to tenants, the Board, and state officials that 
removing the GP was an option, but risky: “CaIPERS has carefully evaluated this right, 
and may yet exercise it if necessary, but to date has refrained from doing so due to the 
potential liability which would come with such replacement and the risks of having to 
take over the operations of the partnership” (Stockbridge Capital Group, 2009:3-4). 
Again, the looming debt repayment made such a replacement less likely and more risky. 
Although CalPERS could do something, a take over could amount to even greater losses, 
including anticipated legal expenses for the take-over. 
 That same spring, the CalPERS consultant from Stockbridge Capital sent a 
midnight email to Page Mill’s general counsel. He was alarmed of a new strategy 
implemented just after the CalPERS Board meeting in which Page Mill exploited the 
Ellis Act in an attempt to sell a portion of its portfolio for cash flow. While ostensibly the 
sale could provide funds for the debt repayment, the underlying asset value would be 
reduced by the loss of units in the portfolio. There would be no added value. Ultimately, 
the sale would provide cash flow for the management company and nothing more. 
Furthermore, tenants would be evicted. The CalPERS consultant asked for an 
explanation:  
…we will be quite interested in any strategy which you feel could add value. That 
said it seems a bit counter-intuitive to be incurring thousands of dollars of 
expenses to evict good long-term tenants when the portfolio is already suffering 
from high vacancy. Yet we do not want to jump to any conclusions or respond to 
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any inquiries we are receiving from others concerned about your actions until we 
hear the facts of and reasons for this strategy directly from you. We trust you can 
appreciate the pressures your actions and resultant publicity put on CaIPERS. 
(Otto, 2009) 
 
The eviction notices already had been given to residents in three properties without 
CalPERS foreknowledge. One of them was to the Stanford University PhD student who 
was the communications director for the Fair Rent Coalition. Although evictions was the 
strategy of Page Mill for decontrol, CalPERS was in particular alarmed by the sale of the 
properties and the persistent denials by Page Mill of tenant displacement despite vacancy 
rates and now the use of the Ellis Act in this latest action. The plan was to sell properties 
for individual home ownership, rather than as rentals, which allowed for the Ellis Act 
provision for evictions. This sale of the properties would decrease the equity of the 
portfolio thereby increasing its debt ratio and risk. 
The Page Mill attorney rebuked the CalPERS consultant for raising tenant 
concern: 
[we] cannot stress enough how difficult it is to have our business judgment 
second guessed by CalPERS every time a tenant or tenant advocate makes an 
inquiry to CalPERS… during these very challenging economic times it is more 
important than ever that the General Partner stays focused on the investments and 
is not questioned or interfered with whenever some dissident contacts CalPERS  
(Shore, 2009). 
 
Clearly the general partner was distressed by the involvement of the pension fund in the 
business operations. Typically, limited partners advise fund operations only during 
established meeting reporting times and not during the course of operations. This is 
regardless of the fact that CalPERS had committed more equity to the fund than the 
general partner whose salary for operations and fund management came directly from the 
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fund. 
The communications director for the Fair Rent Coalition and three other tenants 
attended the June Investment Committee Board meeting to present testimony of 
harassment by Page Mill. The communication director again requested the private 
placement memorandum, or business plan prospectus, from CalPERS. They were met 
with expressions of ongoing concern, but no commitments or additional questions from 
the Board. In response, the Fair Rent Coalition posted a “to-be-announced rent strike” 
warning on a blog that the CalPERS investment officers shared with “high priority” in an 
email thread (CalPERS, 2009f).  
A rent strike would require and demonstrate tenant organization. A strike 
demonstrates renters’ power to withdraw from the interdependent landlord-tenant 
relationship. This could be enacted as a full-strike, or a strike on the rent increases only, 
with lesser effect. In the latter scenario, tenants could take the “rent freeze” attempt by 
the city into their own hands. Disruptive power by withdrawing, as noted by Piven (2006) 
is limited by three criteria, that the protesters’ contribution is crucial; there is something 
to be conceded; and there’s sufficient protection from repression.  
Tenants would be ostensibly protected from retaliation for a rent strike as long as 
they escrowed, or showed demonstrated savings of their due rents. However, the tenants 
rent contributions were not necessarily “crucial”. Tenants Together’s director noted that 
in the case of Page Mill, a rent strike would not have led to Page Mill negotiation because 
Page Mill was no longer relying on the rental income. They could withstand the short-
term losses from any rent withholdings if they could secure reinvestment funds or fresh 
equity for the balloon payment.  
 
220	
 
Advancing Crisis as Political Opportunity 
 
Page Mill’s largest vulnerability was the fund’s need for and access to 
reinvestment or purchaser capital. When Page Mill attempted an eleventh-hour capital 
call on CalPERS asking for $25 million in reinvestment funds to allow for the Wells 
Fargo pay down, CalPERS refused (Eliopoulos, 2010). Without the reinvestment or new 
financing terms, Page Mill defaulted on the payment. In a time span of just three years, 
the portfolio became a total loss to the investors. CalPERS’s Page Mill real estate unit 
team called for an urgent meeting to devise their message to present to the Investment 
Committee and the public (Schlenker, 2009).  
Page Mill was in default. State Assembly Member Ira Ruskin’s office called 
CalPERS to inform them that the management company’s rental office had been 
abandoned (CalPERS, 2009f). In a message thread to CalPERS’ real estate unit, Ruskin’s 
staff person explained, “The tenants don’t know what to do if there is maintenance issue 
or an emergency. They are completely in the dark as to who owns the property” (Ibid.). 
There was no longer any security staffing the properties, and the tenants did not know to 
whom to pay their September rents.   
Despite their abandonment of the properties, Page Mill still explored options to 
save the fund or mitigate losses. In one proposal, the investors considered reorganization 
by filing Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Due to the fact that 101 LLC entities had been created 
in the cross-collateralized debt structuring, the filing charge would cost approximately 
$100,000. Moreover, the attorneys required a $1.5million retainer fee for anticipated 
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negotiation with Wachovia, and $30 million in fresh equity to demonstrate to Bankruptcy 
Court assurances of operation costs. (Binder & Malter, LLP, 2009). CalPERS again 
refused to seek or provide additional capital. Instead the lender pursued foreclosure and 
new bidders. The value of the property had fallen well below the $239 million loan; the 
portfolio was under water and CalPERS lost its total investment of $100 million. 
 
Outlawing Predatory Investment 
 
In the aftermath of the Page Mill default, public scrutiny by the media and state 
lawmakers of CalPERS increased. The “failing economy” was CalPERS’ preferred 
narrative to explain the losses.  However legislators and others overseeing the pension 
fund also focused on their investment strategy: CalPERS itself had risked workers’ funds 
by displacing workers. The Wall Street Journal highlighted CalPERS risk taking, 
including $600 million losses in the predatory equity deals of Peter Cooper-Village and 
East Palo Alto’s Page Mill properties (Karmin, 2010; Heller, 2010). Moreover, state 
assembly members were urged by Tenants Together to push forward action to protect 
renters from predatory investments, explaining that CalPERS had taken little action 
beyond expressions of concern. 
In 2010, State Assembly Member Tom Ammiano D-San Francisco introduced AB 
2337 (Socially Responsible Investment Bill) to the Senate Public Employment & 
Retirement Committee. The bill would be the first in the nation outlawing predatory 
investment by public pension funds. The legislation called for criteria for state pension 
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funds to identify and refuse investments predicated on undermining rent protections and 
displacing tenants. Predatory investment practices were defined in the bill as follows: 
‘Predatory investment practices’ means private real estate investments that rely 
on, or result in, the displacement of persons residing in rent-regulated housing, 
converting rent-regulated housing units to market rate units, or raising rents above 
regulated levels as determined by the appropriate governing authority, in order to 
generate profits to investors… (Ammiano, 2010; ftp://www.leginfo.ca.gov/). 
 
Importantly, the bill states here that investors should neither enact business strategies that 
“rely on” nor “result in” displacement. The bill thereby asserts that investors should 
acquire properties with returns on investments and leverage based on current rents, not 
projected future rents. 
The bill was a bold statement, but was also limited. Investment strategies could 
not rely on or result in decontrol intentionally, but those strategies that resulted in 
displacement by redeveloping, demolition, or creation of new housing could not be 
considered “predatory” by this bill. Instead, the proposed legislation would require 
support to displaced tenants. The tenant protections for demolition merely reiterated 
adherence to renter relocation benefits in accordance to local, state and federal laws.  
An important new mandate of the legislation, however, would require regulatory 
policy promulgated by the pension funds to demonstrate how to implement the criteria 
and to demonstrate compliance. The proposed legislation mandated annual reporting by 
the funds to the legislature. This could allow for a level of scrutiny and transparency of 
portfolios in private equity funds that was unavailable. Notably, the bill would not cover 
publicly traded entities. Instead, only private funds such as private equity real estate 
funds that did not already report to the Security and Exchange Commission would be 
covered. (Ibid.)  
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A coalition of union affiliates supported the bill including the American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, Asian 
Law Caucus (ALC), Service Employees International Union (SEIU), and the California 
Teachers Association (CTA). East Palo Alto tenants and a representative from SEIU 
provided testimony in support of the bill, and CalPERS officials, who also provided 
testimony, did not oppose or support it. Other supporters included the California Alliance 
for Retired Americans (CARA), the San Mateo County Board of Supervisors, The Rent 
Stabilization Board of the City of East Palo Alto, and a number of non-profit 
organizations including YUCA, and Tenants Together and the Fair Rent Coalition, which 
were co-sponsors.  
 Two New York City organizations also provided support for the bill, Tenants & 
Neighbors and the Urban Homestead Assistance Board. These two organizations had also 
led similar campaigns in New York City against New York pension investment in 
predatory equity. Unlike in California, the pension money did not result in organizing 
traction in New York City. An organizer from UHAB recalled, “We held a press 
conference, it was our lead, but the media didn’t seem to care about the retirement 
money…” (personal communication, May 20, 2012). Although NYC comptroller had 
produced guidelines against predatory equity, and the city had created a task force, there 
was less attention to the role of the pension funds in the large-scale deals there and more 
attention to the conditions of deferred maintenance and tenant harassment. Unlike 
CalPERS, New York City and New York State pension funds were not the largest in the 
nation, nor did the funds carry the veneer of socially responsible investments.  
 
224	
Although the legislation passed on the floor 43-30, it eventually died in 
committee. The chair of the CalPERS committee, Lou Correa, was to blame according to 
one tenant organizer, who said Sacramento was a tough place for tenant protections 
(personal communication, June 7, 2012). The opposition included landlords’ interests 
represented by various local and statewide apartment associations and the California 
Bankers’ Association. Moreover, CalPERS and CalSTERS were quick to enact their own 
internal adjustments to avoid legislated compliance. 
Within months of the California state assembly bill’s introduction, CalPERS 
rushed to enact its own policy in response. CalSTERS followed suit, with language 
echoing the CalPERS investment policy and the bill. By April, 2010 both pensions funds 
had introduced multifamily investment policy revisions, which became incorporated into 
their investment policy for real estate. However, the pension funds’ internal policy 
changes did not have a public oversight provision requiring annual reporting as did the 
state legislation. Without such outside review and mandate the pension boards could 
change the policies. Nevertheless the language was clear: “CalPERS will not participate 
in private real estate investment strategies that rely on or result in eliminating rent-
regulated multi-family housing units, converting such units to market rate units, or raising 
rents above regulated levels…” (CalPERS, 2010). The very recognition of rent regulation 
was a small victory for rent control advocates in the era of Costa Hawkins. Also, the 
replacement of rent-regulated units in the case of conversions went above what some 
local ordinances required. Identifying new units to become regulated would run counter 
to existing state law, however, which prohibits rent regulation of newly created or 
converted units vis a vis the Ellis Act (Review of the City of EPA Rent Stabilization 
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Ordinance, 2015:11). Although the funds’ changing internal policies aimed to steer 
pension funds from risky investments in rental housing, without the legislative mandate 
there would be no enforcement and reporting provision beyond self-monitoring for 
compliance. 
 
Winning Transparency  
 
Reporting its private equity funds’ strategies or even specific investment 
portfolios was a matter of “trade secrets” for those funds and CalPERS. Private funds 
were not obligated to report to the S.E.C. (see Chapter 5). Tenant leaders from the Fair 
Rent Coalition, including one of the original petitioners in the “mom and pop” exemption 
case, took the issue of CalPERS transparency to the courts. The First Amendment 
Coalition had already taken on CalPERS to release records of private placement agents, 
or brokers, in private equity funds (see Chapter 5).  Following the multiple requests from 
media and the communications director of the Fair Rent Coalition, the director of the 
First Amendment Coalition officially submitted a Public Information Request to 
CalPERS for a copy of the private placement memorandum and partnership agreement 
for the Page Mill II fund. They were denied.  
CalPERS cited various exemptions to justify their Public Records Act denial. For 
one, CalPERS stated that the “trade secrets” were exempted from public release due to 
the provision in the California statute exempting “private equity fund, venture fund, 
hedge fund, or absolute return fund” from most Public Records Act disclosures 
(Palenscia, 2008). While Page Mill II was indisputably a private venture capital fund 
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exempted from certain S.E.C. filings, CalPERS had listed the fund as a real estate 
investment. The First Amendment Coalition attempted to argue for records release by 
demonstrating that the private fund was not part of CalPERS’ alternative assets listing. 
Rather, Page Mill was an opportunistic fund listed separately within the real estate assets 
management program. Taran’s previous private-equity backed fund, DIVCO West, was 
also marked as a real estate asset. Blackstone, Apollo and other private equity funds that 
capitalize real estate portfolios among other ventures were listed under the separate 
“alternative assets investment management program.” These alternative assets funds are 
exempted from most specific Public Record Act disclosures under the Public Records 
Act.58 Despite CalPERS’ argument that Page Mill was a venture capital fund exempted 
by the Public Records Act, by listing Page Mill as an opportunistic real estate fund, the 
court found that Page Mill would be subject to the Public Records Act. 
Notwithstanding this statute, the court also found that the “balancing test” 
applied. The public interest in the disclosure outweighed CalPERS interest in keeping it 
out of public record. The court’s final decision explained: “CalPERS’ arguments appear 
to ‘misstate that the public’s interest is as serving the privacy interests of a private 
contractor, rather than in serving the public’s interest in participating in local 
government” (Superior Court of California San Francisco, 2010:5). The fact that the fund 
had already been foreclosed favored the arguments for transparency given that the 
investment strategy had failed and there was no active partnership to protect. CalPERS 
had already lost $100 million in the foreclosed fund.  
																																																								
58 For example, the author’s Public Records Act requests for documents held by CalPERS relating to B2R 
Finance, and multifamily investment by Blackstone Real Estate Fund II, were denied. 
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This was an unprecedented victory for the First Amendment Coalition whose 
work for open access at CalPERS included the significant but narrow release of 
placement agent fees and return on investments for its partnerships with venture capital, 
private equity, and hedge funds. As put by the First Amendment Coalition’s director, 
“Only by understanding how the investment was made can the public be confident that 
CalPERS has made sufficient changes to prevent this from happening again” (First 
Amendment Coalition, 2010:1). Although the nearly 2,000 pages of documents, and 
specifically the prospectus, were not available to the tenants during their organizing, the 
late release provided a window into how CalPERS’ shift to concentrated, over-leveraged, 
real estate investments led to not only financial losses for the pension fund, but to 
homelessness and chaos for tenants.  The release of these documents reflects a 
vulnerability of a quasi-state entity, CalPERS, in partnering with predatory investors who 
rely on a cloak of “trade secrets” to profit from poverty and impoverishment. 
 
Targeting Wells Fargo 
 
The tenants pursued CalPERS through the state legislature and transparency case 
after foreclosure. They sought to ensure the pension fund would not repeat its predatory 
investments in California. Yet following foreclosure, the lender Wachovia, which became 
Wells Fargo, came to the fore as the primary target for the tenants.  
At the time Wachovia was inundated with matters of insolvency, investment 
scandals, and mass-foreclosures across its assets. Wells Fargo had announced its take 
over of Wachovia in October, 2008, but the transition was not complete until 2011. 
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Notably, rather than breaking up the banks in the fallout of subprime lending, the federal 
government had aided these banks in their consolidation. Wells Fargo received nearly 
$50 billion in federal subsidy including $25 billion in TARP funds, and additional tax 
breaks leading up to the take-over (https://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list). Wells 
Fargo later returned $25 billion to the federal government by the end of 2009 (Ibid.). This 
was the context in which tenants and bank-tenants (foreclosed) across California 
attempted to hold Wells Fargo accountable for their irresponsible lending and profits 
based on risking people’s homes. 
The shift in control of the portfolio created a window of opportunity for the 
organizers. Vulnerability for the lender and subsequent receiver involved the portfolio’s 
responsibility to the City of East Palo Alto whose officials were preparing to put a lien on 
Page Mill's buildings, saying the company failed to pay an annual $362,607 fee to the 
rent stabilization program. The penalties for the missed payment had now swelled to 
$1,087,821 (Tenants Together, 2014).  
Although the fines were not punitive to the extent of forcing a crisis or 
negotiations with the original investors, the fines did provide opportunity for the city to 
negotiate with the Wells Fargo receiver preceding foreclosure. The city requested that the 
lender break-up the portfolio find a preservation purchaser, and asked to participate in the 
selection process of the purchaser.  
In addition to the fines due, the city held potential consumer power as depositor 
and borrower with the lender. The broken arrows between the city to the lender in the 
diagram presented at the beginning of this chapter indicate this relationship as an 
unrealized point of vulnerability and risk for both the city and the lender. The city could 
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withdraw city funds from the banking institution, or prohibit business with the banking 
institution for city bonds. However, given the tightening credit market of this period it 
was far more likely that Wells Fargo would be in a position to leverage its lending 
capacity rather than the reverse. Moreover, the city’s budget was limited in comparison to 
much larger cities such as San Francisco where such withholdings could have impact. 
Similarly, a petition by tenants for city and residents of EPA to withdraw from Wells 
Fargo was initiated but went unrealized and held little potential impact if not developed 
as a state campaign to scale.  
The City of East Palo Alto did negotiate with the bank’s receiver around fines in 
order to halt pending litigation. The receiver had decided in the interest of the portfolio to 
not pursue the more than 10 lawsuits by Page Mill against the city. The receiver had met 
with the mayor, city administrator and attorneys promising to maintain the units and be a 
“boring” landlord, in contrast to Page Mill.  
The city and the tenants were concerned with who would ultimately purchase the 
portfolio. In the foreclosure proceedings, Wells Fargo was the only bidder at 50% 
purchase price (CalPERS, 2010). Wells Fargo received tax-relief for buying up Wachovia 
debt. In one respect, Wells Fargo was securing title to the properties using federal funds 
that ultimately, if partially, guaranteed gains for the bank.  
The city advocated that Wells Fargo break up the portfolio to sell to multiple 
purchasers to avoid a monopoly purchase and repeat of the Page Mill investment strategy. 
Tenant organizers also called for a sale price justified by rents adhering to the RSO, a 
community benefits agreement between purchasers and the city that stipulated long term 
affordability commitments and purchases backed by minimized leverage (Tenants 
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Together, 2011:1-2). Wells Fargo pro-actively coopted the tenant frustration through a 
series of community meetings facilitated by Bridge Housing, a non-profit affordable 
housing developer commissioned by Wells Fargo. At this series of town halls, including 
one hosted by YUCA, tenants, and organizers demanded explicitly that Wells Fargo 
break up the portfolio, and assure purchase by landlords who would commit to long-term 
holdings, and follow the letter of the RSO. 
 Bridge Housing was a community development corporation that was well known 
in the Bay Area for affordable housing, as a trusted partner in their public relations 
towards the city and tenants. One YUCA organizer said this was considered a positive 
opening, and that tenant advocates and representatives from the city fully participated in 
the community-input process facilitated by Bridge Housing. Yet Wells Fargo shut down 
the recommendations and Bridge Housing would not publicly disclose the community-
input report. By tenants’ accounts, the process in hindsight was a farce.  
Ultimately, the mayor of East Palo Alto and a city council member were apprised 
of the Wells Fargo plans. Wells Fargo solicited their input on the sale of the portfolio to 
contending bidders including Apollo and Equity Residential, both of which were 
considered by tenant organizers from New York City to the Bay Area as “vulture capital” 
entities. The first, Apollo, was well known in New York City for predatory equity 
strategy premised on over-leverage and gutting rent regulation there. Equity Residential 
was headed by Sam Zell, considered the fiercest opponent to rent control in the state of 
California. The mayor who attended this meeting reported that he conveyed to the bank 
and the bidders: that the properties suffered from deferred maintenance; that the residents 
of East Palo Alto had voted every time in favor of rent control; that the city would 
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continue to protect the tenants. He reported that he made plain that he strongly opposed 
the sale to a single buyer (personal communication, June 8, 2012).  
Organizers with PIA and YUCA began to mobilize. PIA had new staff capacity 
and along with YUCA targeted Wells Fargo in a series of actions that protested the likely 
purchase by Equity, a sponsor of the defeated anti-rent control Proposition 98. In one 
protest, YUCA commissioned a bus for tenants and youth leaders to protest in front of 
Wells Fargo’s San Francisco Headquarters, saying “Hells no Wells Fargo. Don’t sell to 
Zell,” referring to the Equity offer (Domingo, 2011). At another protest that began in East 
Palo Alto, YUCA mobilized tenants to march past the house of Facebook CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg, located a stone’s throw across the creek from the Woodland Park 
neighborhood, but light years in social distance from the low-income tenants (personal 
communication, June 7, 2012). Zuckerberg had just purchased a home only several 
hundred feet from East Palo Alto for $7million. Protesters decried the potential sale to 
Equity. Parents pushed strollers and one council member rode his bike alongside as they 
marched to the Wells Fargo branch in Palo.  
The foreclosure crisis was mounting and East Palo Alto tenants were not alone in 
seeking justice from the banks. More than a third of all East Palo Alto homeowners 
would experience foreclosure in the five years following 2008. Bay area activists first 
targeted their protests against the foreclosures in their action, “Showdown with Wells 
Fargo.” The showdown was a harbinger of the Occupy action to follow nearly six months 
later. It was one of the first national actions that would launch the formation of a New 
Bottom Line, conceived in part by the strategist around private equity, Steven Lerner, 
formerly with SEIU. The formation would eventually bring together Alinsky-based 
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national formations such as PICO and National People’s Action with the left-oriented 
alliance Right to the City. Tenants Together co-sponsored the San Francisco “showdown” 
and along with YUCA and PIA, protesters drew attention to the East Palo Alto 
multifamily foreclosure as part of the mobilization, which brought together more than a 
thousand marchers under the larger demand to break up the banks. YUCA had 
spearheaded a drive of more than 700 petitions to Wells Fargo against the offer to Equity 
to present at the shareholders’ meeting, which coincided with the protests.  
Wells Fargo’s solicitous communication with the city and tenants changed course 
as pressure mounted nationally. The bank representatives stonewalled East Palo Alto 
community concerns in an about-face from their initiative for community-input. In fact, 
Wells Fargo missed the deadline to register their properties with the city’s Rent 
Stabilization Board, a point made by the Fair Rent Coalition in their letter to regulators in 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Matthew Freemont, September 22, 2011). 
Eventually, , in December, 2011, Wells Fargo secured the sale to Equity Residential for 
$130 million, less than half of Page Mill’s acquisition price. 
Tenants had forced a crisis for Page Mill and for a while, won time to further 
develop their organizing to freeze rents, increase tenant protections, and halt 
redevelopment. They had not, however, secured resident-control of their homes. Equity 
Residential would usher in a new period of strife. Tenants again faced unlawful detainers 
and displacement. Again, at least one organizing outfit, PIA, proposed a rent strike. 
However, without organizing capacity at the time, tenants relied on the city to fortify 
rental protections.  
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Although the political drive for tenants’ protections was a living legacy in East 
Palo Alto, the actual management of the city was another affair. East Palo Alto City 
Council fired its newly hired city manager in 2014 due to her close relationship and likely 
collusion with Equity Residential to audit the city’s Rent Stabilization Board. After the 
release of 3,000 pages of internal documents to Tenants Together, the city determined 
misconduct by their manager, who at one point had told rent program administrators to 
not assist tenants in filing petition forms and to no longer refer tenants to inspections for 
habitability (Lamont, 2014). The city also expelled a landlord representative from Equity 
Residential from the Rent Stabilization Board, and condemned the audit of the 
stabilization program.  
In one respect, the actions by the city manager was a test of East Palo Alto’s own 
tenacious political commitment to the philosophy of the rent control ordinance. YUCA 
organized hundreds of residents to participate in ongoing planning sessions. In 2015 
SFOP/PIA have proposed a county-wide rent control measure to the San Mateo County 
Board of Supervisors.  Tenants Together has launched a rent control tool kit for 
California, which in 2016 was being adapted by the national Right to the City Alliance 
for localities nation-wide. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the points of vulnerability of the corporate landlord that 
the tenants along with the City of East Palo Alto leveraged to make their claims. As first 
demonstrated in Chapter 4, tenants pressured the city to use their authority to take 
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municipal action. The city responded with a rent moratorium, development moratorium, 
protection of Westside rental properties from redevelopment, and a referendum on rent 
control. City officials also participated actively with their residents and the tenant 
advocates by pressuring CalPERS to restructure the portfolio and protect renters. 
The tenants, advocates, and City of East Palo Alto leveraged three areas of 
CalPERS authority and vulnerability pertaining to the Page Mill Fund. Tenants and the 
city called on CalPERS to withhold any remaining capital commitment and divest in the 
portfolio. Such withholding and withdrawal by CalPERS would create a crisis for the 
general partner that would hasten foreclosure. The second area of vulnerability for the 
primary investor was vis a vis CalPERS’ authority. The limited partnership agreement 
included the option for CalPERS to take control of the portfolio and dismiss the general 
partner. Lastly, the tenants organized the state legislature to act upon their authority to 
demand CalPERS divest from the fund and prohibit investment in future predatory equity 
deals.  
CalPERS claimed that as a limited partner they could not divest workers’ capital 
from the fund or withhold capital committed. Individual high net worth venture capital 
investors did attempt to withhold capital commitment to the fund claiming that they were 
not aware of the partner’s intention to undermine rent control; however, these limited 
partners were then court-ordered to make due on their commitments. CalPERS could 
withhold its capital commitment but would also likely face litigation by the general 
manager for breech of contract. Despite providing the largest amount of equity to the 
fund, the limited partnership agreement stipulated that CalPERS held an advisement role 
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only. However, the governance agreements did allow for the limited partners to dismiss 
the general partner under certain circumstances of general partner imprudence.  
Based on political pressure, CalPERS carried out an independent investigation, 
including an independent audit and appraisal of the properties to ascertain the viability of 
taking over the portfolio; CalPERS did so against the wishes of the general partner and 
the general partner’s claims that CalPERS violated its limited partnership authority. By 
making CalPERS the general principal partner of the portfolio, CalPERS would become 
the tenants’ primary target. CalPERS would then have authority to: halt litigation against 
the city; roll back rent increases; terminate displacement and guarantee a right of tenant 
return; invest new equity; manage maintenance, and transfer fund investment class from 
opportunistic to core investment. A prospective tenant demand to CalPERs then would be 
to eventually transfer ownership from CalPERS to an affordable housing developer or the 
tenants themselves. CalPERS ultimately chose not to take over the portfolio citing 
anticipated litigation expenses. 
California legislature is responsible for appointing a portion of CalPERS Board 
members who oversee all investment allocations. The legislature may also act in the 
public interest to prohibit certain investments and may propose amendments to the 
California Constitution to reform pension policy. CalPERS must also disclose to the 
legislature investment contractual services, returns, and a wide-range of investment 
details for quarterly and annual reviews. However, unlike the California teachers’s 
pension fund, CalSTERS, the state legislature cannot leverage contributions to pressure 
CalPERS or raid the fund for budget needs. The CalPERS fund has exclusive authority 
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over the amount of member and employer contributions to the fund; the current member 
plans cannot be changed without change to the California constitution.  
Tenants and SEIU pressured the state legislature to use its statutory power to limit 
CalPERS’ real estate investment. The legislature proposed an anti-speculation, anti-
predatory-equity prohibition on CalPERS’ real estate investment through a bill that was 
the first prohibition on such investment for a public pension fund in the country. The bill 
passed several reviews before dying in committee after CalPERS and CalSTERS co-
opted the policy by instituting their own anti-predatory equity guidelines, which did not 
include the bill’s reporting and enforcement provisions. 
Through state public information guidelines a secondary, indirect, tenant tactic 
was to pressur CalPERS to disclose all details of the fund to the public. CalPERS had a 
direct interest in withholding this information in part to conceal its stake in the fund, and 
in part to not establish a precedent for other investment funds concerned with protecting 
trade secrets and exposing themselves to the public scrutiny. Tenants won full disclosure 
only after suit by the First Amendment Coalition and after the portfolio went into 
foreclosure. 
Lastly, tenants attempted to target federal regulators to pressure Wells Fargo to 
break-up the portfolio and identify a preservation purchaser. The tenants cited the 
Community Reinvestment Act, but Wells Fargo was not investigated for this fund. An 
untapped point of vulnerability for the lender included the state Attorney General’s 
potential to investigate the portfolio and potential fiduciary imprudence by CalPERS’ 
investment committee board members. Another untapped area of leverage that would 
become part of the debate around foreclosure response in the state was the potential of 
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the Attorney General to deploy eminent domain to seize and purchase foreclosed 
properties. Such an option would have turned the foreclosure crisis into an opportunity to 
directly target the state with demands for renters’ security of home in East Palo Alto. 
Notwithstanding these roads not taken, renters did prevent the rent-controlled properties 
from being included in redevelopment plans that would otherwise decimate the rent 
control program, and the renter households, in their city. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
In multiple key moments in the history of how East Palo Alto became East Palo 
Alto, residents attempted to assert their control in ways that practiced and furthered the 
possibility of a right to the city through local, and democratic action. At the beginning of 
the last century, small farmers attempted to maximize a separatist socialized economy. 
Japanese horticulturalists subverted xenophobic exclusion laws through collectivized land 
holdings before and following World War II. Then, beginning in the late 1950s, Black 
workers claimed the city as their own, developed urban garden plots over the grids of past 
small farms, forged community-controlled schools and a university, and in large numbers 
came to own their homes. In the post civil rights era, a Black and Brown alliance 
organized in coalition and mobilized votes to create and take city power, asserting the 
political voice of people of color in a regional economy known for white affluence, 
dominance, and discrimination. They premised the Black-Brown alliance and 
incorporation campaign on the need for city power for rent control.  
Yet from the very onset of the city’s incorporation, East Palo Alto struggled to 
maintain its activist legacy of forging the security of home and city for people of color. 
East Palo Alto had become a majority minority city in an era of federal abandonment of 
urban infrastructure, recession, regressive state tax reforms, deregulation, privatization, 
heightened drug trafficking, state disciplining of Black bodies by criminalization and 
incarceration, and an increase number of poor, immigrants arriving for refuge after U.S.-
support of right wing military dictatorships and free trade dislocation. By the 2000s, a 
cash-strapped city government sought the promise of a certain kind of entrepreneurial 
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placemaking attractive to capital. The city promoted the fiscalization of its land for lack 
of other tax revenue, and rezoned parcels for commercial development.  
At this same time, out of the federal and state racial housing policies that had 
mapped risk, exclusion, and containment, there emerged new opportunity for real estate 
speculation in the enduring tying of capital and race: predatory lending and securitization. 
What’s more, in 1995, the state signaled new opportunities for investment in residential 
multifamily real estate through the stripping of California rent control protections. In suit, 
the state’s largest public pension fund, California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(CalPERS) took advantage of low interest rates and the urgency of placing capital to 
create portfolios of the very communities where the fund’s municipal and state 
contributors called home. The real estate opportunistic fund sought returns from 
gentrification, or extraction from “capital-poor” communities, and expanded the 
opportunistic real estate fund with the highest level of debt risk and the lowest level of 
CalPERS oversight. In so doing throughout the period leading up to the Great Recession, 
CalPERS borrowed off its fund of funds, invested debt as equity in the securities of 
borrowed funds, and in the portfolios of overleveraged homes, buildings and 
communities. As CalPERS brokered global finance to enter California, CalPERS 
continued to broker and invest California workers’ capital in world-wide markets. 
Notwithstanding immense housing pressure, just before and in the midst of the 
housing crash of 2007/2008, East Palo Alto tenant leaders and city officials stood up to 
global capital actors to re-assert the city’s commitment to rent control and its future as a 
majority minority city. After having survived, or survived in fragments, the trauma of 
drug trafficking violence and organized abandonment, East Palo Alto city officials and 
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renters took a stand at the cross roads of capital and neoliberal governance, and the 
movements of the city’s founders. Renters and the city aligned against the remaking of 
their city by the public pension-backed corporate landlord Page Mill. Local organizers 
were at the heels of a victory having shut down the toxic Romic plant. The relatively new 
organization of youth and adults responsible for that victory, the Youth United for 
Community Action (YUCA), had grown out of broader Bay area left organizing network 
and the East Palo Alto radical tradition. They organized for and with an East Palo Alto of 
their own image: young, Latino, Black and Polynesian.  
YUCA first catalyzed tenants to organize against the corporate landlord and 
demand action from the city. Page Mill had crystallized the class and racial dimensions of 
inequality that had produced a region in which East Palo Alto was now made vulnerable 
to gentrification and displacement after decades of abandonment. The pension fund’s 
investment exposed the mechanisms by which investors had created a portfolio out of 
their homes. Tenants questioned the role of the state, unions, and the city’s own 
inhabitants in financing their own displacement. The very question that had arisen from 
the Romic plant closure would become the question posed by organizers through the 
city’s participatory planning process that followed the Page Mill portfolio foreclosure: 
what did our collective action and demands make possible? What powers of the city did 
this organizing make clear? 
Renters with their city won specific policy changes and organizing outcomes that 
amplified the renters’ and the city’s voice and protected renters in the face of this 
corporate landlord assault:  
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• The East Palo Alto city council mandated a temporary rent freeze in an 
urgency order in response to the mobilization and testimony of hundreds 
of Page Mill tenants. 
• The Rent Stabilization Board activated as the ‘first line of defense’ and 
won eviction stops and rent increase reprieves. 
• Tenants exposed how this corporate landlord restructured its portfolio to 
create smaller LLCs in an attempt to bypass rent control obligations; 
tenants mobilized and won their preliminary class-action suit. 
• Residents voted for a referendum for stronger rent control and protections 
for just cause and against harassment. 
• The city defended its incorporation and city zone of influence in the face 
of Page Mill attempt to secede the Westside from East Palo Alto. 
• The city passed disincentives for landlords to invoke the Ellis Act. 
• New tenant leaders were elected to city’s Rent Stabilization Board. 
• The Rent Stabilization Board organized for the successful dismissal of an 
anti-tenant city manager. 
• The city passed a temporary rezoning moratorium and ultimately passed a 
residential preservation zoning to maintain Westside rental units. 
• A committee of the state committee initially passed state legislation 
against state public pension investment in predatory equity. 
• CalPERS and CalSTERS approved investment guidelines against 
predatory equity allocations based on proposed legislation. 
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• First Amendment Fund transparency win of full disclosure of CalPERS’ 
opportunistic investment in the Page Mill II real estate venture capital 
portfolio. 
 
In addition, as shown herein and below, East Palo Alto tenant organizers forged new 
alignments with unions and the statewide tenant organizing outfit, Tenants Together.  
This chapter distills several key findings and lessons from the dissertation to 
suggest forward moves of action and research for housing justice and secure futures. 
Absent movements of scale, and what Gilmore (2008) refers to as the “stretch” of 
question,59 demands for housing justice in the U.S. may only translate to the status quo 
policies upholding existing architecture of inequalities. Piven and Cloward (1968) 
warned decades ago of an over-emphasis on procedural, technocratic reforms, “Liberals 
and ‘good government’ groups, for their part, are satisfied with perennial reforms of the 
housing codes, to which political leaders acquiesce, knowing that cumbersome 
procedures of legal redress will do little except to satisfy the reformers.” (168). This 
conclusion heeds such caution and offers recommendations for housing justice from the 
perspective of “non-reformist reforms,” (Gorz, 1968; Gilmore in Loyd, 2013) or 
frameworks and policy changes that position tenants and movements to expand and 
embolden their demands by changing power relations, and stretching the questions of 
strategy. 
In one respect even radical demands of non-reformist reforms may become 
reformist. The distinction however, is most useful in envisioning possibility, and how a 																																																								
59 Gilmore (2008) calls this stretch one of perspective and interface, from “Why… this development 
project?” to “What is development?” (37-28). 
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demand translates to implementation. The question for Gorz is whether a policy demand 
provides a means of democratic control of decision-making and, in this case, the housing 
itself by those most affected. The risk is as to whether the outcome, a purported win, re-
concentrates and centralizes capital.60 For example, Gorz (1968) in his now canonical 
work Strategy for Labor gives the example of the French workers’ demand for 500,000 
additional housing units (7). If these units were created through state subsidies to private 
corporations, or private landlords as in the more recent mechanism of Section 8 vouchers 
in the U.S., or developed on expropriated land that displaced existing workers, or 
developed with subpar quality, or for the poorest of the poor exclusively, etc., this reform 
would maintain the “neo-capitalist” structuring of a speculative economy. Although more 
than a million people would be housed (no small feat, Gorz!), the economy that produced 
the very poverty conditions that warrants an urgent need for workers’ housing would 
continue to operate, and even benefit from the state subsidies given to ameliorate the 
experience of impoverishment.  
On the other hand, however, the realization of such a demand would in effect 
signify the radically simple idea of state intervention for the right to remain. Whether 
such a hypothetical reform creates the strategic framework for sequenced non-reformist 
reforms that alter the market and remove the housing permanently from speculation, or 
whether the housing returns to the speculative market is a question of ongoing, sustained 
struggle. 
																																																								
60 Examples of questionable housing reforms abound from early 20th century slum clearance initiatives and 
early 21st century Hope VI projects, to state subsidized nonpermanent affordability scattered site programs 
designed to catalyze a neighborhood’s gentrification. 
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What are the non-reformist reforms for housing security in the era of increasing 
financialization? In order to arrive at this question of strategic reforms, this dissertation 
asks broadly in the preceding chapters, how through this case might we understand how 
financialization operates in the every day realm of rental housing? What are the nexuses 
between tenants, workers, finance actors, and the state? How have workers and renters 
become financial subjects? How are modes of risk, including race, produced and 
mobilized for financial speculation? What are the strategic leverage points of power for 
renters and the city to assert their demands and intervene in the structuring of 
speculation? Some of these relationships presented in the dissertation require an 
elaborated and honed research agenda for greater clarification and generalizability. The 
relationship of workers’ capital to gentrification, or the pension funding of displacement, 
is the salient work of this dissertation, and the starting point of the findings, lessons, and 
areas of non-reformist reforms considered in this conclusion.  
 
Dissertation Findings and Lessons for The Post-Crisis Crisis 
 
Financialization runs on workers who are tenants who are investors; align labor 
strategies with housing justice strategies. 
This dissertation takes an expansive view of capital’s contradictions in an era of 
increasing financialization. The financialized terrain of residential real estate presents a 
strategic point of contradiction that exposes the relationship between capital’s 
organization of space and the dispossession of workers who produce and inhabit place. A 
central finding from this study is that workers’ capital has financed the serial 
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displacement of communities and workers, including the very people to whom pension 
fund managers and investors are under fiduciary obligation to serve by securing 
retirement futures. The case study demonstrates that the systemic risks of housing finance 
are socialized risks, not simply market investor risks; these risks are carried and 
experienced by residents, communities, and cities. In East Palo Alto, the returns 
stipulated by the debt leverage and expectations of renter returns from this portfolio 
resulted in the eviction of approximately 1,500 residents (See Chapter 4). 
Institutional investment funds such as CalPERS do not simply adhere to market 
structures; large institutional investors shape market structures, and investment chances. 
Institutional investors such as CalPERS aggregate U.S. homes, single or multifamily, and 
create a bridge from the extraction of value from those homes to the global securities 
markets, in which pension funds such as CalPERS are also major investors. At the time 
of this writing, CalPERS had a target allocation of 20% investment in global debt 
securities. This involves the purchasing of securities or paper of the U.S. government, 
foreign governments, corporations, residential and commercial backed mortgages, 
student debt loans, credit cards, and other forms of direct loans (CalPERS, 2015: 52). The 
fundamental question of CalPERS’ investment model then is not only whether the 
investment fund realizes returns on investment despite or in proportion to great leverage, 
but how those returns are produced through the production and circulation of debt, and 
the extent to which returns fundamentally and irrevocably rely on dispossession. In the 
dissertation case example, CalPERS expected to profit off housing through the 
exploitation of the California workers, cities, and residents who produced the value of 
place. This was also done to the benefit of the portfolio principals and lenders who 
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accrued fees at multiple exchange points of capital circulation (see Chapter 5).  
Notwithstanding the reputational risks of their eviction campaign and eventual 
portfolio losses, Page Mill’s executive stood to gain from even a failing portfolio. Page 
Mill’s general manager reaped investors’ fees and had accrued $7,137,000 in fees from 
the commingled investment fund (Squar Milner Real Estate Services, 2008: 7). The 
general principal was also well positioned to discount eventual real estate losses against 
federal taxes, benefit from potential carried interest tax credits for any returns, and had 
put comparatively little of his own “skin in the game” to lose. Despite taking 
comparatively less risk than the larger investors, Page Mill’s principal controlled the 
governance structure of the portfolio. Even so, there was opportunity for CalPERS to 
have a say in the portfolio management, and this did not go unnoticed by the tenant 
organizers. 
An interrelated and key finding of this dissertation is that CalPERS proved to be a 
more strategic target than the corporate heads of the Page Mill portfolio fund. Despite 
statements to the contrary by the Page Mill principal and CalPERS, CalPERS real estate 
officers had a voice in the management of this portfolio, and ultimately made key 
decisions that ushered forward the portfolio’s foreclosure (see Chapter 6). CalPERS 
sought to close the portfolio at a loss rather than continue to deal with the relentless 
media, tenant, union and state legislator inquiries, and their evidence of deferred 
maintenance, and eviction. Despite the limited partnership structure of the limited 
liability company (LLC), and CalPERS’ standard reliance on external management, this 
case demonstrates that a large institutional investor such as CalPERS had opportunity to 
restructure this corporate portfolio and provide new equity to save the otherwise failing 
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fund. CalPERS established a third-party investigation by a consulting firm to examine the 
portfolio, and audited the fund when Page Mill executives in email after email cautioned 
against the optics of such an inquiry. CalPERS ultimately made a choice to lose its full 
investment rather than move to dissolve the governance structure and take-over the 
portfolio, or infuse new dollars. 
Tenants recognized that a distinctive feature of the majority investor in this 
portfolio was the institutional investor’s affiliation with the state and with unions. Union 
trustees elected to CalPERS (see Chapter 6) are responsible for protecting labor’s capital 
by seeking greater investment profits, and via those investments, may also advocate for 
expanding union employment prospects in CA industries. However, the “triple bottom 
line” of investing in areas of environmental, social and worker protections while aiming 
to also increase returns for workers’ retirement security raises tension and contradictions. 
For one, this case study demonstrated the contradiction of the worker-, union-, city- and 
state-backed pension’s role in “developing” communities by accelerating displacement 
and gentrification for retirement returns.  
Before “tripling” their concern, CalPERS had first established a “double bottom 
line” that considered social responsibility a tenet of investment returns. In 2000 when 
CalPERS released the “double bottom line” framework, real estate of all forms of 
speculation was still considered a neutral investment of moral value, and therefore 
socially responsible. This assessment, as Chapter 5 demonstrates, would ultimately be left 
to external managers who increasingly managed CalPERS’ real estate investment 
holdings, and received greater power to increase risks through opportunistic funds that 
involved the highest debt ratios and lowest likelihood of stable returns. External 
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managers had incentives of reaping fees paid out by investors before the period of 
investment returns would be realized. CalPERS managers also were incentivized through 
payoffs by placement agents, but also by the tie-in of their compensation bonuses to 
investment returns. Managers internal and external to CalPERS sought out greater 
leverage to create greater fees through greater exchange points of capital, and to improve 
the prospect of higher returns and bonuses for those returns.   
An additional finding of this study demonstrates that labor support of tenant 
organizing added traction to tenant demands when targeting CalPERS. New alignments 
between labor and organizing against housing speculation are necessary to ensure 
workers’ control of both their own retirement futures and homes. In the Page Mill case, 
tenant organizers succeeded to align with SEIU local 521. The union local protested 
CalPERS’ funding of this portfolio, and ultimately supported state legislation to ban 
public sector pension funds from predatory investment in speculative real estate. As the 
CalPERS disclosure demonstrates, union leaders had direct lines of communication with 
CalPERS officials. Labor is a necessary coalitional partner with housing organizers and 
advocates seeking to affect investment priorities (for a New York City example and 
critique of the potential of labor to become incorporated into the urban gentrifying 
regime, see MacDonald [2011]).  
In the Bay Area and Silicon Valley, where housing demand continues to outpace 
supply, there are signs of growing union and tenant organizing affinities against 
gentrification, even, at times, involving the building and trades unions known to support 
high-end development. For example, in 2015 the building trade unions agreed to support 
the San Francisco Jobs with Justice campaign to tighten Just Cause, and in turn housing 
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justice organizations allied with trade unions against nonunion development projects 
(personal communication, June, 25, 2016)61. Strategic housing and labor coalitional work 
gained momentum in part at a pragmatic and personal level involving the crossover of 
organizers years ago in the activist-oriented Bay Area. When the non-profit Tenderloin 
Housing Clinic became a union shop, a tenant staff organizer there became a political 
leader of the union local and in the political realm of the labor council (Ibid.). These 
cross-relationships helped to catalyze work with SEIU in particular around strategic anti-
displacement efforts involving housing for teachers, and lower-income workers. At the 
rank and file level, tenant organizers have attended shop-steward meetings to conduct 
trainings around housing issues with union memberships. 
In addition to exerting influence over city and state rent policy, development 
plans, pension funding, and individual landlord fights, unions can expand the conceptual 
framework of collective bargaining for strategic aims. In the area of pension funds, some 
unions have activated their members to hold their respective funds accountable to the 
needs of their contributors, including and beyond household futures. In the case of 
California, the same SEIU local 521 that worked with East Palo Alto tenants to stop 
CalPERS rent hikes and evictions formed a Retirement Security for All committee. The 
committee mobilizes members around pension reform changes and argues that changes to 
pension funds for current union workers should be negotiated through collective 
bargaining, not by the whim of the state legislature (personal communication, June 5, 
2012; Pham, 2012). These committees can potentially activate union workers to hold 
accountable their union representatives who have seats on pension boards, such as 
																																																								
61 For an overview of the rise and fall of unionized construction in residential market see Rabourn (2008). 
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CalPERS trustees. The committees can also serve as vehicles to develop rank and file 
union members for the pension questions of collective bargaining. 
A more expansive view of collective bargaining takes into account what 
McAlevey calls the “whole worker” that affords the highest level of worker participation 
in the bargaining process (2012; 2016). Expansive collective bargaining sets forth 
demands addressing the context in which labor is reproduced, and labor’s capital 
expropriated, or the processes of financialization (see Bhatti and Lerner, 2016), such as in 
the case of worker and state-subsidized pension funding of evictions. Collective 
bargaining for the whole worker might include principles of investment dollars, and 
specific outcomes for socially controlled housing production. The bottom line for such 
retirement security committees cannot be a narrow vision of protecting wages and 
retirement payouts; it must be in ensuring pension investments secure rather than 
undermine stable and stronger economies, at the community, state, national and global 
scale.  
Strategic union organizers have identified the intersection of housing and labor 
demands in past collective bargaining campaigns, such as when the Stamford Organizing 
Project at the same time mobilized workers to save public housing from demolition, won 
inclusionary zoning, and organized 4,500 workers into a union contract (Clawson, 2003; 
for a more recent update see Botein, 2007). More recently, for teachers in SEIU in the 
Bay Area, collective bargaining provided an opportunity to calculate housing as a 
component of rising costs of living in the workers’ contract demands (personal 
communication, June 25, 2016). Yet, as this dissertation shows, housing as a wage 
supplement is a limited view of the question of housing affordability, and by extension 
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limits the possibilities of collective bargaining. Unions and housing organizers may find 
strategic targets in private equity corporations themselves, such as Blackstone, as Bhatti 
and Lerner (2016) suggest. For one, they point out, as unions organize Blackstone 
workers, unions must bargain also to freeze the rents of properties across the Blackstone 
portfolios at rates affordable to those workers.   
To aim big, and to aim strategically at the sources and structures of corporate 
finance, however, transparency matters. In order to look upwards at the funding sources, 
and identify the investors that control the corporations (that strip states of tax dollars, 
fight unionization and invest in tenant harassment, deferred maintenance and serial 
displacement), legislation must require corporate public reporting, beginning with state-
financed investment portfolios. The Page Mill tenant organizing strategy to target 
CalPERS was due to investigative community lawyering and committed tenant leaders 
who traced the financial actors involved in the portfolio based on court disclosures that 
identified CalPERS role in the portfolio.  
CalPERS’ largest disclosure surrounding Page Mill was court mandated, and 
became the central data source of this dissertation. The court had ruled against CalPERS 
because the fund did not identify the venture capital operating firm Page Mill as an 
alternative investment vehicle in their pension reporting (see Chapters 5 and 6). Instead, 
Page Mill was firmly listed by CalPERS as a real estate fund. Blackstone funds, on the 
other hand, are reported by CalPERS as alternative assets, and do not require portfolio-
level specific reporting even when investment assets may be real estate such as 
Blackstone IV rental housing. CalPERS is exempted from public reporting of details of 
alternative assets. Although CalPERS vigorously fought the Page Mill disclosure in court 
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and described as a protected asset, the First Amendment Coalition’s lawsuit prevailed due 
to the fund’s original real estate classification.  
Public pension funds can circumvent public information requests on the specific 
portfolios of private equity alternative assets investments. Moreover, private equity 
prospectus and memoranda of agreement are not reported to the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Efforts to identify investors, amounts, and agreement provisions 
prove challenging for strategic researchers seeking to find points of vulnerability without 
such data points. In other words, CalPERS can deny requests for specific Blackstone 
funds’ portfolio listings, and these would not be found by the parent corporation’s name 
in public databases (see Chapter 5).  
In New York City, at the time of this writing, the city council recently introduced 
a legislation that would pressure landlords through transparency measures by mandating 
the city’s Housing Preservation Department (HPD) to create a public watch list of 
overleveraged landlords with high debt to income ratios. Tenants alleging harassment in 
those watch-list buildings would receive expedited action in housing court (Zimmer, 
2016). HPD officials have reported to news outlets that creating such a list would be 
burdensome, saying debt ratios fluctuate, and that they did not necessarily have access to 
this data at this time.  
Instead of relying on public transparency measures, over the last several years, 
tenant organizers such as those at California’s Tenants Together have looked for new 
ways to identify corporate investors. They do this through savvy strategic research and 
the investigative navigation of web-based individual rental property listings. For 
example, Tenants Together identified rental homes of Wall Street investor corporate 
 
253	
parent companies such as Blackstone by finding first individual properties and then the 
properties’ limited partner owners. Once researchers identified the subsidiary limited 
partners, they were able to identify the number of rental properties (such as 5,000 for 
Blackstone/Invitation Homes in the Bay Area) listed with these specific portfolio partners 
to begin outreach to those renters (Inglis n.d.). These listings were made possible through 
the publicly available county assessor-records aggregated through propertysharks.com or 
Property Radar.  
Unmasking these relations is not enough. In the case of Tenants Together, 
identifying rental units owned by corporate landlords is a first step to tenant outreach and 
organizing. An advocacy platform that targets corporate landlords on behalf of those 
tenants without the tenants themselves in leadership positions will likely limit the 
strategic, sequenced possibilities of tenant and broader-based action. 
 
Race is a mode of risk that structures speculation; racial justice and housing justice are 
inextricably linked. 
This case study began with an historical overview of the federal and local 
dimensions that produced speculative housing regimes legitimated through race (Chapter 
3). Race is a mode through which boundaries of place have been drawn and re-drawn for 
the purposes of segregation, containment, and gentrification. A finding of this case 
study’s historical tracing is that boundary making around and between people by race and 
class creates axes of difference mobilized for financialized risks and returns, or 
valorization by devalorization. Redlining, exclusionary zoning, restrictive covenants, 
Alien Land laws, Proposition 14 are all examples of how this was practiced through 
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government agencies including HOLC, state-sponsored realtors, and voter mandated 
policies.  
This dissertation presented a regional and historical view of racial containment. 
The value of homes as commodities, grounded in places, has been historically linked to 
ideas of racial occupancy and settlement, involving in the U.S. stolen lands and stolen 
peoples. Moreover, home is the site of the most intimate sphere of social reproduction, 
including the reproduction of stratification at the level of household by age, gender roles, 
and in the reproduction of familial identity through race and ethnicity relational to the 
identities of other family units.  
In the early 1980s, East Palo Alto’s city founders viewed the threat of 
gentrification as both consequence and cause of potential political fragmentation in their 
majority minority city. Two decades following cityhood, corporate landlord evictions 
made visible the gender, race, and class contours of an embattled and predominantly 
immigrant and Black renter population “fighting to stay put” (Chapter 4) after nearly 40 
years of federal disinvestment.  The renewed opportunity for capital there relied in part 
on the historicized racial differentiation of the city’s people in the regional context of 
white affluence, and the raced policies of organized abandonment and expropriation. 
Organizing with racial justice at the center requires a shift from demands for increasing 
“access” to affordable housing, to asking who is defining the value and risks of housing 
markets, and who is expanding and controlling those markets for whom, and by whom. 
Organizing with racial justice at the center involves leading by and for people of color. 
Youth United for Community Action has demonstrated intersectional analysis and 
action that lifts queer, people of color, feminist, and eco-perspectives. YUCA youth 
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organizers mobilized through a racial justice and intergenerational strategy in their 
campaign to save renters’ homes in East Palo Alto. While the GI Bill was creating a 
university boom for largely white beneficiaries at Palo Alto’s Stanford University next 
door, and venture capital grew in innovation to back their technological products, East 
Palo Alto was becoming predominantly a toxic waste site for the chemicals used to 
manufacture Silicon Valley’s computers. YUCA elevated the question of race from this 
historical understanding of how East Palo Alto went from the Silicon Valley’s toxic 
dump where people of color were in effect considered disposable, to a place of value 
where people of color were in effect considered displaceable.  
The California based Anti-Eviction Mapping Project is another forward strategy 
project that reflects a racial analysis of corporate real estate control; this group became 
especially active in the post-crisis renters’ crisis. The project uses spatial visualization to 
make clear not only where evictions are happening, but also the speculator investors 
behind these evictions. Working with Tenants Together the project identified Blackstone 
private equity and other corporate landlord properties in northern California to calculate 
the scale and sites of increased speculation in communities of color based on geographic 
concentration. Spatial visualization allows for the multi-layered view of demographic 
profiles within clusters of speculation. In their “Mapping Market Power” analysis, the 
Anti-Eviction Mapping Project teamed with Tenants Together to identify the single 
family rentals of Blackstone/Invitation Homes, Colony Financial (Colfin), and Waypoint 
that now form the large corporate rental portfolios of previously home owner-occupied 
housing in post-crisis crisis California (See 
www.antievictionmappingproject.net/wallstreet.html). 
 
256	
Other Bay and Peninsula area housing organizations such as Just Cause / Causa 
Justa also develop on-going analysis of demographic shifts and involve the people most 
affected by those shifts in regional strategy. For this group, foregrounding a racial justice 
analysis meant creating a dedicated space and platform, the Black Priorities Project, for 
development without displacement. Building a city where Black lives matter involves a 
re-centering from demands of access to affordable housing to demands of accountability 
for how the conditions of state violence and gentrification were produced through the 
racial disciplining of labor, removal of union jobs, boundary-making of segregation, and 
post-1960s disinvestment in urban infrastructure.  
Labor not only has a vested interest in the structuring of housing speculation 
through financialization, but also the racial contours of that structuring. For those who 
posit that the central aim of labor is the decommodification of workers an analysis of 
racial capitalism is necessary in strategy to address the ways in which racial valorization 
acts as a mode in the commodification of bodies, land, and housing.  
Unions have a direct stake in how gentrification works as racial political 
redistricting. Gentrification results in fragmentation of sustained relationships and 
political networks through displacement. Geographic shifts in union memberships, 
particularly in the service industry, may indicate foreclosure or opening in local political 
strategy.  
For decades, people of color have disproportionately rented, and continue to do so 
(Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, 2016). The foreclosure crisis 
that robbed African-American households of wealth disproportionately resulted in a post-
crisis crisis for renters that again, hit people of color the hardest (Ibid.; Henry, Reese and 
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Torres, 2013). This crisis of enduring crises for Black Americans in particular, and 
political fragmentation by gentrification, is partly why “Black Lives Matter” as cry and 
demand remains so broadly effective. The decentralized form of the BLM organizing 
defies this fragmentation and speaks to people directly within and across place, whether 
urban and suburban, where people find themselves all too often gentrified out, and, or 
segregated-in by race and class.  
 
Organization in place still matters; targeting corporate landlords stretches local 
campaigns to greater scale for potentially greater impact and opens translocal strategy. 
Within and outside the far-reaching call of movements are people organizing, 
disrupting, and changing local politics. Another finding of this dissertation is the 
continuing significance of urban politics in shaping speculative financial real estate 
regimes. Since the 1970s entrepreneurial cities have allowed for much of the transfer of 
public policy decisions to private interests, but this case presents the example of a city 
intervening for social interests within the incomplete processes of hyper-financialization. 
This dissertation demonstrates the attempts by the city to mitigate and even resist 
gentrification in the face of this large corporate landlord and the institutional investor 
(Chapter 6). City officials in East Palo Alto, including key rent board members, city 
council members, and planners responded to the high participation by renters in city 
meetings. The city targeted the corporate landlord directly and froze Page Mill rents. The 
Rent Stabilization Board ruled against evictions, and the City sued and counter-sued the 
litigious corporation around a myriad of issues, including the form in which it announced 
and held meetings. City officials leveraged capacities to support renters by proposing and 
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passing a new stronger rent control ordinance, protecting the properties from demolition 
or conversion in its land use planning, and investigated and fired a city manager and, 
more recently, removed a rent board member deemed anti-tenant. 
City officials also went after CalPERS. The city council passed a unanimous 
resolution calling for CalPERS divestment from the portfolio fund. Officials representing 
the city appeared and spoke at CalPERS Board meetings, and to the media. The city also 
supported and pursued legislation against pension funding of predatory landlords, and 
city council members and the mayor discussed their expectations for a restructured 
portfolio with the lender.  
Localities continue to test their capacities. The city of Richmond, CA put forth a 
plan to use eminent domain there to seize bank loans of foreclosed housing, and 
restructure the loans to be affordable to original home owner occupants or for potential 
conversion to affordable units. Although this plan did not materialize, the local 
government’s pursuit of this proposal was an immediate threat to investment capital, and 
even more so if ever brought to scale throughout California or across the U.S.62 There 
and elsewhere banks cited pension funds, or workers, as the losers in such deals due to 
pension investments in the securitization of many of these loans (Dewan, 2014).  
In California, rent control ordinances reflect a popular demand for renter 
protections, if not an actual salve in light of the restrictions of Costa Hawkins. In 
November 2016, four new rent control initiatives were slated for localities in the Bay 
Area and Silicon Valley by local California referenda, including in Richmond, 
																																																								
62 A housing justice critique of the Richmond eminent domain plan was the city’s use of a profit-motivated 
firm that would generate fees for its mortgage restructuring services. This critique further demonstrated the 
need for state-funded REO transfer mechanism and social housing conversion.  
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Mountainview, San Mateo, and Burlingame (Inglis, 2016). New taxes were also proposed 
in East Palo Alto specifically for affordable housing revenue; also on the ballot were 
proposals to strengthen eviction controls in both East Palo Alto and Oakland.  
Although movements gain traction through bold demands, a necessary stretch of 
question applies especially to the local policy reforms that can make a difference when 
brought to scale. Corporate landlords by sheer economy of scale would influence 
prevailing rents if entire portfolios were deemed rent controlled, regardless of rental unit 
size. Page Mill had attempted to use the “mom and pop” provision of exempting smaller 
multi-family holdings from East Palo Alto’s rent regulation and to obscure its single-
entity principal. Page Mill attempted this by registering a network of LLCs as subsidiary 
owners of their otherwise rent regulated smaller holdings. Corporate landlords that seized 
the capital opportunity of investing in scattered site portfolios comprised of single family 
REOs were also exempted from local rent ordinances because these assets are single 
units. In California, due to the small landlord protections of Costa Hawkins, these single 
family homes cannot be covered by rent regulation, despite the portfolio’s overall asset 
value and the aggregate number of assets leveraged by a singular portfolio. Corporate 
landlords of multi-holdings, single family and greater, should not be exempted by Costa-
Hawkins’ small landlord protections. 
The elimination of Costa Hawkins is a labor and housing coalitional campaign 
that can be launched at the state level. First and foremost, Costa-Hawkins must be 
eliminated to end vacancy decontrol and to allow for statewide rent control provisions. 
Yet, a stretch of question challenges organizers to seek beyond the perpetual changing of 
housing legislation and finance regulation to questions of who controls the housing to be 
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legislated and the capital to be regulated? Massive federal spending remains necessary to 
produce new social housing, and to support the conversion of private REO housing to 
social housing. 
The foreclosure crisis was a missed opportunity for affordable housing conversion; 
notwithstanding city rent regulatory capacities in places such as California, the 2010 
federal Dodd-Frank mortgage regulatory capacities, and municipal and state tools for 
bank owned to social housing conversion, new social housing production and 
maintenance requires massive federal investment. 
 
The housing crisis of 2007/2008 hit East Palo Alto in relentless waves. By the last 
quarter of 2008, East Palo Alto held the distinction of having the highest rate of 
foreclosures in San Mateo County (Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2008). The 
succession of single-family foreclosures further exacerbated the existing affordability 
crisis for many low-income renters. These renters compete with new renters in a 
narrowing market of supply further shaped by exploitative landlord speculators seeking 
higher rents for debt servicing and returns. By 2015, renter demands had outstripped 
rental supply across the country. 
In East Palo Alto, the one period of anomaly of increased housing unit vacancy in 
this tightening market was during the period of the Page Mill portfolio evictions. 
Although evictions would create availability of a unit for rental, tenant organizing and 
media attention on the problematic landlord kept would-be tenants away (personal 
communicaiton, January 7, 2014). The combination of Page Mill evictions and single-
family foreclosures exacerbated the crisis for renters in this small city. The crisis further 
reflected a generalized crisis for renters throughout the country.  
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The present rentership society was catalyzed by a number of causes that resulted 
from both the housing crash, and demographic shifts. Between 2008-2014, more than 9.5 
million foreclosed or distressed sale homes led to both increases in rental units and renter 
growth (Kusisto, 2015). Less than a third of these foreclosed and stress sale households 
are expected to become homeowners again, according to the National Association of 
Realtors (Ibid.). An early indicator of the shift of owner to renter was the tripling of 
single-family rentals from 2005-2010, compared with the first half of that ten year period; 
a neutral effect on vacancy rates for single-family units over the same period signifies the 
likelihood of foreclosed owners turned renters of those same foreclosed units (Joint 
Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, 2012). The sheer number of 
foreclosures at first indicated that that the supply might offset the new demand. Yet rental 
vacancy rates have steadily decreased and by late 2016 were the lowest rate in 20 years 
(US Census, 2016).  Despite foreclosures, rental supply options were circumvented by 
the recession due to empty foreclosed properties awaiting resale, a narrowing of credit 
opportunity for homeownership, and a decrease, or stalling, of both single family and 
multifamily new construction (Freddie Mac, 2012). Although younger people were more 
likely to remain in place with parents as a result of the failing economy than of the same 
age cohort in the previous decade, demographic shifts of immigrants, and increasing 
number of renters in all age groups between 30-70s as well as the number of foreclosed 
or distressed sale households contributed to the eventual renter demand upsurge.  
Moreover, rental demand grew in this period as incomes fell. Between 2000-2010 
U.S. household incomes fell by 7%, while rents rose by 12% (Woo, 2016). Rents 
outpaced inflation resulting by 2015 in the highest rental burden ever in the recording of 
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rental burdens, established in 1981 at more than 30% of household income (Schwartz, 
2006), and in other measures of rent burdens recorded since 1960 (Woo, 2016). Rental 
burdens continue to hit the poorest the hardest. In the critical period of crisis and post-
crisis, in the ten years between 2005-2015, more than half of all new rental growth was 
among households earning less than $25,000; a third of all U.S. renter households fall in 
this income bracket (Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, 2016:26). 
The foreclosure crisis was a giant missed opportunity for the conversion of 
foreclosures to social housing. In this case example, the foreclosure of Page Mill 
properties represented opportunity for the city, tenants, and labor allies actively seeking 
renter protections. There was no viable strategy in place, however, for the city or a third-
party organization to seize the bank loan and devise a community-control structure of the 
portfolio’s land and housing units.  Instead, there were marginal victories that bought 
valuable time and secured the city’s existing rent control (see Chapter 6). These were 
nominal short-term wins: the receiver called off litigation against the city; and the city 
halted zoning changes and strengthened rent control and eviction protections. Still, 
Equity Residential, owned by the financier of anti-rent control referenda in California, 
Sam Zells, acquired the entire Page Mill portfolio. This occurred before the Richmond 
and earlier San Bernandino proposals of eminent domain use. Yet, even if a mechanism 
existed for eminent domain and a third-party transfer, funding for mitigating deferred 
maintenance alone would require significant sourcing. Funding and technical assistance 
for the conversion of the foreclosed Real Estate Owned (REO) private corporate portfolio 
to a social housing structure could have allowed the former Page Mill tenants to become 
controllers, if not owners, of their housing futures.  
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Housing control versus ownership is an important distinction for potential 
conversion of any REO housing to social housing. Indeed, the foreclosure crisis 
challenged the myth of ownership as a symbol of self-reliance or the actualization of the 
American dream. As detailed above, owners by the millions, including many small 
landlords, became renters, and an increasing number of stable paying renters, such as the 
remaining renters in the Page Mill properties, found themselves in unstable, foreclosed 
buildings. Foreclosed owners and renters alike became “bank tenants” paying rent as debt 
service, often at a leverage point beyond the asset value. The trope of the ownership 
society became subverted by the reality of the “renter nation” (see Samara, 2014) 
described above, or debt nation. 
Ultimately, the findings of this dissertation beget questions of alternative housing 
models operating outside the speculative market.  What does democratically controlled 
social housing look like? What are the models of limited equity, land trusts, and public 
financing that can help to envision the conversion of foreclosed or predatory landlord 
properties, single or multifamily, to an outcome of sustained social housing?63 How 
might we expand the pool of residential real estate that can be taken off the speculative 
market? How much federal funding is required for new social housing production? What 
are other sources of revenue for housing conversion, maintenance and production? 
A lesson and impetus of the foreclosure crisis has been the need to bring 
homeowners and renters together to identify the current financialization processes that 
structure the economy, unmask the illusion of ownership, and invert the socialized effects 
of finance and debt risks to allow for conversion of any housing stock targeted by 																																																								
63 For an overview of existing models of limited-equity and land trust formations see (Emmeus Davis, 
2006a; 2006b) 
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speculative portfolio structures. The foreclosure crisis has brought organizers to 
reevaluate ownership, and by extension landlordism of any form, as a tenet of housing 
security (see examples of alternative housing models, Baiocchi, et. al. 2016).  
 
A Research Agenda, Forward Moves 
 
Develop and Echo a Framework of Housing Security  
 
In the aftermath of the foreclosure crisis, the Right to the City Alliance64 brought 
to its organizing membership the question, what is housing security? The group had put 
forth study papers on the concept of transformative demands, and “non-reformist 
reforms” recognizing the need to distinguish transitional and technical policy changes 
versus bold, provocative vision of possibilities in the midst of the foreclosure crisis 
(Brady and Romano, 2012). The need to reconsider the very framework of the alliance’s 
organizing campaigns and terms of housing justice grew out of what was revealed then as 
a crisis of crises. This was a crisis that was quickly spurring new opportunity for greater 
theft of wealth and equity from households across the U.S. to corporate investors, 
particularly and disproportionately impacting people of color. The historical, ongoing 
adaptation of capital and finance capital to innovate and prosper from crisis made evident 
the need to define fundamental tenets of alternative housing models.  
Right to the City developed of a five-point framework for evaluating housing 
models around the following pillars: affordability (cost), tenure (sustained occupancy), 
																																																								
64 The translocal U.S. network of membership-based organizing groups that formed in 2007 in response to 
gentrification and public housing demolition. 
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access (fair by opportunity and location), sustainability (environmentally sound, 
habitability), and control (democratic decision making by affected residents and 
occupants) (Samara, 2014). The framework rejects a right to fair or greater returns as the 
central measure of housing policy, and explicitly rejects speculation as a business model.  
Future research around this framework might address the question of scale and 
further define equity measures for the hardest hit groups. Moreover, these umbrella 
pillars might spur a detailed research agenda to consider indices of housing security.  In 
this direction, future research might consider the application of these pillars to existing 
housing demands, such as rent control. The strengthening and protection of rent control 
was a concrete win from the East Palo Alto tenant organizing against Page Mill. Yet, 
Costa Hawkins circumscribed this win. What might a rent-control future look like? Is rent 
control an aim to be obtained through the tool of state regulation, or renter-control of rent 
as maintenance to support alternative models such as land trusts, limited equity, or other 
collective resident control structures? On the one hand, each of these pillars could be 
discussed in relationship to city or state regulated rent control (see Figure 7-1). The Right 
to the City Alliance’s framework provides a vantage point to consider areas to strengthen 
state-based regulatory capacities. 
Another research trajectory unexplored herein and that engages a framework of 
housing security would be to situate rent control within an evaluation of its transitional, 
non-reformist reform capacities relative to and interrelated with other demands. To what 
extent does rent control change market conditions by lowering the regional rent floor, or 
widening the rent gap, and at what scales? How might rent control, as a regulatory tool of 
the state, perpetuate endless “good government” advocacy on the loopholes, mechanisms 
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of implementation, and enforcement of landlords? In this way how might rent control and 
advocacy around regulatory details maintain or reinforce the power dynamics of status 
quo or accountability at a municipal, regional, or national scale? Does rent control merely 
remove regulated residential real estate from the speculative economy or can rent control 
potentially produce prevailing rent ceilings? (See Chapter 6) What must be anticipated, 
such as rent gap future speculation following the piecemeal stripping and weakening of 
politically vulnerable regulatory controls? These are questions to consider in future 
research from the vantage point of housing security, and reformist-reforms versus non-
reformist reforms. 
 
Table 7.1. Analysis of Tenants Together Rent Control Tool Kit (2016), and Berkeley and 
East Palo Alto rent control ordinances (2015) through the application of the RTTC 
housing security framework.  
Five Pillars Moderate (Typical, Existing) Strong(er) 
Affordability 
Locked increase measure can 
permit fluctuating affordability / 
profits 
 
Ties base rent to what market can 
bear. 
Ties maximum rents to Consumer 
Price Index increase.  
Allows for individual landlord 
adjustments based on hardship 
claims. 
Discretionary increases to established maximum 
allowable rent maintains affordability, caps profit 
 
Ties base rent to Net Operating Income for fair 
return. 
Ties maximum rent increases to percentage of 
Consumer Price Index based on annual RB discretion 
to maintain or increase renter affordability (i.e., 1%-
100% of total Consumer Price Index increase);  
Prohibits landlords’ rent banking;  
Strict individual landlord adjustment provisions;  
Rent freeze (no new annual increase) for seniors 
60+;  
Emergency hardship grants to tenants for rent. 
Emergency hardship grants to landlords for capital 
repairs. 
Anti-speculation tax (tax on turn-over of the property 
within certain time period). 
Accessibility 
City, multifamily, aging stock 
 
Local scale;  
Excludes new construction; 
Limits neighborhoods impacted 
County, state, national, varied new and older stock  
 
National scale; 
Includes new construction;  
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based on type and age of rental 
stock. 
No zoning restrictions (includes Single Resident 
Occupancy units [SROs], mobile home parks, garage 
rental conversions, single family rentals, at four or 
more rental properties of any unit size) 
Long Term 
Stability 
Decontrol 
 
Vacancy and rehabilitation 
decontrols induce landlord 
harassment, unwarranted and 
costly (even if amortized) Major 
Capital Improvements (MCIs), 
and result in tenant turn over/ 
displacement and permanent loss 
of affordable unit. 
 
Control, Just Cause, Replacement and Relocation 
 
Just cause eviction;  
Vacancy control / 
Prohibitive vacancy decontrol;  
Conversion (to condo, single family) requires 1:1 
rent control unit replacement and significant 
relocation payment;  
No rehabilitation decontrol;  
Punitive fees for overcharging. 
 
 
Health & 
Sustainability 
Passive 
 
Renters must report code 
violations; passive if any 
inspections; no landlord 
rehabilitation inducements. 
Active 
 
Rehabilitation subsidies available as grants and liens 
if landlord hardship or inaction;  
Housing inspection reports and maximum allowable 
rent rolls must be included in all bank appraisals and 
at underwriting review;  
Municipal liens placed on properties with code 
violations must be cleared for sale, acquisition;  
Third party transfers and social housing conversion 
in cases of continued deferred maintenance, liens; 
Landlords cannot raise rents to maximum allowable 
with open violations; rental write-offs;  
City administration pro-actively inspects, monitors, 
and enforces all provisions; criminal proceedings 
against landlords for certain code violations and 
harassment. 
Community 
Control 
Passive 
 
Rent Control Board dominated by 
appointments and representatives 
of real estate interests; Landlords 
put on record the base rent at time 
of purchase only; onus on tenants 
to petition erroneous rent 
increases or code violations; little 
oversight on building demolition 
or conversions or MCI approval. 
Active 
 
Rent Control Board includes appointed and elected 
tenant union/organizational representatives, tenants, 
and landlord representatives;  
Tenant rights included in all lease agreements;  
Free representation for tenant petitions;  
Landlords file base rent and rent increase 
information with administration every year and with 
every vacancy; Revenue produced through 
registration fees plus real estate transfer tax, other 
tax, not only rental registration (re: resources and 
economy of scale);  
Major Capital Improvement (not code violation 
related) must be approved by majority of buildings’ 
tenants;  
Rent board review of demolition or conversion 
permits;  
Rent board can decrease rent increase percentage 
each year based on their own discretion to maintain 
affordability. 
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Rent control ordinances approved by popular 
referendum (California) to not allow for regulatory 
changes at the whim of city officials. 
Research to Evaluate Real Estate Holdings 
 
An essential research agenda going forward to extend this case study would 
include a housing security evaluation of CalPERS residential real estate investments 
originated over the last ten years of the crisis and “post-crisis” crisis. Such an analysis 
would seek to recalibrate systemic risk measures to account for housing security. For 
example, considering the Right to the City Alliance’s tenet of control, securitization of 
mortgage or rent would imply the further removal of control from those who occupy and 
live in and produce the value of places that have become financial portfolios. 
Securitization developed by and for private interests, regardless of whether guaranteed by 
federal funds, invites global financial actors, and individual investors, to gamble on the 
risks of whether value can be extracted from the residents and producers of place for 
revenue payout in the case of rental securities or debt repayment in the case of mortgage 
backed securities.  
A research agenda to clarify the relationship of public pension funds to 
financialization and gentrification would take stock of pension investment in Residential 
and Commercial Mortgage Backed (RMB & CMB) securities and single-family rental 
(SFR) securities, as well as in the funds that spawned the latest innovation of the latter. 
Single family rental securities, a market invention to finance the creation of large scale 
portfolios from single family homes turned rentals, was in development in 2011 when 
Fannie Mae announced its plan to transfer huge pools of single family REOs to private 
equity funds (Moody’s Investors Service, 2014). Between 2011 and 2014, investors 
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purchased more than 200,000 single-family homes at more than $20 billion (Perlberg and 
Gittelsohn, 2014). The securitization of these portfolios began in 2014 based on the 
pooling of not only mortgages, but also rental payments. The general principal of the 
investment fund thereby spreads the risk to securities holders and originating investors; 
lenders in turn receive new cash infusion from the creation of the securities bond to 
purchase new assets and establish new funds. The rental income, not the borrower’s 
income becomes the basis for the loan, and thus a driver for increasing rent (See for 
example, Olick, 2016; Beswick, Alexandri, et. al., 2016; Edelman, 2014; Bond-Graham, 
2014).   
Ultimately, many of these portfolios may become transferred again into Real 
Estate Investment Funds (REIT) structures that would allow for new debt access if 
brought to the scale for a public offering (Colomer, 2013). These developments also 
signify the renter as embedded financial subjects; individual renters who are 401k 
investors could become direct stockholders of their own homes, securing investment 
returns in part through their own, and their neighbors’ and fellow workers’ rents. Most 
concerning, the model is based on high rents to formulate the mortgage debt ratio. 
Analysts are skeptical of the loan to value ratios of these pools given that appraisals are 
not necessary in the valuing of the assets (Yalamanchili, 2016:17). New political actors in 
housing policy such as private equity mortgage issuers may intervene in financing anti-
rent control campaigns if such proposed controls would cover these scattered site assets. 
Researchers and organizers can find which rental properties became securitized as 
rental securities and mortgage backed securities using the same SEC inquiry methods to 
search trusts and pooling and service agreements that this study employed to find that the 
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largest loans of the Page Mill portfolio did not in fact become securitized (See Chapter 
5). Tenants Together found 1,786 rental homes in the state that were included in a 
Blackstone securitization package (Inglis, u.d.). A closer look at the SEC findings can 
detail the purchasers of these securities, such as institutional investors like CalPERS. 
Through an expansive search and comparative study, strategic researchers can look at 
whether and how tenant affordability and maintenance conditions for securitized rental 
homes versus nonsecuritized rentals differ (Ibid.).  
Examples of additional pension fund investments in rent regulated multifamily 
housing should be added to research agendas. One such investment was $250 million in 
2012 by the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association College Retirement Equities 
Fund (TIAA-CREF) at 8 Spruce Street in Manhattan. The exemplary 2016 case remains 
the largest purchase by Blackstone Group to-date: Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper 
Village. Forty-percent of this $5.3 billion dollar deal was backed by Canadian pension 
fund investments managed by the Quebec-based real estate firm Ivanhoe Cambridge.  
The city negotiations of the deal ensured 5,000 of the original 11,000 units that were 
(nearly all) rent stabilized in 2000, would remain stabilized or relatively affordable for 20 
years from the 2015 purchase. These terms all but give up on long-term affordability for 
this massive real estate holding.  
CalPERS presents a key subject for public pension fund research because it is the 
largest public pension fund in the U.S. and as such often sets policy precedents for other 
funds. Also, CalPERS abides by relatively stronger California public transparency 
provisions, and has a legacy of shareholder activism and social responsibility policy. For 
one, in 2010 CalPERS and CalSTERS in suit established a commitment to ban 
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investment in predatory real estate across its funds, a direct outcome of the East Palo Alto 
organizing efforts.  
Another component of an elaborated research agenda would further clarify the 
terms and enforcement of this 2010 commitment. Since few prospectuses make explicit 
strategies to subvert existing rent control laws (illegally or otherwise), or demolish the 
housing stock, CalPERS must develop a standard measure of predatory-ability based on 
debt ratios, net operating income, and development fees, to determine whether investment 
returns rely on future rent increases and, or, displacement. This would be akin to the 
criteria of New York City council’s proposal of a “predatory equity” watch list.  
A related area of strategic research would be to identify CalPERS and unions 
pension contributor households throughout the CalPERS California real estate portfolios. 
Unions in turn should use strategic research to identify the real estate holdings of 
corporate targets, identify union household members of those holdings, as well as identify 
pension investment dollars and pension contributors households linked to those holdings 
or securities of those holdings. Strategic researchers might take the lead of journalists 
following the money behind Blackstone real estate investment funds. Based on a review 
of annual pension reports, more than 30 local and state public pensions were found to 
have invested $3.2 billion in the single-family foreclosure to rental portfolios of Black 
Stone Real Estate Investments VII (Burns, 2015).  
 
Research for Transfer and Conversion Programs 
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Moreover, additional research is needed to identify and evaluate transfer and 
funding mechanisms for converting large portfolios of private housing to social housing. 
Once a mechanism becomes established for municipalities, or the federal government, to 
seize corporate and bank-held housing via eminent domain of foreclosed assets, 
criminalization of predatory rental exploitation, or deferred maintenance, the housing 
should be converted to social housing.  Research is needed to identify the number of 
potential corporate portfolios that should be targeted to remove from the speculative 
market, and the details of the remaining 72,783 (4Q 2015) Real Estate Owned (REO) 
properties (foreclosed properties) held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that could be 
transferred from the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) for social housing 
conversion (Federal Housing Finance Administration, 2016:3).  
The federal government transferred much of Fannie Mae REO’s most optimal 
bulk holdings directly to corporate bidders in monopoly sales. This additional transfer of 
wealth from the a quasi state entity to corporate interests, involving loans paid at below 
the dollar, accelerated the current terms of rental financialization, including through the 
invention of rental securities. An alternative response by the federal government to 
foreclosures would have secured a transfer and restructuring of the REO mortgages, and 
allowed for the conversion of the housing stock to community-controlled social housing.  
Additional research is needed to identify areas to strengthen and reintroduce the 
National Tenant Protection and Private Rental Housing Conversion Act (HR 4727, 1987-
1988) with federal funds (see for example Black Lives Matter 2016 reparations and 
redistribution platform). Research should look to existing and past models of third party 
transfer intermediaries, such as in the case of the Division of Alternative Management 
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(DAMP) and Housing Development Finance Corporation (HDFC) structures in New 
York City to understand the potentials and pitfalls of transfer structures, as well as the 
finance and governing structures of a variety of social housing forms. In the fall 2016 
session, city council introduced a legislative seeks to expand the HPD third-party 
preservationist transfer programs for distressed buildings owned by predatory equity 
(overleveraged portfolio-based) landlords.  Researchers can look to these models to 
consider economies of scale, and evaluate existing and envisioned programs through the 
tenets of housing security. 
 
Final Note 
 
 This dissertation demonstrated one case through which financial actors attempted 
to displace the poor by using the municipal, state, and California public workers’ own 
capital. The case also demonstrated how the threat of this corporate landlord backed by 
the nation’s largest pension fund catalyzed intergenerational and Black, Brown, citizen, 
immigrant, and allied organizing from their buildings and unions to city hall to pension 
fund board meetings to the state assembly, and to the streets. This presence of people 
collectively organizing led to greater renter voice in the city as demonstrated by a popular 
referendum that strengthened rent control and eviction protections there. The city did not 
manage the renters’ discontent into hesitant consent or disappearence by displacement, 
but instead took action through the local referendum, city zoning policy, the rent board, 
legal suits, and before CalPERS and the state assembly. 
The most well researched reports, pithy tweets, and Facebook posts echoing our 
despair are but a simulacrum of struggle. There is no strategic research on corporate 
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entities that can win fights against capital, only engaged struggle by people most affected 
by the historical development of today’s present can win the non-reformist reforms and 
dream the visions beyond them. When in a period in which little federal intervention to 
preserve affordability or convert bank holdings to social housing seems plausible, states, 
the city, and community control are the first lines of defense and strategy for housing 
affordability. A right to the city as call and as demand against gentrification in the U.S. at 
the urban intersection of people, land and housing is an outcome of and response to the 
cojoining of anti-racism and class struggle. By definition this call must be a practice of 
tactics and strategy congruent with the aims of collectivized, socially sustained futures 
envisioned and realized by the leadership of people whose very “right to place” has been 
historically targeted through extractive disposession. 
 
 
275	
Bibliography 
 
 
Aalbers, M. B., & Christophers, B. (2014). Centering housing in political economy. 
Housing, Theory and Society, 31(4), 373-394.  
Aalbers, M. (2015). Corporate financialization. The International Encyclopedia of 
Geography: People, the Earth, Environment, and Technology.Oxford: Wiley,  
Alinsky, S. D. (1971). Rules for radicals: A pragmatic primer for realistic radicals New 
York: Random House.  
Ambachtsheer, K. (2012). The dysfunctional'DB vs. DC'pensions debate: Why and how 
to move beyond it. Rotman International Journal of Pension Management, 5(2)  
Ambachtsheer, K. (2012). Pension funds shaping the future of capitalism. Rotman 
Management, Business Source Complete, 85-88.  
Ammiano, T. Socially Responsible Investment Bill, AB 2337, Senate Public Employment 
& Retirement Committee Cong. (2010).  
Anderson, D. M. (2014). Introduction. Leveraging (pp. 3-34) Springer.  
Anderson, J. (2010). Pension funds fail to reap rewards in private equity  
Angotti, T. (1977). The housing question: Engels and after. Monthly Review, 29(5), 39-
51.  
Angus McDonald & Associates.,San Mateo Local Agency Formation Commission.,. 
(1981). Spheres of influence for East Palo Alto. Berkeley, Calif.: Angus McDonald 
& Associates.  
Anson, M. (2011). The evolution of equity mandates in institutional portfolios. Journal of 
Portfolio Management, 37(4), 127.  
 
276	
Anti Eviction Mapping Project. (2015). from 
antievictionmappingproject.net/wallstreet.html  
Aoki, K. (1998). No right to own: The early twentieth-century alien land laws as a 
prelude to internment. BC Third World LJ, 19, 37.  
Appelbaum, E., & Batt, R. (2012). A primer on private equity at work: Management, 
employment, and sustainability. Challenge, 55(5), 5-38.  
Appelbaum, E., & Batt, R. (2014). Private equity at work: When wall street manages 
main street Russell Sage Foundation.  
Appelbaum, R. P., & Gilderbloom, J. I. (1990). The redistributional impact of modern 
rent control. Environment and Planning A, 22(5), 601-614.  
Aptheker, B. (1999). The morning breaks: The trial of Angela Davis. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press.  
Armento, V. (December 18, 2008). to Shore J., Letter from the city of East Palo Alto to 
Page Mill Properties  
Arrighi, G. (1994). The long twentieth century: Money, power, and the origins of our 
times Verso.  
Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development (ANHD). (2009). Predatory 
equity: Evolution of a crisis. the threat to New York’s affordable rental housing, 
2005–2009 (November). New York, New York:  
August, M. (2014). Challenging the rhetoric of stigmatization: The benefits of 
concentrated poverty in Toronto's regent park. Environment and Planning A, 46(6), 
1317-1333.  
 
277	
Batchelder, L. (1994). The incorporation movement of East Palo Alto: Renegotiating the 
boundaries of community organizing theory. Unpublished, Stanford University, Palo 
Alto, CA.  
Battalio, R., & Schultz, P. (2011). Regulatory uncertainty and market liquidity: The 2008 
short sale ban's impact on equity option markets. The Journal of Finance, 66(6), 
2013-2053.  
Benmelech, E., & Dlugosz, J. (2010). The credit rating crisis. NBER macroeconomics 
annual 2009, volume 24 (pp. 161-207) University of Chicago Press.  
Bernstein, A. (2008). Incorporating labor and human rights risk into investment 
decisions. Harvard Labor and Worklife Program, Occasional Paper Series, (2)  
Bernstein-Wax, J. (2009, August 31). Page mill properties could lose ownership over 
East Palo Alto properties. Daily News,  
Bernstein-Wax, J. (2009, May 13). Tenant group: East Palo Alto landlord evicting many 
residents. Mercury News,  
Bernstein-Wax, J. (2010, April 21). E. Palo Alto residents head to state capital for pro-
tenant bill. The Mercury News,  
Beswick, J., Alexandri, G., Byrne, M., Vives-Miró, S., Fields, D., Hodkinson, S., et al. 
(2016). Speculating on London's housing future: The rise of global corporate 
landlords in ‘post-crisis’ urban landscapes. City, 20(2), 321-341.  
Bevington, D., & Dixon, C. (2005). Movement-relevant theory: Rethinking social 
movement scholarship and activism. Social Movement Studies, 4(3), 185-208.  
Bhatti, S., & Lerner, S. (2016, August 10). Labor must take on capital. Portside,  
 
278	
Binder & Malter, L. (October 20, 2009). to Taran D., Shore J. Correspondence. Old York 
Chapter 11. Palo Alto, CA.  
Black, L. K., Chu, C. S., Cohen, A., & Nichols, J. B. (2012). Differences across 
originators in CMBS loan underwriting. Journal of Financial Services Research, 
42(1-2), 115-134.  
Black Lives Matter. Platform. The Movement for Black Lives from 
https://policy.m4bl.org/platform/ 
Blomquist, D. (January 10, 2010). RealtyTrac® year-end report shows record 2.8 million 
U.S. properties with foreclosure filings in 2009 (Media ReleaseRealtyTrac).  
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. (undated). Mortgage debt 
outstanding statistical supplement, historical data U.S. Federal Reserve.  
Bodie, M. T. (2008). Mother Jones meets Gordon Gekko: The complicated relationship 
between labor and private equity. U.Colo.L.Rev., 79, 1317.  
Bond-Graham, D. (2014). The rise of the new landlords. East Bay Express,  
Bond-Graham, D., & Liu, Y. Y. (2012). Communities of color organize against urban 
land grabs. Race, Poverty & the Environment, 19(1-2012)  
Bonilla-Silva, E. (2006). Racism without racists: Color-blind racism and the persistence 
of racial inequality in the United States. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.  
Botein, H. (2007). Labor unions and affordable housing an uneasy relationship. Urban 
Affairs Review, 42(6), 799-822.  
Bowling, M. (2012). Palo alto remembered. Palo Alto, CA: Palo Alto Historical 
Association.  
 
279	
Boyd, R. L. (1994). The allocation of Black workers into the public sector. Sociological 
Focus, 27(1), 35-51.  
Brady, M., & Romano, A. (2009). Transformative reforms. Unpublished report.  
Bratt, R. G., Stone, M. E., & Hartman, C. W. (2006). A right to housing: Foundation for 
a new social agenda. Temple University Press.  
Bratton, W. W., & Wachter, M. L. (2010). The case against shareholder empowerment. 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, , 653-728.  
Brenner, N. (2000). The urban question: Reflections on Henri Lefebvre, urban theory and 
the politics of scale. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24(2), 
361-378.  
Brenner, N. (2009). What is critical urban theory? City, 13(2-3), 198-207.  
Brenner, N., Marcuse, P., & Mayer, M. (2011). Cities for people, not for profit. 
Routledge.  
Brenner, N., & Theodore, N. (2002). Cities and the geographies of “actually existing 
neoliberalism”. Antipode, 34(3), 349-379.  
Brescia, R. H. (August 19, 2010). The cost of inequality: Social distance, predatory 
conduct, and the financial crisis. NYU Annual Survey of American Law, 66  
Brodkin, K. (1998). How Jews became white folks and what that says about race in 
America Rutgers University Press.  
Bronfenbrenner, K. (1998). Organizing to win: New research on union strategies Cornell 
University Press.  
Bronfenbrenner, K. (2007). Global unions: Challenging transnational capital through 
cross-border campaigns Cornell University Press.  
 
280	
Bronfenbrenner, K., & Juravich, T. (2001). The evolution of strategic and coordinated 
bargaining campaigns in the 1990s. Rekindling the Movement: Labor’s Quest for 
Relevance in the 21 St Century,  
Brooks, C. (2009). Alien neighbors, foreign friends: Asian Americans, housing, and the 
transformation of urban California University of Chicago Press.  
Brown, W. (2003.). “Neoliberalism and the end of liberal democracy”. Theory and Event, 
7(1), 1-21.  
Business Editors. (2002, November 12). Divco West raises $255 million in equity for real 
estate fund; Page Mill Properties, L.P. targets office, industrial assets in Silicon 
Valley and other technology dominant markets. Business Wire,  
California Public Employees Retirement System. (2002). Annual report. Sacramento, 
CA: CalPERS.  
California Public Employees Retirement System. (2003). Annual report. Sacramento, 
CA: CalPERS.  
California Public Employees Retirement System. (2004). Annual report. Sacramento, 
CA: CalPERS.  
California Public Employees Retirement System. (2005). Annual report. Sacramento, 
CA: CalPERS.  
California Public Employees Retirement System. (2006). Annual report. Sacramento, 
CA: CalPERS.  
California Public Employees Retirement System. (2007). Annual report. Sacramento, 
CA: CalPERS.  
 
281	
California Public Employees Retirement System. (2008). Annual report. Sacramento, 
CA: CalPERS.  
California Public Employees Retirement System. (2009). Annual report. Sacramento, 
CA: CalPERS.  
California Public Employees Retirement System. (2010). Annual report. Sacramento, 
CA: CalPERS.  
California Public Employees Retirement System. (2011). Annual report. Sacramento, 
CA: CalPERS.  
California Public Employees Retirement System. (2012). Annual report. Sacramento, 
CA: CalPERS.  
California Public Employees Retirement System. (April 27, 2006). CalPERS backs UN 
principles for responsible investment. Sacramento, CA: CalPERS Office of Public 
Affairs.  
California Public Employees Retirement System. (February 14, 2011). Real estate 
strategic plan. Sacramento, CA: CalPERS.  
California Public Employees Retirement System Global Real Estate Investments, Weir, 
L. (June 22, 2009). Page mill email correspondence.  
California Public Employees Retirement System Global Real Estate Investments, Weir, 
L. (2009). CalPERS Board of Administration Investment Committee, Memo to 
investment committee.  
California Public Employees Retirement System Real Estate Unit, & Weir, L. (February 
18, 2009). Kane S., CalPERS Board of Administration Investment Committee, 
Email correspondence. 
 
282	
California Public Employees Retirement System Real Estate Unit, & Weir, L. (March 16, 
2009). to Page Mill Properties II GP LLC, Taran D., Correspondence. 
California Public Employees Retirement System, Investment Office Staff, & Real Estate 
Unit. (April 10, 2010). Real estate program review.   
California Public Employees Retirement System Board of Administration Investment 
Committee Open Session. (December 15, 2008). Brady M., State of California 
Public Records Act request, transcript of proceedings. Sacramento, CA: Peters 
Shorthand Recording Corporation.  
California Public Employees Retirement System Board of Administration Investment 
Committee Open Session. (April 22, 2009). Transcript. Sacramento, CA: Peters 
Shorthand Recording Corporation. 
California Public Employees Retirement System Board of Administration Investment 
Committee Open Session. (June 15, 2009). Transcript, open session. Sacramento, 
CA: CalPERS.  
California Public Employees Retirement System Global Real Estate Unit. (March 2, 
2010). Taran D., Shore J., Correspondence   
California Public Employees Retirement System Global Real Estate Unit, Schenkler, E. 
(2009). Ediopoulous T., California Public Employees Retirement System Real Estate 
Unit, Email correspondence  
California Public Employees Retirement System Global Real Estate Unit,  Weir, L. (May 
26, 2009). Shore J., Correspondence  
California Public Employees Retirement System Real Estate Unit. (April, 2009). Page 
Mill Properties II GP LLC, Correspondence  
 
283	
Camarillo, A. M. (2007). Cities of color: The new racial frontier in California's minority-
majority cities. Pacific Historical Review, 76(1), 1-28.  
Camp, J. T. (2012). Blues geographies and the security turn: Interpreting the housing 
crisis in Los Angeles. American Quarterly, 64(3), 543-570.  
Čapek, S. M., & Gilderbloom, J. I. (1992). Community versus commodity: Tenants and 
the American city SUNY Press.  
Castells, M. (2000). Toward a sociology of the network society. Contemporary 
Sociology, 29(5), 693-699.  
Castells, M. (2002). “The urban ideology”. In I. Susser (Ed.), The castells reader on 
cities and social theory (pp. 35). Malden, MASS: Blackwell.  
Cavanagh, E., & Veracini, L. (2016). The Routledge handbook of the history of settler 
colonialism Routledge.  
Chakravartty, P., & Ferreira da Silva, D. (2012). Accumulation, dispossession, and debt: 
The racial logic of global Capitalism—An introduction. American Quarterly, 64(3), 
361.  
Chamber of Commerce. (1921, January 15). A proposal. Palo Alto Times.  
Charette, A., Herbert, C., Jakabovics, A., Tracy, E., & McCue, D. T. (2015). Projecting 
trends in severely cost-burdened renters: 2015–2025. Cambridge, MA: Publication 
of the Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University.  
Christie, J., Henderson, P., & Ablan, J. (2009). Laying on bets at America’s biggest 
pension fund.  
City of East Palo Alto Rent Stabilization Board, (2008). Decision: Case no. 08.01-08.18 
January 4.  
 
284	
City of East Palo Alto. (2012). Ordinance No. 379.  
City of East Palo Alto. (2013). Existing conditions report update to the general plan. East 
Palo Alto, CA. 
City of East Palo Alto. (2014). Municipal Code Ordinance no. 374, May 6.  
City of East Palo Alto. Resolution Against CalPERS Investment in Page Mill, (December 
15, 2008).  
City of East Palo Alto. Special city council meeting: Transcript, City Council City of East 
Palo Alto (January 3, 2008).  
City of East Palo Alto Office of the City Attorney. (2009). Report on tenant petitions  
Clark, G. L., & Hebb, T. (2004). Pension fund corporate engagement: The fifth stage of 
capitalism. Relations industrielles/industrial Relations, , 142-171.  
Clark, G. L., Roger. (2010). Innovative models of pension fund governance in the context 
of the global financial crisis. Pensions: An International Journal, 15(1), 62-77.  
Clawson, D. (2003). The next upsurge: Labor and the new social movements Cornell 
University Press.  
Cloward, R. A., & Piven, F. F. (1974). The politics of turmoil: Essays on poverty, race, 
and the urban crisis Pantheon.  
Coates, T. (2015). The Case for Reparations. The Atlantic, June.  
Coffee Jr, J. C. (2011). Systemic risk after Dodd-Frank: Contingent capital and the need 
for regulatory strategies beyond oversight. Columbia Law Review, 795-847.  
Collinson, R. (2011). Rental housing affordability dynamics, 1990—2009. Cityscape, 71-
103.  
 
285	
Colomer, N. (2013, February 4,). REO to rental: Closer, but no securitization. Asset 
Securitization Report,  
Colton, K. (2002). Housing finance in the united states: The transformation of the U.S. 
housing finance system. Cambridge, MA: Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard 
University.  
Cont, R., & Wagalath, L. (2016). Institutional investors and the dependence structure of 
asset returns. International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance, 19(02), 
1650010.  
Corkery, M. (2009, October 24). MacFarlane resigns as adviser to Calpers. Wall Street 
Journal,  
Corkery, M., & Karmin, C. (2008, May 1). Calpers takes hit on land deal . Wall Street 
Journal,  
Corkery, M., Karmin, C., Rundle, R. L., & Lublin, J. S. (2008, December 17). Risky, ill-
timed land deals hit Calpers - WSJ. Wall Street Journal,  
Cruz, & Hyland, S. (2006, September-October). Letter to the editor. East Palo Alto 
Today, pp. 23.  
Culver, L. W. (1982). The politics of suburban distress. JUAF Journal of Urban Affairs, 
4(1), 1-18.  
Cumming, D., & Walz, U. (2010). Private equity returns and disclosure around the world. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 41(4), 727-754.  
Damodaran, A. (January 16, 2016). Annual returns on stock, T.bonds and T.bills: 1928 - 
current. Retrieved January, 2015, from 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/histretSP.html  
 
286	
Davies, T., Sywulka, B., Saffold, R., & Jhaveri, R. (2002). Community democracy 
online: A preliminary report from East Palo Alto. American Political Science 
Association (APSA) Annual Meeting,  
Dávila, A. M. (2004). Barrio dreams: Puerto ricans, latinos, and the neoliberal city Univ 
of California Press.  
Davis, J. E. (2010). The community land trust reader Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.  
De Certeau, M. (1984). The practice of everyday life. Berkeley: University of California 
Press.  
De Genova, N. (2007). The production of culprits: From deportability to detainability in 
the aftermath of “homeland security”. Citizenship Studies, 11(5), 421-448.  
de Oliver, M. (2015). Gentrification as the appropriation of therapeutic 'diversity: A 
model and case study of the multicultural amenity of contemporary urban renewal. 
Urban Studies, 53(6), 1299-1316.  
Dean, J. P. (1947). Only caucasian: A study of race covenants. The Journal of Land & 
Public Utility Economics, 23(4), 428-432.  
DeFilippis, J., & Saegert, S. (2013). The community development reader. Routledge.  
Delgado, G. (1994). Beyond the politics of place: New directions in community 
organizing in the 1990s Applied Research Center.  
Desmond, M. (2016). Evicted: Poverty and profit in the American city. Crown 
Publishers.  
Dewan, S. (January 11, 2014). Eminent domain: A long shot against blight, maybe not. 
New York Times. 
 
287	
Dickerson, A. M. (2009). Over-indebtedness, the subprime mortgage crisis, and the effect 
on US cities. Fordham Urb.LJ, 36, 395.  
DiPasquale, D., & Cummings, J. L. (1992). Financing multifamily rental housing: The 
changing role of lenders and investors. Housing Policy Debate, 3(1), 77-116.  
Divco West. Retrieved June 10, 2014, from www.divcowest.com  
Domhoff, G. W. (2010). Pension fund capitalism or Wall Street bonanza? Who Rules 
America.Net. 
Domingo, C. (2011, October 3,). East Palo Alto families are not for sale. Message posted 
to www.siliconvalleydebug.org/articles/2011/10/03/east-palo-alto-families-are-not-
sale  
Domingo, C., & Nguyen, V. (2009). Youth group shuts down toxic waste facility. Race, 
Poverty & the Environment, 16(2), 50-51.  
Dotson, O. F., & Merriweather, L. R. (2013). Physical places and ideological spaces: 
Fourth world theory and the abandonment of cities. Spaces & Flows: An 
International Journal of Urban & Extra Urban Studies, 3(3)  
Dreeman, S. (2015, April 13,). East Palo Alto residents march against displacement. Palo 
Alto Online,  
Dreier, P. (1982). The status of tenants in the United States. Social Problems, 30(2), 179-
198.  
Dreier, P. (1997). The new politics of housing: How to rebuild the constituency for a 
progressive federal housing policy. Journal of the American Planning Association, 
63(1), 5-27.  
 
288	
Dreier, P. (2000). Labor's love lost? rebuilding unions’ involvement in federal housing 
policy. Housing Policy Debate, 11(2), 327-392.  
Dreier, P. (1999). The politics of rent control in California and Massachusetts. Research 
in Politics and Society, 7, 207-250.  
Drucker, P. F. (1976). Pension fund socialism. The Public Interest, (42), 3.  
Duménil, G., & Lévy, D. (2011). The crisis in neoliberalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Press.  
East of Eden : [East Palo Alto].(1993). Housing and Development Report., 6(4)  
East Palo Alto (Calif.), Cotton/Beland/Associates.,Dinwiddie & Associates.,. (1999). City 
of East Palo Alto general plan. [East Palo Alto, Calif.]: [The City].  
East Palo Alto (Calif.)., Planning Commission,. (1986). The general plan for the city of 
East Palo Alto, California : Adopted december 1986 : A comprehensive revision of 
the 1982 community plan & EIR. [East Palo Alto, CA]: The Commission.  
East Palo Alto (Calif.).,Planning Department.,. (1990). City of East Palo Alto general 
plan. East Palo Alto, CA: The Dept.  
East Palo Alto Day School.,Mothers for Equal Education.,. (1970). Day school, E.P.A.,. 
East Palo Alto, Calif.: M.E.E. Bookstore.  
East Palo Alto Council of Tenants (EPACT). (2006, September-October). Letter to the 
editor. East Palo Alto Today. 
East Palo Alto Historical and Agricultural Society. (1997). Weeks neighborhood plan. 
East Palo Alto, CA: East Palo Alto Historical and Agricultural Society.  
The East Palo Alto municipal council: A voice out of the future. (1968).  
 
289	
East Palo Alto Redevelopment Agency.,. (1994). East Palo Alto redevelopment agency 
component unit financial statements : For the fiscal year ended ... East Palo Alto 
Redevelopment Agency Component Unit Financial Statements : For the Fiscal Year 
Ended . 
East Palo Alto-East Menlo Park 701 Project., Housing Committee.,Collaborative for 
Environmental Research and Design, Inc.,. (1971). East Palo Alto-East Menlo Park : 
701 comprehensive planning program : Phase I, housing component study. [East 
Palo Alto]: [Housing Committee of the East Palo Alto-East Menlo Park 701 Project].  
Edelman, S., Gordon, J., & Sanchez, D. (2014). When wall street buys main street. 
Center for American Progress. Retrieved from 
Http://www.Americanprogress.org/issues/housing/report/2014/02/27/84750/when-
Wall-Street-Buys-Main-Street-2,  
Eichler, N. (1982). The merchant builders. MIT Press.  
Ekers, M., Hamel, P., & Keil, R. (2012). Governing suburbia: Modalities and 
mechanisms of suburban governance Regional Studies, 46(3), 405.  
Elam, H., & Fowler, K. (2001). Dreams of a city: The East Palo Alto project. Performing 
Democracy: International Perspectives on Urban Community-Based Performance, 
197-212.  
Eliopoulos, T., & California Public Employees Retirement System. (February 14, 2011). 
CalPERS real estate unit strategic plan.  
Eliopoulos, T., CalPERS. (January 13, 2010). Investment committee confidential 
memorandum,  
 
290	
Engelen, E., Konings, M., & Fernandez, R. (2010). Geographies of financialization in 
disarray: The Dutch case in comparative perspective. Economic Geography, 86(1), 
53-73.  
Engels, F. (1935). Edition. The housing question.  
Englander, E., & Kaufman, A. (2004). The end of managerial ideology: From corporate 
social responsibility to corporate social indifference. Enterprise & Society, 5(3), 
404-450.  
Epstein, G. A. (2005). Financialization and the world economy Edward Elgar Publishing.  
Executive Office of the President Council of Economic Advisors. (2010). The Executive 
Office of the White House 
Fainstein, S., Gordon, I., & Harloe, M. (1992). Divided cities. Cambridge, Balckwell,  
Fair Rent Coalition. (April 20, 2009).  Placencia J. Email correspondence  
Fair Rent Coalition. (February 11, 2009). McKinley C. Email correspondence  
Fair Rent Coalition. (February 2, 2009). Weir L., Email correspondence  
Fair Rent Coalition. (February 4, 2009). Weir L., Email correspondence  
Fair Rent Coalition. (January 30, 2009). Weir L., Email correspondence.  
Fair Rent Coalition. (September 12, 2009). San Mateo County Local Agency Formation 
Commission., Email correspondence. 
Fanon, F. (1961). 2001. The Wretched of the Earth. Penguin. 
Fantasia, R. (1988). Cultures of solidarity: Consciousness. Action, and Contemporary 
American Workers (Berkeley 1988), 228-233.  
Federal Properties Managers' Report, & Federal Housing Finance Agency. (2015). 
Fourth quarter reportFederal Housing Finance Agency.  
 
291	
Feinstein, S., Hu, G., Marcus, M., & Ali, Z. (2013). Underestimation of securities fraud 
aggregate damages due to inter-fund trades. Journal of Forensic Economics, 24(2), 
161-173.  
Fernandes, S. (2010). Who can stop the drums?: Urban social movements in Chávez’s 
venezuela Duke University Press.  
Fields, D. (2015). Contesting the financialization of urban space: Community-based 
organizations and the struggle to preserve affordable rental housing in new york city. 
Journal of Urban Affairs, 37(2)  
Fields, D., & and Uffer, S. (2016). The financialization of rental housing: A comparative 
analysis of new york city and berlin. Urban Studies, 53(7), 1486.  
Fine, J. (2005). Worker centers: Organizing communities at the edge of the dream. NYL 
Sch.L.Rev., 50, 417.  
Fine, J. R. (2011). New forms to settle old scores: Updating the worker centre story in the 
united states. Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations, , 604-630.  
Fine, J., & Gordon, J. (2010). Strengthening labor standards enforcement through 
partnerships with workers’ organizations. Politics & Society, 38(4), 552-585.  
First Amendment Coalition. (January 10, 2010). Press release. From 
www.firstamendmentcoalition.org  
Fisher, R. (1994). Let the people decide: Neighborhood organizing in America Twayne 
Pub.  
Fisher, R., & DeFilippis, J. (2015). Community organizing in the United States. 
Community Development Journal, 50(3), 363-379.  
Foucault, M. (2007). Security, territory, population Springer.  
 
292	
Foucault, M. (1994). “Governmentality,” in In G. Burchell (Ed.), The Foucault effect (pp. 
87). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Fox Piven, F., & Cloward, R. A. (1971). Regulating the poor: The functions of public 
welfare. New York: Vintage,  
Freeman, J. B. (2001). Working-class New York: Life and labor since world war II The 
New Press.  
Freemont, M. (September 22, 2011).  Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
Correspondence  
French, S., Leyshon, A., & Wainwright, T. (2011). Financializing space, spacing 
financialization. Progress in Human Geography, 35(6), 798-819.  
Freund, D. M. (2010). Colored property: State policy and white racial politics in 
suburban America University of Chicago Press.  
Fullilove, M. (2009). Root shock: How tearing up city neighborhoods hurts America, and 
what we can do about it One World/Ballantine.  
Fullilove, M. T. (2001). Root shock: The consequences of African American 
dispossession. Journal of Urban Health, 78(1), 72-80.  
Fullilove, M. T., & Wallace, R. (2011). Serial forced displacement in American cities, 
1916–2010. Journal of Urban Health, 88(3), 381-389.  
Fung, A. (2003). Countervailing power in empowered participatory governance archon 
fung and erik olin wright. Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in 
Empowered Participatory Governance, 4, 259.  
Fung, A., Hebb, T., & Rogers, J. (2001). Working capital: The power of labor's pensions 
Cornell University Press.  
 
293	
Gamson, W. A. (1968). Power and discontent Dorsey Press.  
Ganz, M. (2009). Why David sometimes wins: Leadership, organization, and strategy in 
the California farm worker movement Oxford University Press.  
Gaventa, J. (2006). Finding the spaces for change: A power analysis. IDS Bulletin, 37(6), 
23-33.  
Gelter, M. (2013). The pension system and the rise of shareholder primacy. Seton Hall 
Law Review, 43(3)  
Geronimus, A. T., & Thompson, J. P. (2004). To denigrate, ignore, or disrupt: Racial 
inequality in health and the impact of a policy-induced breakdown of African 
American communities. Du Bois Review, 1(02), 247-279.  
Gilderbloom, J. I. (1989). Socioeconomic influences on rentals for US urban housing: 
Assumptions of open access to a perfectly competitive 'free market'are confronted 
with the facts. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 273-292.  
Gilderbloom, J. I., & Markham, J. P. (1996). Moderate rent control: Sixty cities over 20 
years. Journal of Urban Affairs, 18(4), 409-430.  
Gilmore, R. W. (1993). Public enemies and private intellectuals: Apartheid USA. Race & 
Class, 35(1), 69-78.  
Gilmore, R. W. (2008). Forgotten places and the seeds of grassroots planning. in 
engaging contradictions: Theory, politics, and methods of activist scholarship. ed. 
Charles Hale. GAIA Books, 6  
Gilmore, R. W. (2007). Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in 
Globalizing California. University of California Press. 
 
294	
Gilson, R. J., & Gordon, J. N. (2013). The agency costs of agency capitalism: Activist 
investors and the revaluation of governance rights. Columbia Law Review, 863-927.  
Glass, R. L. (1964). London: Aspects of change MacGibbon & Kee.  
Gledhill, J. (2004). Neoliberalism. A Companion to the Anthropology of Politics, , 332-
348.  
Goodwin, J., & Jasper, J. M. (1999). Caught in a winding, snarling vine: The structural 
bias of political process theory. Sociological Forum, , 14. (1) pp. 27-54.  
Gotham, K. F. (2000). Racialization and the state: The housing act of 1934 and the 
creation of the federal housing administration. Sociological Perspectives, 43(2), 291-
317.  
Gotham, K. F. (2002). Race, real estate, and uneven development: The kansas city 
experience, 1900-2000 SUNY Press.  
Gotham, K. F. (2009). Creating liquidity out of spatial fixity: The secondary circuit of 
capital and the subprime mortgage crisis. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research, 33(2), 355-371.  
Graeber, D. (2014). Debt-updated and expanded: The first 5,000 years Melville House.  
Graeber, D. (2011). Debt Melville House.  
Gray, T. R. The developing role of international non-state actors in the market for 
corporate governance: The case of the UN principles of responsible investment (UN 
PRI).  
Griffith, C. (2008). In City of East Palo Alto (Ed.), Letter to the city of East Palo Alto, 
January 3.  
 
295	
Grissom, J. A., & Keiser, L. R. (2011). A supervisor like me: Race, representation, and 
the satisfaction and turnover decisions of public sector employees. Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management, 30(3), 557-580.  
Hackworth, J. (2007). The neoliberal city: Governance, ideology, and development in 
American urbanism Cornell University Press.  
Hackworth, J., & Smith, N. (2001). The changing state of gentrification. Tijdschrift Voor 
Economische En Sociale Geografie, 92(4), 464-477.  
Hagerman, L. A., Clark, G. L., & Hebb, T. (2007). Investment intermediaries in 
economic development: Linking pension funds to urban revitalization. Labor and 
Worklife Program/Hagerman L., Clark G., Harvard Law School 2007–
Http://www.Frbsf.org/publications/community/review/062007/hagerman.Pdf,  
Hagermann, L., Clark, G. L., & Hebb, T. (2005). Pension Funds and Urban 
Revitalization, New York Case Study: Competitive Returns and a Revitalized New 
York,  
Hall, S. (1980). Sociological theories: Race and colonialism. Sociological Theories: Race 
and Colonialism  
Hall, S. (1996). Race, articulation, and societies structured in dominance. Black British 
Cultural Studies: A Reader, 16-60.  
Han, H. (2014). How organizations develop activists: Civic associations and leadership 
in the 21st century Oxford University Press, USA.  
Harris, C. I. (1993). Whiteness as property. Harvard Law Review, 106(8), 1707-1791.  
Harris, L. R., & Cespedes, S. (2015). Partner organization.  
 
296	
Hartman, C. (1979). Comment on “Neighborhood revitalization and displacement: A 
review of the evidence”. Journal of the American Planning Association, 45(4), 488-
491.  
Hartman, C. (1979). Displacement: A not so new problem. Social Policy, 9(5), 22-27.  
Hartman, C. (1984). Right to stay put, reprinted in: Between eminence and notoriety. 
New Brunswick.  
Harvey, D. (1978). The urban process under capitalism: A framework for analysis. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 2(1‐4), 101-131.  
Harvey, D. (1989). The urban experience JHU Press.  
Harvey, D. (2005). From globalization to the new imperialism. Critical Globalization 
Studies, , 91-100.  
Harvey, D. (2005). Spaces of neoliberalization: Towards a theory of uneven 
geographical development.  
Harvey, D. (2007). A brief history of neoliberalism Oxford University Press, USA.  
Harvey, D. (2007). Neoliberalism as creative destruction. The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 610(1), 21-44.  
Harvey, D. (2008). The right to the city. The City Reader, 6, 23-40.  
Harvey, D. (2005). The new imperialism Oxford University Press.  
Hebb, T. (2005). California case study A: Private equity CalPERS’ California initiative.  
Hebb, T. (2005). Pension funds and urban revitalization California case study B: Real 
estate CalPERS’California urban real estate initiative. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Law School Labor and Worklife Program. 
 
297	
Hebb, T. The economic inefficiency of secrecy. (2008). In T. Hebb (Ed.), (1st ed., pp. 37-
56) Cornell University Press.  
Hebb, T., & Beeferman, L. (2009). US pension funds’ labour-friendly investments. 
Journal of Comparative Social Welfare, 25(2), 109-117.  
Hebb, T., & Sharma, R. (2014). New finance for America's cities. Regional Studies, 
48(3), 485-500.  
Heintz, J., & Balakrishnan, R. (2012). Debt, power, and crisis: Social stratification and 
the inequitable governance of financial markets. American Quarterly, 64(3), 387-
409.  
Heller, J. (April 15, 2009). Calpers rule would limit evictions at investments. Wall Street 
Journal. 
Henry, B., Reese, J., & Torres, A. (2013). Wasted wealth. Alliance for a Just Society.  
Hernandez, J. (2009). The residual impact of history: Connecting residential segregation, 
mortgage, redlining, and the housing crisis. The Ohio State University: Kirwan 
Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity.  
Herod, A. (2001). Labor geographies: Workers and the landscapes of capitalism 
Guilford Press.  
Herod, A., & Wright, M. W. (2008). Geographies of power: Placing scale John Wiley & 
Sons.  
Heskin, A. D. (1983). Tenants and the American dream: Ideology and the tenant 
movement Praeger Publishers.  
Heskin, Allan, Levine, Ned,Garrett, Mark,. (2000). The effects of vacancy control. 
Journal of the American Planning Association, 66(2), 162-176.  
 
298	
Hirsch, P., & Morris, M. (2010). Immoral but not illegal: Monies vs mores amid the 
mortgage meltdown. Strategic Organization, 8(1), 69-74.  
Hoare, Q., & Smith, G. N. (2010). Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio 
Gramsci International Publishers.  
Hockett, D., McElwee, P., Palletiere, D., & Schwartz, D. (2005). The crisis in America's 
housing: Confronting myths and promoting a balanced housing policyCenter for 
Community Change; Center for Economic and Policy Research.  
Hogarth, P. (2009, May). Is East Palo Alto landlord paying bloggers to promote tenant 
displacement? Beyond Chronicle  
Holston, J. (2009). Insurgent citizenship in an era of global urban peripheries. City & 
Society, 21(2), 245-267.  
Immergluck, D. (2009). Core of the crisis: Deregulation, the global savings glut, and 
financial innovation in the subprime debacle. City & Community, 8(3), 341-345.  
Immergluck, D. (2009). Foreclosed. High-Risk Lending, Deregulation, and the 
Undermining of America's Mortgage Market.Ithaca, London,  
Immergluck, D. (2011). Foreclosed: High-risk lending, deregulation, and the 
undermining of America's mortgage market Cornell University Press.  
Immergluck, D. (2011). The local wreckage of global capital: The subprime crisis, 
federal policy and High‐Foreclosure neighborhoods in the US. International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 35(1), 130-146.  
Immergluck, D. (2010). Neighborhoods in the wake of the debacle: Intrametropolitan 
patterns of foreclosed properties. Urban Affairs Review, 46(1), 3-36.  
 
299	
Incite! Women of Color Against Violence. (2007). The revolution will not be funded: 
Beyond the non-profit industrial complex South End Press.  
Jackson, K. T. (1980). Race, ethnicity, and real estate appraisal:" the Home Owners Loan 
Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration". Journal of Urban History, 
6(4), 419.  
Jackson, K. T. (1985). Crabgrass frontier: The suburbanization of the united states 
Oxford University Press.  
Jasper, J. M. (2008). The art of moral protest: Culture, biography, and creativity in social 
movements University of Chicago Press.  
Jasper, J. M. (2008). Getting your way: Strategic dilemmas in the real world University 
of Chicago Press.  
Jayaraman, S., & Ness, I. (2005). The new urban immigrant workforce: Innovative 
models for labor organizing ME Sharpe.  
Jenkins, S. (2002). Organizing, advocacy, and member power. Working USA, 6(2), 56-89.  
Jensen, J. M. (1969). Apartheid: Pacific coast style. The Pacific Historical Review, , 335-
340.  
Joint Center for Housing Studies. (2009). Rental market stresses: Impacts of the great 
recession on affordability and multifamily lending. Cambridge, MA: Joint Center for 
Housing Studies, Harvard University.  
Joint Center for Housing Studies. (2011). America's rental housing: Meeting challenges, 
building on opportunities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.  
 
300	
Joint Center for Housing Studies. (2011a).  Rental market stresses: Impacts of the great 
recession on affordability and multifamily lending . Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University.  
Joint Center for Housing Studies. (2013). America's rental housing: Evolving markets 
and needs . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.  
Joint Center for Housing Studies. (2015). America's rental housing: Expanding options 
for diverse and growing demand. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.  
Juravich, T. (2007). Beating global capital: A framework and method for union strategic 
corporate research and campaigns. Global Unions: Challenging Transnational 
Capital through Cross-Border Campaigns, , 16-39.  
Juravich, T., & Bronfenbrenner, K. (1998). Preparing for the worst: Organizing and 
staying organized in the public sector.  
Kalleberg, A. L. (2015). Financialization, private equity, and employment relations in the 
united states. Work and Occupations, 0730888415570612.  
Katznelson, I. (1981). City trenches: Urban politics and the patterning of class in the 
united states University of Chicago Press.  
Kazak, D. (1995, Feb 22). How rent control works. Palo Alto Weekly,  
Kazak, D. (1999, Jan 20). East Palo Alto: Rent control eased in East Palo Alto state law 
removes cap on what new tenants pay. Palo Alto Weekly,  
Kelekian, J. (2008). James, A. D., Berkeley rent stabilization program peer review of city 
of East Palo Alto rent stabilization program. Berkeley, CA:  
Kenrick, C. (1996, July 17). Our town: Mrs. Wilks' journey. The Weekly,  
 
301	
Kim, C. J. (1999). The racial triangulation of Asian Americans. Politics and Society, 
27(1), 105-138.  
Klein, J. (2006). For all these rights: Business, labor, and the shaping of America's 
public-private welfare state Princeton University Press.  
Klein, N. (2007). The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism Macmillan.  
Krippner, G. R. (2011). Capitalizing on crisis Harvard University Press.  
Kuckes, D. (1992). The impacts of enacting the proposed ordinance to allow 
condominium conversions in East Palo Alto. Palo Alto Today 
Kusisto, L. (2015, July 28). U.S. homeownership rate hits 48-year low. Wall Street 
Journal - Eastern Edition 
Lamont, C. (2012). In Ron Davis, Interim City Manager (Ed.), Analysis of eviction 
actions by equity residential involving woodland park residents, 
January – June 2012 (July 20 ed.) City of East Palo Alto.  
Lamont, C. (March 17, 2014). Updated response to review. East Palo Alto, CA: City of 
East Palo Alto Rent Stabilization Board.  
Langhi, R., Bailey, B., McCook, M., & Anson, M. (2002). In Members of the Investment 
Committee, CalPERS (Ed.), CalPERS agenda item 4B, opportunistic investments. 
Sacramento, CA 
Langley, P. (2004). In the eye of the ‘perfect storm’: The final salary pensions crisis and 
financialisation of Anglo‐American capitalism. New Political Economy, 9(4), 539-
558.  
Lapavitsas, C. (2009). Financialised capitalism: Crisis and financial expropriation. 
Historical Materialism, 17(2), 114-148.  
 
302	
Lawson, R. (1986). The tenant movement in New York City, 1904-1984 Rutgers Univ Pr.  
Lee, T., & Page Mill Properties LLP. (2007). PMP II fund overview and summary of 
investments, july 24, 2007  
Lees, L., Slater, T., & Wyly, E. (2013). Gentrification Routledge.  
Lefebvre, H. (1970). La revolución urbana Alianza Editorial.  
Lefebvre, H., Kofman, E., & Lebas, E. (1996). Writings on cities. Cambridge, Mass, 
USA: Blackwell Publishers.  
Lembke, D. (1971, Aug 24, 1971). 1,200 switch voluntarily for racial balance. Los 
Angeles Times (1923-Current File), pp. A1.  
Lerner, S. (2010). An injury to all going beyond collective bargaining as we have known 
it. New Labor Forum, 19. (2) pp. 45-52.  
Levy, J. (2014). Accounting for profit and the history of capital. Critical Historical 
Studies, 1(2), 171-214.  
Levy, R. (2011). Housing data from the U.S. census bureau: What we collect, why we 
collect it, how to find it U.S. Census Bureau, Financial and Market Characteristics 
Branch Social, Economic and Housing Statistics Division.  
Ley, D. (1986). Alternative explanations for inner-city gentrification: A Canadian 
assessment. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 76(4), 521-535.  
Li, T. M. (2007). The will to improve: Governmentality, development, and the practice of 
politics Duke University Press.  
Loewen, J. W. (2005). Sundown towns: A hidden dimension of American racism The 
New Press.  
 
303	
Logan, J. R., Molotch, H. L., Fainstein, S., & Campbell, S. (1987). The city as a growth 
machine  
Logan, J., & Molotch, H. (1987). Urban fortunes. The Political Economy of Place. 
Berkeley, University of California,  
Lopez, G. P. (1992). Economic development in the murder capital of the nation. 
Tenn.L.Rev., 60, 685.  
Lovell, A. (2005, September). Smooth operator. Private Equity Real Estate, 1 issue 6, 22.  
Lowe, R. (1989).  Dunnmeyer high school and the struggle for racial justice in the 
redwood union High school District. Unpublished PhD, Stanford University, Palo 
Alto, CA.  
Loyd, J., Mitchelson, M., & Brundridge, A .,(Eds.). (2013). Beyond Walls and Cages: 
Prisons, Borders and Global Crisis. University of Georgia. 
Macdonald, I. T. (2011). Bargaining for rights in luxury city: The strategic dilemmas of 
organized Labor’s urban turn Labor Studies Journal, 36(2), 197.  
Malanga, S. (2013). The pension fund that ate California. City Journal, 23  
Maliska, Barbara., Elam, Harry Justin., Levin, Michael., Brink, Nancy., Stanford 
University., Libraries., Academic Software Development., Stanford University., 
Committee on Black Performing Arts., University of California, Berkeley.,Center for 
Media and Independent Learning.,. (1996). Dreams of a city : Creating East Palo 
Alto. Berkeley, CA: University of California Extension, Center for Media and 
Independent Learning [distributor].  
 
304	
Marciano, R., Goldberg, D. & Hou, C. "T-RACES: A testbed for the redlining archives of 
California's exclusionary spaces"., 2012, from http://salt.umd.edu/T-
RACES/references.html  
Marcuse, P. (1973). The rise of tenant organizations. Housing Urban America, 3, 49.  
Marcuse, P. (1980). Housing in early city planning. Journal of Urban History, 6(2), 153.  
Marcuse, P. (1985). Gentrification, abandonment, and displacement: Connections, 
causes, and policy responses in new york city. Wash.UJ Urb.& Contemp.L., 28, 195.  
Marcuse, P. (1999). "Housing movements in the USA". Housing, Theory and Society, 16, 
67.  
Marcuse, P., Smith, N., & Williams, P. (1986). Abandonment, gentrification, and 
displacement: The linkages in new york city  
Marcuse, P. (2016). Gentrification, social justice and personal ethics. International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research,  
Márquez, J. D. (2012). The Black Mohicans: Representations of everyday violence in 
postracial urban America. American Quarterly, 64(3), 625-651.  
Marwell, N. P. (2004). Privatizing the welfare state: Nonprofit community-based 
organizations as political actors. American Sociological Review, 69(2), 265-291.  
Mayer, M. (1999). “Urban movements and urban theory in the late-20th-century city”. In 
S. Body-Gendrot, & R. A. Beauregard (Eds.), The urban moment : Cosmopolitan 
essays on the late-20th-century city (pp. 185). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications.  
Mayer, M. (2009). The ‘Right to the City’ in the context of shifting mottos of urban 
social movements. City, 13(2-3), 362-374.  
 
305	
McAdam, D. (2010). Political process and the development of Black insurgency, 1930-
1970 University of Chicago Press.  
McAlevey, J. (2015). The crisis of new labor and Alinsky’s legacy revisiting the role of 
the organic grassroots leaders in building powerful organizations and movements. 
Politics & Society, 0032329215584767.  
McCallum, J. K. (2013). Global unions, local power: The new spirit of transnational 
labor organizing Cornell University Press.  
McCann, M., & Wheeler, S. (2011). Gender diversity in the FTSE 100: The business case 
claim explored. Journal of Law and Society, 38(4), 542-574.  
McCook, M. (March 29, 2006). Fair political practices commission of California, 
statement of economic interests form 700.  
McCook, M. (May 25, 2006). Fair political practices commission of California, 
statement of economic interests form 700  
McCook, M. (November 6, 2006). Fair political practices commission of California, 
statement of economic interests form 700   
McKittrick, K., & Woods, C. A. (2007). Black geographies and the politics of place 
JSTOR.  
McQuarrie, M., & Marwell, N. P. (2009). The missing organizational dimension in urban 
sociology. City & Community, 8(3), 247-268.  
Measure E: City of East Palo Alto Drug and Violence-Free Homes Act, (2006).  
Michelson, A., & Solomonson, K. (1997). Remnants of a failed utopia: Reconstructing 
runnymede's agricultural landscape. Perspectives in Vernacular Architecture, 6, 3-
20.  
 
306	
Michelson, A., & Solomonson, K. (1997). Remnants of a failed utopia: Reconstructing 
runnymede's agricultural landscape. Perspectives in Vernacular Architecture, 6, 3-
20.  
Milkman, R. (2006). LA story: Immigrant workers and the future of the US labor 
movement Russell Sage Foundation.  
Miller, M., & Schutz, A. (2014). People power: The community organizing tradition of 
saul alinsky Vanderbilt University Press.  
Minsky, H. P. (1990). Money manager capitalism, fiscal independence and international 
monetary reconstruction. The Future of the Global Economic and Monetary System, 
, 209-218.  
Mintz, J. (2014). Local government solutions to household financial instability: The 
supervitamin effect. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Community Investment, 
26(6), 16-19.  
Mitchell, D. (2003). The right to the city. Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space, , 
32.  
Montagne, S. (2016). The boundaries of finance as zones of conflicts. The Routledge 
Companion to Banking Regulation and Reform,  
Montezuma, J. (2004). Housing investment in an institutional portfolio context: A review 
of the issues. Property Management, 22(3), 230-249.  
Moody's Investors Service. (2014, March 6). Moody's sees growth for single family 
rental securitizations; outlines rating approach. Message posted to 
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-sees-growth-for-single-family-rental-
securitizations-outlines-rating--PR_294410  
 
307	
Moraga, C. (2002). Watsonville: Some place not here; circle in the dirt: El pueblo de 
East Palo Alto West End Press.  
Morris, A. (1984). The origins of the civil rights movement. The Free Press 
Moskovitz, M. (2010). The great rent control war. Publications. Paper 159 
 
Moynihan, D. P. (1997). The negro family: The case for national action (1965). African 
American Male Research. 
Munnell, A. H., & Quinby, L. (2012). Legal constraints on changes in state and local 
pensions. State and Local Issue in Brief, 25  
Muñoz, C. B. (2008). Transnational tortillas: Race, gender, and shop-floor politics in 
mexico and the united states Cornell University Press.  
National Multifamily Housing Council. (2015). Capital flows to the multifamily market. 
Neagu, G. (1972). Tenant power in public housing—The east park manor rent strike. 
Tenants and the urban housing crisis. Burghardt, St. (Ed.) The New Press. 
Newman, K., & Wyly, E. (2006). The right to stay put, revisited: Gentrification and 
resistance to displacement in new york city Urban Studies, 43(1), 23-57.  
Nothaft, F., & Freund, J. (2009). The evolution of securitization in multifamily mortgage 
markets and its effect on lending rates. Journal of Real Estate Research. 
Nugent, D., & Vincent, J. (2008). A companion to the anthropology of politics John 
Wiley & Sons.  
Office of the New York City Comptroller William C. Thompson Jr. (February 28, 2008). 
"Thompson and New York City pension funds announce effort to protect affordable 
housing in New York City". New York, New York:  
 
308	
Oliver, M. L., & Shapiro, T. M. (2006). Black wealth, white wealth: A new perspective on 
racial inequality Taylor & Francis.  
Olmsted, F. L. (1919). Lessons from housing developments of the united states housing 
corporation. Monthly Labor Review, 8(5), 27-38.  
Omni, M., & Winant, H. (1994). Racial formation in the United States. N.York: 
Routledge,  
Ong, A. (2006). Neoliberalism as exception: Mutations in citizenship and sovereignty 
Duke University Press.  
Otto, W., & Stockbridge Capital Group. (2009). In Shore J. (Ed.), Email correspondence. 
Page Mill Fund II. (November 13, 2007). Presentation hand-out to investors. 
Unpublished manuscript.  
Page Mill Invests in East Palo Alto.(2008, October). Apartment Management Magazine,  
Page Mill Properties. Retrieved June 10, 2013, from http://www.pagemill.com  
Page Mill Properties. (March 20, 2009). Notice to cease: Janet Boggs.  
Page Mill Properties II, L.P. (July 26, 2006). Agreement of limited partnership between 
Page Mill Properties II.  
Page Mill Properties.“Page mill fund II and Page Mill Access Fund, Page Mill 
Properties annual investor meeting”. (Nov. 13, 2007).  
Panel, C. (2010). Commercial real estate losses and the risk to financial stability. 
February Oversight Report 
Parson, D. (1984). Organized labor and the housing question: Public housing, 
suburbanization, and urban renewal. Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space, 2(1), 75-86.  
 
309	
Patillo, M. (2007). Black on the block: The politics of race and class in the city. 
University of Chicago. 
Peck, J., & Tickell, A. (2003). Neoliberalizing space. Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban 
Restructuring in North America and Western Europe, , 33-57.  
Pederson, R. (2001). Alien land laws, santa cruz county history - santa cruz public 
libraries  
Perkins, H. A., (1990). One of the songs of Zion: Incorporation and community in East 
Palo Alto. PhD Dissertation. University of California, Santa Cruz. 
Perlberg, H., & Gittelsohn. (2014, February 21). Wall street landlords buy bad loans for 
cheaper homes. Bloomberg,  
Peterson, J. (2010, April 19,). CalPERS changes multifamily investment policy. San 
Francisco Registry Bay Area Real Estate News. 
Pincus, A. (2007, September 24). Public money helps fund expensive housing flip. CIty 
Limits,  
Pincus, A. (2009, April 27). Focused on quality of life, HPD tracks over-leveraged 
apartments. The Real Deal,  
Pisani, D. J. (1996). Water, land, and law in the west: The limits of public policy, 1850-
1920 Univ Pr of Kansas.  
Piven, F. F. (2006). Challenging authority: How ordinary people change America 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.  
Piven, F. F. (2008). Can power from below change the world? American Sociological 
Review, 73(1), 1-14.  
 
310	
Piven, F. F., & Cloward, R. (1977). Poor people's movements (new york. Pantheon, 
101(2)  
Piven, F. F., & Cloward, R. A. (1967). The case against urban desegregation. Social 
Work, 12(1), 12-21.  
Piven, F. F., & Cloward, R. A. (1967). Rent strike. New Republic, 157(23), 11-15.  
Piven, F. F., & Cloward, R. A. (2000). Power repertoires and globalization. Politics & 
Society, 28(3), 413-430.  
Plasencia, F. J., & CalPERS Legal Office. (2008). In Bernstein-Wax J., Reporter, Daily 
News, Bay Area News Group (Eds.), Public records act / page mill properties II. 
Sacramento, CA:  
Postero, N. G. (2007). Now we are citizens: Indigenous politics in postmulticultural 
bolivia Stanford University Press.  
powell, j. a. (2009). Breakthrough communities: Sustainability and justice in the next 
American metropolis. In M. Pavel (Ed.), MIT Press.  
Powell, W. W., & Steinberg, R. (2006). The nonprofit sector: A research handbook Yale 
University Press.  
Price Waterhouse Coopers, L. (2008). Proprietary and confidential report of independent 
auditors: Page mill properties, LP and page mill access, PIV, LLC. San Francisco, 
CA:  
Price Waterhouse Coopers, L. (March, 2008). Proprietary and confidential notes to the 
combined consolidated financial statements, PMP II, L.P. and PMP access PIV, 
LLC  
 
311	
Pritchett, W. E. (2010). Robert Clifton Weaver and the American city: The life and times 
of an urban reformer University of Chicago Press.  
Pulido, L. (2000). Rethinking environmental racism: White privilege and urban 
development in southern California. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers, 90(1), 12-40.  
Purcell, M. (2002). Excavating Lefebvre: The right to the city and its urban politics of the 
inhabitant. Geojournal, 58(2-3), 99-108.  
Purcell, M. (2006). Urban democracy and the local trap. Urban Studies, 43(11), 1921-
1941.  
Purcell, M., (2008). Recapturing democracy: Neoliberalization and the struggle for 
alternative urban futures Routledge.  
Rabourn, M. (2008). Organized labor in residential construction. Labor Studies Journal, 
33(1), 9.  
Radford, G. (1996). Modern housing for America: Policy struggles in the new deal era 
University of Chicago Press.  
Raimi + Associates. (2014). Existing conditions report: East Palo Alto general plan 
update. East Palo Alto, CA: Raimi + Associates.  
Real Estate Alert. Retrieved March 4, 2009, from https://www.realert.com/  
Rediker, M. (2007). The slave ship: A human history Penguin.  
Reed, A. L. (1999). Without justice for all: The new liberalism and our retreat from 
racial equality Westview Press.  
Riddle, R. T. (2009, November). The pension fund evictions. San Francisco Bay 
Guardian,  
 
312	
Rigenhagen, R. (1993). A history of East Palo Alto Romic Chemical Corporation.  
Robinson, C. J. (1983). Black marxism: The making of the Black radical tradition Univ 
of North Carolina Press.  
Robinson, E., & Marois, M. (2010). Cleaning up Calpers. Bloomberg Markets, 19(10), 
52.  
Robinson, G. (2012). Pacific citizens: Larry and Guyo Tajiri and japanese American 
journalism in the World War II era University of Illinois Press.  
Rolnik, R. (2013). Late neoliberalism: The financialization of homeownership and 
housing rights. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 37(3), 1058-
1066.  
Rolnik, R. (2014). Place, inhabitance and citizenship: The right to housing and the right 
to the city in the contemporary urban world. International Journal of Housing 
Policy, 14(3), 293-300.  
Rossi, U. (2013). On life as a fictitious commodity: Cities and the biopolitics of late 
neoliberalism. Int J Urban Reg Res, 37(3), 1067-1074.  
Rost, J., Fernandez, A., & McCook, M. (2004). In Members of the Investment 
Committee, CalPERS (Ed.), Agenda item 5A, CalPERS delegation authority 
clarification - opportunistic program  
Ruffin, H. G. (2014). Uninvited neighbors: African Americans in Silicon Valley, 1769–
1990 University of Oklahoma Press.  
Rugh, J. S., & Massey, D. S. (2010). Racial segregation and the American foreclosure 
crisis. American Sociological Review, 75(5), 629-651.  
 
313	
Saegert, S. (2006). Building civic capacity in urban neighborhoods: An empirically 
grounded anatomy. Journal of Urban Affairs, 28(3), 275-294.  
Saegert, S., & Winkel, G. (1998). Social capital and the revitalization of new york city's 
distressed inner‐city housing. Housing Policy Debate, 9(1), 17-60.  
Samara, T. (2007). Right to the city: Notes from the inaugural convening. Japanese 
American Cultural Center, Little Tokyo, Los Angeles. pp. 1.  
Samara, T. R. (2014). Housing demolition and the right to place. Polis, 6  
Samara, T. R. (2015). The age of the renter. Metropolitics 
San Francisco Strike Daily. (1968). San Francisco State, archives.  
San Mateo County (Calif.), Menlo Park (Calif.), (1963). The city of East Palo Alto 
Community Plan  
San Mateo County (Calif.), Menlo Park (Calif.), (1968). Model cities grant application; 
final draft.   
San Mateo County (Calif.).,Planning and Development Division.,. (1981). East Palo Alto 
community plan and environmental impact report : Hearing draft, july 1981. San 
Mateo County: The Division.  
Superior Court of California Count of Santa Clara, Declaration. CV 117360 (September 
10, 2008).  
Taran, D. Superior Court of the State of California. Declaration, (August, 18, 2009). Case 
no. CIV 478796, 3. 
San Mateo County Local Agency Formation Commission. (October 15, 2009). Service 
review, sphere of influence.  
 
314	
San Mateo County Planning Commission. (1963). A general plan for East Palo Alto. 
[Redwood City, Calif.]: The Commission.  
Sassen, S. (1991). The global city: New York, London, Tokyo. NJ: Princeton,  
Sassen, S. (2008). Mortgage capital and its particularities: A new frontier for global 
finance. Journal of International Affairs,187-212.  
Sassen, S. (2004). Local actors in global politics. Current Sociology, 52(4), 649-670.  
Sassen, S. (2005). Regulating immigration in a global age: A new policy landscape 1. 
Parallax, 11(1), 35-45.  
Sassen, S. (2005). The repositioning of citizenship and alienage: Emergent subjects and 
spaces for politics. Globalizations, 2(1), 79-94.  
Saunders, P. (1984). Beyond housing classes: The sociological significance of private 
property rights in means of consumption. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research, 8(2), 202-227.  
Schafran, A., & Wegmann, J. (2012). Restructuring, race, and real estate: Changing home 
values and the new California metropolis, 1989-2010. Urban Geography, 33(5), 
630-654.  
Schneider, G. A. (1927). California real estate principles and practices Prentice-Hall, 
Incorporated.  
Scott Armstrong Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor. (1994, Feb 14, 1994). 
East Palo Alto takes back its mean streets. The Christian Science Monitor (1908-
Current File), pp. 8.  
Security and Exchange Commission. (2002). Form D: Notice of sale of securities, Page 
mill Properties, L.P.  
 
315	
Security and Exchange Commission. (2003). Form D, notice of sales of securities: Page 
mill Properties 1.  
Sedway/Cooke (Firm). (1970). East Palo Alto neighborhood development program : 
Project area 1 urban renewal plan. San Francisco, Calif.: Sedway/Cooke.  
Service Employees’ International Union (SEIU), Local 521. Resolution Against 
CalPERS Investment in Predatory Real Estate, Executive Board Cong. (2008).  
Shemtov, R. (2003). Social networks and sustained activism in local NIMBY campaigns. 
Sociological Forum, 18(2), 215-244.  
Sheyner, G. (2009, March 11). Tenants win suit against Page Mill. Palo Alto Weekly,  
Shore, J. (2009). In Otto W., Stockbridge Capital Group(Eds.), "New strategy" 
correspondence  
Shore, J. (2009). In Weir L., California Public Employees Retirement System Real Estate 
Unit(Eds.), Correspondence  
Shore, J., & Page Mill Fund II. (April 29, 2009). In Weir L. (Ed.), Letter. Palo Alto, CA:  
Silver, B. J. (2003). Forces of labor: Workers' movements and globalization since 1870 
Cambridge University Press.  
Simone, A. (2015). Drawing lines: A response to Adrian Parrs 'urban debt, neoliberalism 
and the politics of the commons. Theory, Culture & Society, 32(7-8), 309-316.  
Situs Strategic Advisors. (2006). In CalPERS (Ed.), Confidential summary report on the 
due diligence of page mill properties fund II (July 27 ed.)  
Skeel Jr, D. A. (2012). States of bankruptcy. The University of Chicago Law Review, 
677-735.  
 
316	
Slater, J. (1971, September 11). Learning is an all-Black thing. Ebony Magazine, XXVI, 
88.  
Slater, T. (2008). ‘A literal necessity to be Re‐Placed’: A rejoinder to the gentrification 
debate. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 32(1), 212-223.  
Smith, N. (1984). Uneven development: Nature. Capital, and the Production of Space,  
Smith, N. (1987). Gentrification and the rent gap. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers, 77(3), 462-465.  
Smith, N. (1992). Contours of a spatialized politics: Homeless vehicles and the 
production of geographical scale. Social Text, (33), 55-81.  
Smith, N. (1996). The new urban frontier: Gentrification and the revanchist city 
Psychology Press.  
Smith, N. (2002). New globalism, new urbanism: Gentrification as global urban strategy. 
Antipode, 34(3), 427-450.  
Smith, N., & DeFilippis, J. (1999). The reassertion of economics: 1990s gentrification in 
the lower east side. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 23(4), 
638-653.  
Soureli, K., & Youn, E. (2009). Urban restructuring and the crisis: A symposium with 
Neil Brenner, John Friedmann, Margit Mayer, Allen J. Scott, and Edward W. Soja. 
Critical Planning, 16(1), 35-59.  
Special to The New York Times. (1972, Aug 7, 1972). Community program on coast 
seeks to make punishment fit young offenders. New York Times (1923-Current File), 
pp. 13.  
 
317	
Square, Milner, Peterson, Miranda and Williamson, LLP. (February 29, 2008). In Jensen, 
Larry, Chief Officer of Audit Services (Ed.), Independent accountants' report on 
applying agreed-upon procedures. Newport Beach, Californai:  
Squires, C. R. (2012). Coloring in the bubble: Perspectives from Black-oriented media on 
the (latest) economic disaster. American Quarterly, 64(3), 543-570.  
Stabilizing New York City Coalition. (2016). "Banking on gentrification". New York, 
New York: Stabilizing New York City Coalition.  
Stanton, R., & Wallace, N. (2012). CMBS subordination, ratings inflation, and 
regulatory-capital arbitrage.  
Stein, M. (1987, Jan 21,). East Palo Alto--more ghetto than glitter for a minority city. Los 
Angeles Times (1923-Current File), pp. 7.  
Stepan-Norris, J., & Zeitlin, M. (2003). Left out: Reds and America's industrial unions 
Cambridge University Press.  
Stockbridge Capital Group. (July 28, 2009). CalPERS, real estate unit Page Mill 
summary and update  
Stockbridge Capital Group. (June 8, 2009). Page mill summary and update report  
Stockbridge Capital Group, & Otto, W. (2009). In Page Mill Properties II, L.P. (Ed.), 
Correspondence.  
Stockbridge Capital Group, & Otto, W. (2009). In Brand D., Weir L. and Placencia 
J.(Eds.), Organizational chart. electronic communication.  
Sumka, H. J. (1979). Neighborhood revitalization and displacement A review of the 
evidence. Journal of the American Planning Association, 45(4), 480-487.  
 
318	
Sunstar Properties L.P. (2006). In McNeill J., CalPERS(Eds.), Private placement 
confidential offering memorandum, Sunstar Properties L.P.  
Superior Court of the State of California. Case no. CIV 487 665, (October 28, 2009).  
Order Granting Writ of Mandate, First Amendment Coalition v. California Public 
Employees' Retirement System, CP-10-510552, (September 14, 2010).  
Superior Court of the State of California.  Case no. 478796, (September 1, 2009).  
Table: Top bonus earners at CalPERS, CalSTERS.(2010, April 19). Pensions and 
Investments,  
Taran, D. (2009). In California Public Employees Retirement System Real Estate Unit, 
Weir L.(Eds.), Email.  
Taran, D. (February, 2009). In California Public Employees Retirement System Real 
Estate Unit (Ed.), Letter of correspondence to CalPERS  
Taran, D. (February 6, 2009). In Eliopoulos T. (Ed.), Letter to CalPERS Page Mill 
Properties.  
Taran, D. (June 30, 2009). In San Mateo County Local Agency Formation Commission 
(Ed.), Letter to the san mateo county local agency formation commission  
Taran, D. (March 23, 2009). In The Honorable Ruben Abrica (Ed.), Letter from 
woodland park management, LLC. Palo Alto, CA:  
Taran, D. (May, 2009). In Weir L., California Public Employees Retirement System Real 
Estate Unit(Eds.), Correspondence.  
Taran, D., & Page Mill Properties II GP LLC. (2009). In California Public Employees 
Retirement System, Investment Office Staff (Ed.), Page mill properties II LP 
funding notice no 4-june 162009  
 
319	
Tenants Together. (2014, June 2,). Page mill. Message posted to 
http://tenantstogether.org/article.php?id=1174  
Tenants Together. (2016). National rent control tool kit Tenants Together; Right to the 
City.  
Tenants Together. (July 25, 2010). In Wells Fargo (Ed.), Letter  
Teresa, B. F. (2015). Managing fictitious capital: The legal geography of investment and 
political struggle in rental housing in New York City. Environment and Planning A,, 
0308518X15598322.  
Thallum, S. (2012). Understanding the Multifamily Mortgage market American Action 
Forum (August). http://www.americanactionforum.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/default/files/Multifamily%20Mortgage%20Market.pdf 
Theodore, N., Valenzuela, A., & Meléndez, E. (2006). La esquina (the corner): Day 
laborers on the margins of new york's formal economy. Workingusa, 9(4), 407-423.  
Theoharis, J. (2006). ‘Alabama on avalon’: Rethinking the Watts uprising and the 
character of Black protest in Los Angeles. The Black Power Movement: Rethinking 
the Civil Rights-Black Power Era, 27-53.  
Thompson, J. (2007). In The City of East Palo Alto (Ed.), Letter to the city of East Palo 
Alto, (December 12).  
Tilly, C. (2005). Social movements, 1768-2004. Routledge. 
Tonello, M., & Stephan, R. (2010). The 2010 institutional investment report: Trends in 
asset allocation and portfolio composition.  
Tyner, J. A. (2006). “Defend the ghetto”: Space and the urban politics of the Black 
panther party. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 96(1), 105-118.  
 
320	
U.S. House of Representatives. (1884).  No. 1448.  
United States Commission on Civil Rights.,. (1967). A time to listen ... a time to act : 
Voices from the ghettos of the nation's cities. Washington: [Supt. of Docs., U.S. 
Govt. Print. Off.].  
Vigdor, J. L., Massey, D. S., & Rivlin, A. M. (2002). Does gentrification harm the poor? 
[with comments]. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs, 133-182.  
Vogel, D. (2007). The market for virtue: The potential and limits of corporate social 
responsibility Brookings Institution Press.  
Voorhes, M. (2015). Responsible investment in the United States. The Routledge 
Handbook of Responsible Investment, , 58.  
Voss, K., & Sherman, R. (2000). Breaking the iron law of oligarchy: Union revitalization 
in the American labor movement1. American Journal of Sociology, 106(2), 303-349.  
Wachovia National Bank Association. (2007). Loan agreement between Old York 
Financial Services LLC, et. al. and Wachovia Bank National Association (june 21).  
Wacquant, L. (2008). Urban outcasts: A comparative sociology of advanced marginality 
Polity.  
Walsh, M. W. (2003). New rules urged to avert looming pension crisis. New York Times, 
A1.  
Wassmer, R. W. (2002). Fiscalisation of land use, urban growth boundaries and non-
central retail sprawl in the western united states. Urban Studies, 39(8), 1307-1327.  
Weber, R. (2002). Extracting value from the city: Neoliberalism and urban 
redevelopment. Antipode, 34(3), 519-540.  
 
321	
Weber, R. (2010). Selling city futures: The financialization of urban redevelopment 
policy. Economic Geography, 86(3), 251-274.  
Wei, L., & Hilsenrath, J. (2008, December 22). Developers ask U.S. for bailout as 
massive debt looms. Wall Street Journal,  
Weil, D., Graham, M., & Fung, A. (2013). Targeting transparency. Science, 340(6139), 
1410-1411.  
Williams, D., & Youth United for Community Action. (January 15, 2009). In Weir L., 
California Public Employees Retirement System Real Estate Unit(Eds.), Email 
correspondence  
Wolfe, P. (1999). Settler colonialism A&C Black.  
Wolfe, P. (2016). Traces of history: Elementary structures of race Verso Books.  
Woods, C., & McKittrick, K (Eds.). (2007). Black geographies and the politics of place. 
Woods. 
Wright, E. O. (2000). Working-class power, capitalist-class interests, and class 
compromise. American Journal of Sociology, , 957-1002.  
Wrong, D. H. (1980). Power: Its forms, bases, and uses Transaction publishers.  
Wyly , E., Moos, M., Hammel, D., & Kabahizi, E. (2009). Cartographies of race and 
class: Mapping the class-monopoly rents of American subprime mortgage capital. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 33(2), 332-354.  
Wyly, E., Ponder, C., Nettling, P., Ho, B., Fung, S. E., Liebowitz, Z., et al. (2012). New 
racial meanings of housing in America. American Quarterly, 64(3), 571-604.  
Yalamanchili, K. K. (2016). Single-family rental securitizations: Residential wine in a 
commercial bottle. The Journal of Structured Finance, 21(4), 15-19.  
 
322	
Youth United for Community Action. (2008). Homeless now. East Palo Alto, CA: 
YUCA.  
Zald, M. N., & McCarthy, J. D. (1979). The dynamics of social movements: Resource 
mobilization, social control, and tactics Little Brown & Co.  
Zalewski, D. A. (2002). Retirement insecurity in the age of money-manager capitalism. 
Journal of Economic Issues (Association for Evolutionary Economics), 36(2), 349.  
Zimmer, A. (2016). 3 ways the city council wants to curb tenant harassment and 
evictions. DNA Info.  (Oct 31). from https://www.dnainfo.com/new-
york/20161031/belmont/tenant-evictions-predatory-equity-renting-apartment-city-
council-nyc 
Zukin, S. (1982). Loft living as ‘historic compromise’in the urban core: The new york 
experience. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 6(2), 256-267.  
Zukin, S. (1987). Gentrification: Culture and capital in the urban core. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 129-147. 
 
323	
 
 
																																																								
